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Abstract 
This research project investigates the governing of Europe’s external border. It 
analyses how the common Schengen short-stay visa policy has been applied in 
practice by member states in the period from 2005 to 2010. So far, little 
systematic theoretical and empirical research has been carried out on the 
implementation of Schengen. The contributions of the thesis are two-fold. Firstly, 
it makes available a comprehensive and easily accessible database on the visa 
requirements, issuing-practices and consular representation of EU states in all 
third countries. It enables researchers to map out and compare how restrictively 
the visa policy is implemented by different member states and across sending 
countries. Secondly, the project provides three separate papers that in different 
ways make use of the database to explore and explain the varying openness of 
Europe’s border and dynamics of cooperation among member states. The three 
papers are tied together by a framework conceptualising Schengen as a border 
regime with two key dimensions: restrictiveness and integration. 
 
The first paper asks to what extent, and why, Europe’s border is more open to 
visitors of some nationalities rather than others. The second paper investigates to 
what extent, and why, EU states cooperate on sharing consular facilities in the 
visa-issuing process. The third paper examines to what extent, and why, Schengen 
participation has a restrictive impact on the visa-issuing practices of member 
countries. The analyses test existing theories and develop new concepts and 
models. The three papers engage with rationalist and constructivist theories and 
seek to assess their relative explanatory power. In doing so, the project makes use 
of different quantitative comparative approaches. It employs regression analysis, 
social network analytical tools and quasi-experimental design. Overall, the thesis 
concludes that Schengen is characterized by extensive cooperation and restrictive 
practices towards especially visitors from poor, Muslim-majority and refugee-
producing countries. 
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…I may be utterly convinced of the truth of a statement; certain of the evidence of 
my perceptions; overwhelmed by the intensity of my experience; every doubt may 
seem to me absurd. But does this afford the slightest reason for science to accept 
my statement? (Popper 2002: 24f) 
 
 
 
Hostility to one people intruding into another’s territory is an almost universal 
phenomenon. Individuals and temporary residents may be tolerated, even 
welcomed, but the arrival of large numbers of people, with a sense of identity and 
solidarity, is usually regarded as a threat. Frontiers have been established and 
clearly marked in order to prevent such intrusions; they have always had the 
general purpose of controlling or preventing the movement of people. (Anderson 
1996: 149) 
 
 
 
States’ ability to “embrace” their own subjects and to make distinctions between 
nationals and non-nationals, and to track the movements of persons in order to 
sustain the boundary between these two groups (whether at the border or not), has 
depended to a considerable extent on the creation of documents that make the 
relevant differences knowable and thus enforceable. (Torpey 2000a: 2) 
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Preface 
In contemporary Europe, internal borders have been physically dismantled across 
most of the continent and common rules put in place to regulate the entry of 
visitors. This regional free travel area is usually referred to as the Schengen 
cooperation. It has generated considerable public debate. Supporters of the policy 
see it as a key symbol of the unification and stabilisation of the continent 
following the Second World War and the fall of the Berlin Wall. Critics stress that 
common border policies infringe on state sovereignty and endanger national 
identity.  
 
That border cooperation should be controversial is not surprising. The 
development of passports, visas and the guarding of territorial frontiers play a 
central role in processes of state formation. These practices help to establish who 
is present within a polity and determine their status as citizens, residents or 
temporary visitors. Border control is thus important to the on-going construction 
and policing of national identity and state sovereignty. Hence, understanding how 
new border policies are carried out is relevant to grasping the character of a 
political community and identifying potential trajectories for future developments.  
 
Starting off from this assumption, this study seeks to improve our knowledge of 
how the Schengen cooperation is in practice being implemented by European 
public authorities. I focus on the external border, specifically the application of 
short-stay entry visa rules, and seek to explore and explain patterns of 
restrictiveness and dynamics of cooperation characterizing the common policy. 
This is done via quantitative methods, making use of a new comprehensive 
database developed for the project detailing visa requirements, visa-issuing 
practices and consular representation abroad in the period from 2005 to 2010. The 
project consists of three separate but linked papers. The database and background 
material for the individual analyses are available at www.mogenshobolth.dk/evd. 
 
The first paper focuses on restrictiveness. It explores the question why the 
openness of the external border varies for different nationalities. Borders differ in 
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their permeability; they are neither open nor closed but selectively crossable for 
varying groups of persons. Nationals of Chile, for example, can travel freely to 
Europe whereas Peruvian citizens need a visa. Russian visa applications are 
seldom refused while Egyptian entry requests often are. How can we make sense 
of these differences? I develop and test a security theoretical explanation of 
variation stressing migration fears and a rival interest group account focusing on 
business lobbying. The conclusion, based on linear regression analysis, is that the 
former holds the most explanatory purchase. The main driver of variation in 
openness is concerns over migration from poor, refugee-producing and Muslim-
majority countries.  
 
The second paper concentrates on cooperation patterns. Visa applications are 
inspected abroad, and the Schengen rules enable the members to make use of each 
other’s consular facilities for doing so. I analyse how and to what extent the 
participating states in practice enter into cooperative agreements. Using 
descriptive statistics and social network analytical tools, I show that collaboration 
is extensive and structured in territorial clusters. The Nordic countries, for 
example, cooperate internally but in general not with Southern European states. I 
advance and develop the concept of ‘regional imagined communities’ to explain 
the pattern. It highlights the importance of shared identities founded in similarities 
in language, culture and state-building trajectory as a basis for the development of 
cooperation on border control.  
 
The third paper investigates restrictiveness and cooperation in combination. It 
explores how, if at all, Schengen participation has an impact on the openness of 
domestic borders. Is Europe’s frontier more closed to visitors from the outside as 
a result of EU-integration, or is cooperation in this field without significant 
effects? I approach this question using institutional theory. I set out a rational 
choice explanation highlighting that liberal states have little incentive to cooperate 
with restrictive partners. This I contrast with a sociological institutional model 
emphasising restrictive norms and informal mechanisms ensuring their diffusion 
and uptake. I test these two arguments empirically through a quasi-experimental 
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study of the enlargement of Schengen with the Central and Eastern European 
countries. I show that integration had a marked restrictive impact on domestic 
visa-issuing practices lending support to sociological institutionalism. 
 
Existing research conceptualize Schengen as a border regime with both 
supranational and intergovernmental governance and varying degrees of openness 
towards outsiders. Drawing the three papers together, I develop this framework 
further to advance our understanding of the dynamics and patterns within this 
mixed regime. What nationals are allowed easy entry and which are not? Do 
member states coordinate and adhere to the common rules when carrying out the 
Union’s visa policy? The model I set up distinguishes between, on the one hand, 
civic and ethnic forms of entry selectivity and, on the other hand, conflictual and 
cooperative implementation practices. Based on the findings of the three papers, I 
argue that the European border regime is characterized by extensive cooperation 
and displays evidence of an ethnic mode of regulating access. Taken together this 
reflects what I term a ‘communitarian Europe’. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Border control cooperation in the European Union 
 
 
1. Research theme 
The borders of Europe used to be governed by a wide variety of national legal 
rules and practices (Anderson 1996; Anderson et al. 2000). In the mid-1990s, for 
example, a citizen of Bolivia could freely embark on a trip to Germany, Sweden 
or Spain, but had to apply for a visa beforehand when travelling to Belgium, 
France or Denmark (OJEU 1996). If the visit involved several countries, he or she 
would likely have had to obtain several entry permits and have the papers checked 
at the territorial border of each member state. Today, in marked contrast, uniform 
rules and procedures regulate the entry of foreign visitors to Europe, and internal 
frontiers have been physically dismantled across most of the continent (Lavenex 
2010). This new regional free travel area is usually referred to as the ‘Schengen’ 
cooperation. 
 
The transformation of the borders of Europe has generated considerable public 
debate. Criticism of cooperation is particularly strong on the opposite ends of the 
political spectrum. Left-wing parties, non-governmental pro-migration and 
refugee rights organizations often label it ‘Fortress Europe’. Schengen, from this 
perspective, is about the undermining of civil liberties, the proliferation of new 
forms and sites of police checks, denying asylum-seekers access, and the 
institutionalisation of discrimination and racism towards outsiders (Bigo 1998: 
155-7). Right-wing parties, in contrast, often refer to the cooperation as a form of 
‘sieve Europe’. This frame highlights the eroding effects of EU-integration on 
borders for national identity and sovereignty, and the loss of control caused by the 
dismantling of national frontiers (Bigo 1998: 153-5). Supporters of the project, 
mainly centre-parties and European institutions, present cooperation as a symbol 
of political unification and stabilisation of Europe and a practical means to 
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advance intra-European trade and mobility (COM 2010b; Kunz and Leinonen 
2007). 
 
The establishment of common policies in the area of policing and border control – 
justice and home affairs – thus raises fundamental and interesting questions on the 
character and direction of the European integration process. The political 
contestation surrounding the cooperation mirrors the importance attributed to the 
subject in academic studies of borders and state-making. Establishing and 
exercising control over the ‘coming and going’ of persons play a central role in 
the formation of nation-states (Salter 2003; Torpey 2000a, 2000b, 2003). 
Passports, visas and document inspections are necessary, in practice, to acquire 
knowledge on who is present on a territory and establish who belongs and who 
does not. These mundane actions of classification and sorting of individuals are 
central to the on-going enactment of citizenship, national identity and state 
sovereignty (Anderson 2000: 15).  
 
Practices of control both reflect and shape ideas about the character of polities 
(Anderson 2000: 16). The way border control is set up and carried out is moulded 
by interests and identities at a given time, but can also set a path which makes 
different later changes and actions more or less likely (Hall and Taylor 1996; 
Thelen 2004). The form, scope and depth of the implementation of the new 
European common border policy are thus important to study. Grasping the 
structure put in place help to understand contemporary state formation processes 
in Europe and potential future trajectories. 
 
Existing political science research has first and foremost provided a set of 
analyses of why cooperation was initially established (Bigo 2000; Guiraudon 
2003; Monar 2001; Munster 2009; Niemann 2008; Ruben 2008; Stetter 2000). It 
has specified main drivers leading to the agreement to coordinate policies. The 
dynamics identified are manifold ranging from spill-over effects from the 
establishment of the single market, over strategic behaviour of state officials and 
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rational attempts to solve complex collective action problems, to evolutionary 
struggles between different cultures of control.  
 
Turning to the implementation of Schengen, systematic and in-depth studies are 
largely absent. We thus know surprisingly little about how European border 
control cooperation works in practice. Existing analyses have established 
theoretical typologies of border regimes using contemporary events and trends to 
illustrate features of the arguments (Berg and Ehin 2006; Grabbe 2000; Mau 
2006; Zielonka 2001). A key focus of empirical conjecturing has been Eastern 
Europe and the implications of the enlargement of the European Union. The main 
conclusion of these studies is that the picture is mixed: the new border regime is 
neither supranational nor national and frontiers neither open nor closed (See also 
Mau 2010; Mau et al. 2012; Mau et al. 2008). Legislative rules, for example, are 
negotiated at the European level but the implementation is left to the member 
states. Nationals of Indonesia need to obtain a visa to travel to Europe whereas 
Malaysian citizens do not. Visa applications from Russia are seldom refused 
whereas entry requests lodged in Algeria often are. European borders are, thus, 
selective in who they seek to allow in and try to exclude, and are governed using a 
combination of supranational and intergovernmental elements.  
 
The main aim of this thesis is to advance and deepen our understanding of what 
characterizes this complex and multifaceted border regime. I seek to map out 
different patterns of restrictiveness, identify dynamics of cooperation, and explain 
why they occur. I do so through a quantitative comparative analysis of the 
implementation of the Schengen cooperation by the member states. Focusing on 
the external border I trace, specifically, how the common visa policy is in practice 
applied and enforced. Visas are a crucial component of the border regime. The 
most extensive control of travellers takes place at diplomatic representations 
during the visa application process (Bigo and Guild 2005). For the majority of 
persons in the world, the borders of Europe are first encountered when they apply 
for an entry permit at consulates abroad (Guild 2003; cf. Zolberg 2003).  
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The two key dimensions at the centre of the analysis are, following the existing 
literature, openness and governance. Why do visitors of some nationalities face 
stringent controls and others not? In what ways, if at all, do member states 
coordinate the execution of the visa policy? Are national borders more closed to 
visitors from the outside as a result of EU cooperation, and why? 
 
By bringing to light and analysing trends in how European visa policy has been 
put into practice, I primarily seek to contribute to the public and academic debate, 
as set out above, on the characteristics of the European border regime. The 
analysis is, however, also of relevance for other bodies of literature. It advances 
our understanding of how visas are used in the context of asylum policy 
(Collinson 1996; Gammeltoft-Hansen 2011; Ryan 2010). A key concern within 
refugee studies is that visa requirements impair the ability of refugees to access 
protection in destination states. Yet to what extent visa rules are actually enforced 
in conflict countries has not been studied in detail. Additionally, policing and 
border control is a largely absent issue area in EU implementation research (Ette 
and Faist 2007; Toshkov 2010; Toshkov et al. 2010; Treib 2008). The study 
provides rare quantitative insight into how a common policy is applied in practice. 
Existing large-N studies almost always focus solely on the extent to which 
member states transpose directives legally and trends in infringement proceedings 
launched by the European Commission (Hartlapp and Falkner 2009; Mastenbroek 
2005). The project thus advances our knowledge of key questions within this 
literature on reasons for similarities and differences in how shared policies are 
actually applied in practice.  
 
2. Research questions 
The thesis seeks to answer the following overarching question: 
 
How, if at all, has the common European visa policy been implemented by the 
Schengen member states, and why? 
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The focus of the project is on the implementation and not the design and 
legislative enactment of Schengen rules. I do not, in other words, seek to uncover 
how integration came about but how it was subsequently put into practice. By 
implementation I understand the processes occurring in between a decision is 
made and the realisation of its end results (Bardach 1977; Hill and Hupe 2002: 2; 
Pressman and Wildavsky 1979). It is important to study what takes place in this 
stage of the policy cycle (May and Wildavsky 1978) because the way in which 
new legislation is realised cannot simply be read off the act. Manifold dynamics 
and processes take place in this phase significantly shaping and altering practices 
and outcomes. 
 
In the thesis I explore the main research question through three separate analyses. 
The specific questions investigated are: 
 
1. How, if at all, does the openness of Schengen member states’ external 
borders to visitors of different nationalities vary, and why? 
 
2. How, if at all, does Schengen member states cooperate in the 
implementation of the common visa policy, and why? 
 
3. How, if at all, does participation in the common visa policy affect the 
openness of Schengen member states’ external borders, and why? 
 
The first question highlights border restrictiveness, openness and permeability. 
How restrictive or lenient are the member states in issuing entry permits? What 
theoretical models are best suited for explaining when they are more or less strict? 
The second question emphasises governance. In what ways do the member states 
cooperate in the execution of the visa policy? Are there any strong patterns in 
their mutual interaction and, if so, what explains this? The third question, finally, 
combines restrictiveness and governance. Is there an impact of participation in 
EU-cooperation on restrictiveness? Are the member states’ borders towards third 
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countries more closed or open as a result of European integration than they would 
otherwise likely be?  
 
The three analyses thus differ in the choice of variables. The first takes as the 
dependent variable restrictiveness; the second governance dynamics. Neither 
focuses on a particular explanatory factor but seek to test and evaluate the 
purchase of a set of theories and variables. The third has restrictiveness as the 
dependent variable and specifically focus on EU-integration as the main 
independent variable of interest.  
 
3. Analytical framework 
Existing research offers a range of theoretical conceptualisations of borders and 
border control. Balibar (2001, 2004), Salter (2005) and Walters (2002, 2004, 
2006) have in different ways tried to develop post-structural approaches. They 
highlight post-colonial relations, genealogical analysis of practices of power and 
rites of passages. These studies provide overall social theories improving our 
understanding of the symbolic meaning of borders. As frameworks for studying 
the practical implementation of the Schengen cooperation they are, however, less 
useful. For this purpose a mid-range theorisation is more suited. Rudolph (2003) 
has developed a classical realist perspective within international relations theory. 
This approach is too state-centric as a general analytics. It rules out a priori that 
polities can change. This is a problematic starting-point as such potential 
transformations are at the centre of interest in European border cooperation. A 
final perspective views borders as institutions and regimes (Anderson 1996; Berg 
and Ehin 2006; Zielonka 2001). This approach has specified a set of key 
operational dimensions of borders and border control, and is open to alterations in 
underlying nation-state political structures. I thus adopt this perspective and 
develop it further.  
 
3.1 Conceptualising border cooperation as a regime 
Zielonka (2001) and Berg and Ehin (2006; Koslowski 1998) view European 
border cooperation as a regime. The term captures governance activities in an 
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environment that is as a starting-point characterized neither by international 
anarchy nor hierarchical relations with a central government (Czempiel and 
Rosenau 1992). But beyond this, how should a regime precisely be understood? 
Zielonka (2001) does not explicitly define the concept while Berg and Ehin 
(2006) refer to a border regime as “a system of control, regulating behaviour at the 
borders”. They do not, however, discuss this formulation further leaving it unclear 
what is meant by for example system. 
 
In regime theory the characteristics of regimes are debated (Kratochwil and 
Ruggie 1986). Phenomena such as regimes, institutions and organizations are 
difficult to pin down and the terminology is often criticised for being unclear 
(Haggard and Simmons 1987; Strange 1982). I here follow Young’s (1982, 1989) 
conceptualisation as set out in Breckinridge (1997: 174): 
 
Oran Young makes a distinction between organizations and 
institutions (of which regimes are a subset): organizations are 
‘material entities possessing physical locations (or seats), offices, 
personnel, equipment, and budgets … generally possess[ing] legal 
personality’ (Young, 1989, p. 32), whereas institutions are ‘social 
practices consisting of easily recognized roles coupled with clusters of 
rules or conventions governing relations among the occupants of these 
roles’ (Young, 1989, p. 32). Furthermore, international institutions can 
be broken down into two subsets: international orders and 
international regimes. The former are broad structures governing a 
wide variety of activities of most or all actors in international society, 
such as the international economic order, and the latter are more 
specific structures governing ‘well-defined activities, resources, or 
geographical areas of only some actors’ (Young, 1989, p. 13). 
 
I find Young’s definition particularly helpful because it clearly distinguishes 
between organisations and institutions, and further sub-divide the latter into orders 
and regimes. An order could for example be international law as a global set of 
rules, roles and codes of conduct. Debates on legality and treaty codifications are 
carried out by almost all participants in global politics and are not confined to 
specific subjects. The scope of regimes is more limited – geographically or 
functionally. Examples include cooperation on the extradition of criminals or the 
Council of Europe system for the mutual recognition of civil law acts such as 
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marriage certificates. Organisations are concrete entities, for example a ministry 
of justice or the national border police, whose officials take on and shape roles, 
rules and codes of conduct defined by orders and regimes when carrying out tasks 
and interacting with partners. 
 
EU integration in the area of borders and border control can be usefully 
conceptualized as a regime. It prescribes the roles of the border police and 
consular services abroad in controlling the movement of temporary travellers. 
Roles are also defined for foreign citizens as for example applicants for a visa and 
short-stay visitors. The regime sets out rules regulating the interaction of the 
participants. It structures in what ways consulates can and should cooperate in 
assessing requests for entry permits. Rules might also specify in what ways 
different actors are entitled and obliged to supervise and monitor how others 
perform their roles. The Schengen border regime is characterized by a focus on 
the regulation of trips of a limited duration. The main aim is not to govern for 
example labour migration or the entry of refugees. However, a key concern within 
the regime might be to screen people in order to establish that visitors do not in 
reality intend to work or stay permanently. 
 
There are different views in the literature on how the practices of organisations 
and individuals – their actions and behaviour – relates to regimes. For instance, is 
the actual issuing of entry permits or exchange of information internal or external 
to a border regime? One position is to view behaviour as exogenous (Keohane 
1984; Krasner 1982). Regimes are thereby turned into explanatory or intervening 
variables. Is, say, the global environmental regime capable of solving collective 
action problems and produce different outcomes than we would otherwise expect? 
Another view is that practices are intrinsic (Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986; Puchala 
and Hopkins 1982). Regimes are here not used as variables but as concepts which 
capture integration in its entirety. I adopt the latter view. This does not mean that 
it is not possible to query in what ways practices alter as rules and roles are 
redefined. The approach adopted here only entails that such questions are not 
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asked as a matter of the effects of a regime, but as an investigation of the 
consequences of different changes within a regime.  
 
This understanding of a regime has moderately constructivist (Adler 1997) 
underpinnings. Throughout the project I adopt an eclectic approach (Almond 
1989) making use of both rationalist and constructivist theories and models. This 
introduces tensions at the meta-theoretical level, but it has the benefit of capturing 
interesting and important dimensions of European border cooperation. The aim is 
not a grand synthesis but rather fruitful dialogue across perspectives. In doing so, 
I contribute to a wider literature which seeks to advance and test the explanatory 
potential of contrasting interest and identity or discourse oriented approaches 
(Garry and Tilley 2009; Hooghe and Marks 2005), realism and constructivism 
(Adler 1997; Finnemore and Sikkink 2001; Schimmelfennig 2001) as well as 
rational choice and sociological institutionalism (Hall and Taylor 1996; Jupille et 
al. 2003; Thielemann 2001). 
 
Having set out the general framework, I now turn to the two key dimensions 
characterising the European regime in the area of borders and border control. 
 
3.2 The existing model of the European border regime 
Two variables are at the centre of Zielonka’s (2001) and Berg and Ehin’s (2006) 
analyses of the European border regime. These are degree of openness and mode 
of governance.
1
 The first refers to the permeability of the border. How easy or 
difficult is it to enter the territory? The latter concerns the allocation of 
competences between the national and the European level. To what extent are 
rules adopted and implemented by European agencies or by national authorities? 
Using these two dimensions Zielonka set up four ideal-typical border regimes:  
 
                                                 
1
 Berg and Ehin (2006: 55), additionally, highlight the “functions attributed to the border”. Is 
border control primarily about the regulation of persons and goods, the protection of cultural ideas 
or the surveillance of military threats? The focus of this project is solely on the movement of 
people and I therefore do not consider variation in function further. 
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Figure 1: Zielonka’s ideal-typical border regimes (copied from Zielonka 2001: 516, figure 1). 
By communitarian Zielonka means the community method of decision-making in the EU 
usually seen as the most intensive form of integration. 
 
Starting from the bottom left, ‘parochial nationalism’ refers to situations where 
borders are difficult to cross and governed exclusively by nation-states.
2
 Although 
perhaps rare today, the type fits with the tightly policed borders of European 
countries in the first half of the 20
th
 century after the onset of the First World War 
(Anderson 1996). Under ‘liberal internationalism’ borders are still nationally 
controlled but are now generally open. An example of this could be the period 
from the late 19
th
 century until the beginning of the 20
th
 (Martin 2008). In this 
period states did not patrol borders tightly, although lack of economic means and 
the cost of travel meant that the freedom to move in practice was limited to the 
few except in the form of permanent migration to e.g. the United States. Turning 
to the right-side of the model, ‘Westphalian superstatism’ captures the 
combination of closed borders and supranational governance. By contrast, 
‘imperial neo-medievalism’ characterises supranational regimes with permeable 
borders. An example of the Westphalian super-state trajectory could be the 
gradual unification of Germany in the 19
th
 century. The imperial neo-medieval 
                                                 
2
 The term parochial would seem to indicate a normative distancing from this type by Zielonka, 
although he does not expand on this. 
Open 
Communitarian 
Closed 
Intergovernmental 
Westphalian 
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form has not been seen before, but resembles Europe before the formal 
establishment of the Westphalian state-system in the middle of the 17
th
 century 
(Wæver 2000; Watson 1992).  
 
Zielonka argues that imperial neo-medievalism is what currently characterises 
Europe and that it is likely to continue to do so. The reasons for this are manifold. 
Closed borders do not work in addressing crime and migration. There is also an 
expansionary push for liberalization by domestic interest groups, such as 
transnational firms, as well as from wider processes of globalization. 
Additionally, the enlargement project continually questions the location of 
Europe’s border and hence prevents the creation of hard boundaries. Zielonka’s 
analysis is, nevertheless, nuanced and he notes that we are likely to see 
considerable variation. In some cases borders might be relatively closed. His key 
claim is that as long as these differences persist we cannot talk of a European 
super-state as this would entail clear-cut boundaries identical across all fields. 
Berg and Ehin (2006) arrive at a similar conclusion. The current regime is a 
mixture of supranational and intergovernmental, and the borders are neither fully 
open nor entirely closed.  
 
This overall positioning of the European border regime finds support in the 
broader literature. On the governance dimension, cooperation on justice and home 
affairs generally features both supranational and intergovernmental elements 
(Lavenex 2009, 2010; Wallace 2010). On the openness dimension, it is well 
established that European borders – and contemporary frontiers in general – are 
restrictive to varying degrees (Mau 2010; Mau et al. 2012). Indeed, the majority 
of academic analyses discussing ‘Fortress Europe’ in the last twenty years 
criticise the metaphor for being misplaced and unable to account for the 
selectivity of borders or simply equate a Fortress with focused surveillance and 
control of particular types of travellers (Bauman 1998; Bigo 1998; Geddes 2003; 
van Houtum and Pijpers 2007). 
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The general finding that the European border regime is neither open nor closed 
and neither national nor supranational is important and interesting in a wider 
perspective. What Zielonka’s model highlights is that this is only one possible 
form of governing borders, and we have seen very different regimes historically. 
Different future paths are therefore, at least in principle, available for Europe. 
 
Notwithstanding the merits of the model, it has a set of limitations. The first is a 
lack of consistency. How precisely is the supranational end of the governance axis 
defined? In his description of the closed version of a communitarian regime as a 
super-state, Zielonka equates supranational with a full transfer of decision-making 
and implementation powers to the European level. Yet the open version is 
described as neo-medieval, a concept he has previously defined as being about 
“overlapping authorities, divided sovereignty, diversified institutional 
arrangements and multiple identities” (Zielonka 2001: 509). This is very different 
from a Westphalian mode of governance writ large. Yet there is not only a lack of 
clarity in his use of the governance axis but also in relation to the openness 
dimension. He finds that Europe resembles a ‘maze’ rather than a ‘Fortress’ where 
“the inside/outside will be blurred” (Zielonka 2001: 518). As a metaphor the maze 
hardly suggests openness but rather a complex terrain where some find access and 
others not. It would therefore have been more convincing if Zielonka had placed 
the neo-medieval type on the mid-point on the horizontal and vertical axis. 
Following this point further, we can also speculate if the proper supranational 
regimes are not simply mirror instances of the national. That is, could we not see 
parochial nationalism or liberal internationalism as potential trajectories for a 
future European super-state?  
 
The second limitation is that the model does not help us to further understand 
what characterises a mixed regime. It does not aid us in identifying, for example, 
if and in what ways there might be systematic differences in the permeability of 
the border for different nationalities and groups. Neither does it allow us to 
capture more specifically what governance dynamics are at play in the mid-point 
of the model. The identification of Europe as a neo-medieval regime is thus 
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important but only a first step. If indeed this mixed regime form is likely to persist 
for some time a more nuanced conceptualisation of it is called for. Probing 
dynamics in greater detail could also provide us with insights into the likelihood 
of future transformations towards the other ideal-typical border regimes.  
 
Could a case be made that a shift away from the mixed regime has in fact already 
taken place? In recent years, migration policies have turned very restrictive in 
many member states. Rules have been tightened especially in the areas of asylum 
(Hatton 2004, 2009; Thielemann 2006) and family unification (Goodman 2011). 
Schengen cooperation has also been challenged. France, for example, in 2011 
moved to reinstate internal checks at its Italian borders and Denmark announced 
the introduction of permanent ‘customs control’ at its borders (Nielsen 2012; 
Wind 2012). These events might suggest that rather than a neo-medieval Europe 
the current regime is one of parochial nationalism. While important to highlight 
fluctuations such a conclusion would seem unwarranted. Migration control may 
have been intensified but we have hardly seen a shift to closed borders. Schengen 
is also still in operation and the strong political controversies surrounding the 
French and Danish interventions testifies to the widespread commitment to the 
free travel area. Rather than abandoning the neo-medieval model, these events 
underline the importance of understanding and capturing dynamics within mixed 
border regimes.  
 
All in all, Zielonka’s model helpfully captures the contemporary European border 
regime as a mixed type of governance with varying forms and degrees of 
openness. This neo-medieval regime should, however, be re-positioned at the 
centre of the model. The outer-points on the supranational side of the graph could 
instead be renamed ‘liberal superstatism and ‘parochial superstatism’. 
Additionally, it would be appropriate to re-label the right-side of the governance 
axis as ‘supranational’ rather than ‘communitarian’. The latter term is potentially 
misleading as it also refers to a holist conceptualisation of society and individuals 
in political theory which indicate that borders ought to be relatively closed 
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(Walzer 1983). Having made these initial alterations, we can now begin to 
conceptualize in more detail dynamics and patterns within mixed border regimes.  
 
3.3 A revised model of the border regime 
In what ways can we build on the existing conceptualisation to construct a model 
that better identifies variation within the current European border regime? Let us 
as a starting-point clarify the analytical scope. As depicted in figure two, I zoom 
in on the centre of Zielonka’s model seeking to capture the mixed border regime 
of today:  
 
Figure 2: Visualising the scope of the revised model 
 
The aim is to provide a conceptual scheme which captures the different possible 
dynamics within this regime type. Doing so should enhance our understanding of 
how it actually operates. The focus of the project is on implementation, and I 
therefore set up the model with this in mind. It is, however, not necessarily limited 
to this stage in the policy cycle and could be applied to the decision-making phase 
as well. 
 
Starting with the governance dimension, we are in the middle of the graph 
because decision-making is supranational but implementation national. On the one 
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hand, the common rules are agreed upon by member states using qualified 
majority voting and co-decision by the European Parliament. On the other hand, 
the main responsibility and resources for applying and enforcing these are vested 
in domestic public authorities. This so-called ‘indirect implementation’ mode 
(Egeberg and Trondal 2009) can be pulled in either the intergovernmental or 
supranational direction. Flexible rules allowing for considerable domestic 
discretion might push the regime towards the national end. The establishment of 
common European agencies, such as Frontex, capable of deploying officers at 
territorial borders moves the system in the supra-national direction. Allowing EU-
delegations to issue visas in certain countries and cities abroad would have the 
same effect.  
 
To capture variation on the governance axis, I distinguish between conflictual and 
cooperative practices (Blanton 2006; Copeland 2000; Goldstein 1992). 
Cooperation occurs when member states coordinate actions as well as when they 
provide and accept assistance from each other. It is evidenced, for example, in the 
extensive consular collaboration between the Schengen countries for issuing visas. 
To illustrate, Denmark depends heavily on French embassies in a number of 
African countries for handling entry requests. Poland, reversely, cooperates to a 
lesser extent relying almost exclusively on its own consulates. Practices turn to 
the conflicting end when the member states start to in different ways avoid or 
challenge the spirit if not the letter of the common EU-rules. This occurs when, 
for example, the Schengen countries regularly issue otherwise ‘extraordinary’ 
national visas or they very frequently reintroduce internal border control. Conflict 
and cooperation is thus here a matter of different forms and degrees of interaction. 
 
Turning to the openness dimension, we are currently in the middle of the axis 
because EU borders vary considerably in their restrictiveness towards different 
nationalities and groups of travellers. In order to probe this variation further, I 
make a distinction between civic and ethnic border regimes (cf. Bartolini 2005: 
32-34; Brubaker 1992; Joppke 2005). The aim is to trace different types of 
selectivity.  
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I borrow the distinction between ethnic and civic from Brubaker’s (1992) classical 
study of migration and nationhood in the context of German and French 
citizenship traditions. Here he analyses two contrasting perspectives on political 
boundaries and membership which play a formative role in modern Europe. In 
Germany Brubaker finds an ethnic ideal which he characterises as pre-political. It 
stresses ascriptive criteria for inclusion such as “cultural, linguistic, or racial” 
(Brubaker 1992: 1). Where a person resides or holds formal citizenship is 
secondary. So too are the actions and political aspirations of individuals. What 
matters are the ethno-cultural ties, as illustrated by Germany’s historical tradition 
for preferential treatment of ethnic German immigrants (Brubaker 1992: 3). 
Brubaker contrast this with a French civic ideal which is distinctly political. At the 
centre is “the belief, which France took over from the Roman tradition, that the 
state can turn strangers into citizens” (Brubaker 1992: 8). This community is 
bounded by universalistic ideals of law, liberty and political representation. 
Anyone born on the territory, irrespective of socio-cultural background or 
ancestry, can claim membership provided they are willing to take up and identify 
with the common political principles. This is summed up in a pointed remark by a 
French revolutionary that “’the only foreigners in France are the bad citizens’” 
(Tallien quoted in Brubaker 1992: 7). 
 
Brubaker is aware that this contrast is ideal-typical and risks over-simplification. 
Later studies have questioned the relevance of the dichotomy. Joppke (2005, 
2007), for example, argues that as liberal norms have spread after the Second 
World War Western countries increasingly resemble each other in their approach 
to citizenship and migration (cf. Cornelius and Tsuda 2004). Yet the distinction 
still holds purchase and can be usefully applied beyond the nation-state context. If 
we look at the heated debate on the preamble to the European constitutional treaty 
we find restatements of civic and ethnic ideals. For some it was important to 
include references to the Christian heritage of Europe while others adamantly 
opposed such cultural-religious formulations (Foret and Riva 2010). 
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I use the terms civic and ethnic in a related but different context from Brubaker’s. 
I shift the analytical perspective away from the nation-state and to the mixed 
European regime. Moreover, the focus is not on citizenship and permanent 
migration but on border control and temporary access. Employed in this way, we 
can stipulate the following key traits of civic versus ethnic border regimes. 
 
An ethnic border regime affords privileged access to nationals of foreign states 
depending on the degree to which they share the majority culture of the receiving 
country. States with the same language and religion, for example, are treated 
preferentially. Travellers from countries that are predominantly Christian or 
secular are preferred to visitors from Muslim-majority states. Where linguistic ties 
bind sending and receiving states together this too should count in favour of easy 
entry. In ethnic regimes selectivity thus tends to follow certain ascriptive features. 
 
A civic border regime by contrast is one in which the political characteristics of 
foreign states have a significant influence on the openness of the border. Liberal 
democratic ideals oblige states to maintain friendly relations with other republics 
around the world by welcoming visits of their citizens. All else being equal, 
nationals of democratic states therefore enjoy easier access than citizens of 
autocracies. Civic selectivity also entails a commitment to afford protection to 
asylum-seekers (Benhabib 2004). Universal ideals imply that persons whose lives 
are in danger because of political activities or persecuted on the grounds of their 
race or ethnicity should be offered sanctuary. An ethnic border regime could also 
provide protection for some refugees but again it would be likely to flow from 
commonalities in ethno-cultural criteria (cf. Walzer 1983). 
 
Civic and ethnic selectivity is a matter of degree. There is not a specific cut-off 
point where a border regime becomes either one or the other. To take a couple of 
examples, a civic European regime would be open towards democratic India and 
closed towards autocratic Belarus. In an ethnic regime practices would be the 
opposite. Where foreign states are both democratic and ethnically similar, as in 
the United States and Canada, both forms of selectivity entails openness. Where 
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sending countries are both culturally different and autocratic, such as in China and 
Saudi Arabia, civic and ethnic regimes alike would have closed borders.  
 
Combining the revised openness and governance dimensions we get the following 
detailed picture of the mid-point of the general model:  
 
 
Figure 3: A revised border regime typology 
 
The revised model captures four different sub-types at play in the middle of 
Zielonka’s framework. All of them are thus characterized by varying degrees of 
openness and a mixed mode of governance. Where relations are conflictual, the 
main distinction is between a civic “Europe of national republics” and an ethnic 
“Europe of cultural nation-states”. Reversely, when cooperation is extensive the 
outer points are “cosmopolitan Europe” and “communitarian Europe”. In setting 
up the model as a coordinate grid it is important to note that the different end-
points on the axes are not each other’s logical opposites. If a regime is not civic 
this does not necessarily mean that it is ethnic. Rather, barring evidence to suggest 
otherwise it is simply in the middle of the graph. Similarly, if states do not 
cooperate this need not entail that relations are characterized by conflict. And the 
absence of conflict does not mean that there is cooperation. 
Civic 
Cooperation 
Ethnic 
Conflict 
Communitarian 
Europe 
Europe of cultural  
nation-states 
Europe of national 
republics 
Cosmopolitan 
Europe 
Mogens Hobolth 
  Page 30 of 244 
Within the border regime we might find different clusters of states. For example, 
some Schengen countries might approximate the civic ideal and others the ethnic. 
The extent of coordination can also vary. Cooperation might be a more pervasive 
feature of the practices in some participating countries than in others. If this is the 
case, the revised model can be used to map out and contrast the different clusters 
within the regime.  
 
Summing up, the theoretical basis of the project is regime theory. Drawing on 
earlier studies, I understand Schengen as a border regime and focus analytically 
on the dimensions of openness and governance. The key finding of existing 
research is that integration is best characterized as multi-facetted: it combines 
supranational and national elements and the borders vary in their openness. 
Moving on from here, I shift the analytical focus to better capture variation within 
this regime. On the openness dimensions I distinguish between civic and ethnic 
forms of selectivity. Governance is conceptualized as a question of conflictual 
versus cooperative practices. Juxtaposing these two revised scales, I identify four 
main types within the mixed border regime.  
 
The analytical framework ties the different papers of the thesis together. The 
individual analyses focus on different aspects of the regime and I draw on and 
discuss additional theory relevant for the question at hand. The first paper tracks 
variation in the openness of the external border. It explores the importance of 
factors such as wealth, democracy, the number of asylum-seekers and religion on 
visa-issuing practices. In this way it provides material for assessing the civic or 
ethnic character of the regime. The second paper explores to what extent member 
states rely on each other’s consulates in the visa-issuing process. The third 
examines the impact of EU-integration on domestic control practices. It theorises 
and tests how and why we should expect adaptation to or circumvention of the 
common rules and norms. These two papers enable us to assess levels of 
cooperation and conflict. The conclusion brings the threads together and positions 
Schengen in the revised regime typology. 
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4. Research design 
The overall methodological approach of the project is quantitative and 
comparative (Agresti and Finlay 1997; Lijphart 1971). The analyses are based on 
comprehensive empirics detailing the border control practices of each member 
state in all third countries abroad. 
 
The main strength of this strategy is breadth and generalizability. With a large 
amount of observations it is possible to arrive at stronger conclusions on the 
extent to which different trends are likely to hold for the border regime as such. It 
allows for systematic tests of theoretically generated hypotheses and an 
assessment of the relative explanatory purchase of different perspectives. A large-
N analysis is in this way well-suited to identify overall clusters and characteristics 
of the entire structure of cooperation as well as advancing theoretical debates. 
Each paper makes use of a different method to analyse large datasets. The first 
employs linear regression, the second social network analysis and the third quasi-
experimental design. These different techniques are appropriate to examine 
different aspects of the regime. The regression analysis provides a broad overview 
of practices and assessment of the importance of different explanatory factors. 
The social network analysis captures both the density and patterns of interaction 
between member states. The quasi-experiment is particularly useful for measuring 
changes before and after participation in Schengen.  
 
The key weakness of quantitative approaches is the lack of depth. In order to 
cover a large number of cases it is necessary to focus on a few simple variables. 
Closer analyses are likely to reveal measurement errors and validity problems. 
The focus on overall patterns also entails a particular approach to identifying 
causes and dynamics. It is difficult to study the different causal pathways through 
which outcomes and explanatory variables are connected. The emphasis is instead 
on the relative effects of different factors, rather than on detailed inspection of the 
channels through which they are likely to impact (Hancké 2009). The latter are 
stipulated and discussed theoretically but only tested indirectly by identifying 
correlations between explanatory variables and outcomes. Additionally, it is 
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difficult to identify if multiple pathways might lead to the same outcome and pin-
point factors which might be either necessary or sufficient for different events to 
occur (Ragin 2000). 
 
These limitations of quantitative strategies highlight the utility of dialogue 
between research projects adopting different methodologies.
3
 Existing studies of 
the European border regime have mainly analysed policy documents, in particular 
those detailing the setup of new technologies of visa-processing as well as visa 
legislation (Bigo and Guild 2005; Huysmans 2006; Munster 2009), and drawn on 
secondary sources in explorative discussions of implementation practices in 
particular border areas (Berg and Ehin 2006; Zielonka 2001). In addition, 
interviews have been carried out with government officials in France (Bigo and 
Guild 2005), visa applicants in Bulgaria (Jileva 2002) and cross-border 
commuters between Poland and the Ukraine (Pijpers and van der Velde 2007). 
The European Commission has also commissioned and produced descriptive 
accounts of the overall operation of the visa policy in each of the member states 
and practices in specific sending countries (COM 2011b). This material provides 
detailed insights into the ways through which new modes of regulating movement 
has been developed. I make use of these secondary sources to hypothesise on 
causal pathways and dynamics and as a way to further substantiate statistical 
findings. 
 
There are no existing databases detailing the operation of the European border 
cooperation.
4
 Some studies do nevertheless provide empirics which could 
indirectly be used to do so. Neumayer (2006) has compiled a global dataset of 
visa requirements. Whyte (2008) and Mau (2010) employ the so-called Henley 
                                                 
3
 Lieberman (2005) advocates the use of ‘mixed methods’, i.e. the combination of quantitative and 
qualitative approaches in a single study. Although an attractive strategy it is in practice seldom 
feasible to pursue fundamentally contrasting research strategies in a single project. The same 
nuanced result and triangulation of findings is achieved through dialogue and cross-referencing of 
studies using different approaches. 
4
 Existing datasets relating to migration have mainly been developed to map the scale of the 
phenomena. How many migrants live in a country? What is their nationality? How many move 
from one state to another? A range of source have been used to do so, including population 
registers, permits, surveys and population censuses (Gamlen 2010). Fewer comparative datasets, in 
contrast, capture variation in state policy (IMPALA 2011). 
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index over international travel restrictions. Similar to Neumayer’s dataset, this 
index measures how many countries a citizen of a given state can travel to without 
needing a visa. These information sources are, however, not well-suited for 
analysing the European case as travel visa requirements are almost fully 
harmonized in Europe today. Hence, they do not contain any variation between 
member states. Nor are they able to differentiate between third countries on the 
visa list. The restrictiveness of the border varies between visa list countries. It can 
be significantly more difficult or easy to obtain a visa depending on the 
nationality of the traveller.
5
 Finally, these existing sources do not includes data on 
cooperative and conflictual governance dynamics. 
 
For the purposes of this project I have thus put together a new dataset, the 
European Visa Database, containing comprehensive information on the visitor 
visa requirements, consular coverage abroad and issuing practices of European 
Union (Schengen) states. These variables captures key aspects of border regimes: 
whether a visa is required in order to travel, where applications can be lodged, the 
extent of cooperation, and how restrictively visa rules are enforced. Data on these 
elements have hitherto been available from governments and EU institutions, but 
in a scattered and not easily accessible form. The database compiles and 
systematizes the public data making it much easier to use. Apart from supporting 
the thesis, it should as well reduce barriers for future comparative research into 
the border regime. It allows for quantitative studies as well as provides a way for 
qualitative projects to position their cases in the wider universe of the border 
regime.  
 
The database is accessible online.
6
 It is possible to search for information on 
particular years, sending and receiving countries. The data can be viewed on the 
screen as a table, visualized on a world map and downloaded in excel format for 
further processing. All three papers are based on the database, and use it to answer 
                                                 
5
 The Henley index, additionally, was put together by a private organization and the method it used 
in compiling it is not transparent (For a longer discussion see Whyte 2008). 
6
 The database can be accessed via www.mogenshobolth.dk/evd. 
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the specific research question of interest. In the next two sections I describe how I 
constructed and use the database. 
 
4.1 The construction of the database 
The database collects and makes easily available a wide range of information on 
the European border regime. The primary empirical basis of the dataset is 
secondary legislation and information exchanged between European Union (EU) 
member states in relation to the development and operation of the EU’s common 
visa policy. The time-period covered is 2005 to 2010 (six years in total) though 
for visa lists the information goes back to 2001. Some data on issuing practices is 
available for 2002, 2003 and 2004 but it does not cover all member states and is 
less standardised (Council 2003a, 2003b, 2004a, 2005). 
 
The unit of analysis is pairs of receiving and sending countries in different years. 
A data point is, for example, France (receiving country) in Algeria (sending 
country) in 2005. All in all, the database for the period from 2005 to 2010 
contains 35.640 measurement points. 
 
On the receiving country side the dataset first and foremost contains information 
on the members of EU’s common visa policy (the Schengen area). From 2005 to 
2007 the circle of participants included 13 EU-states and 2 non EU-states 
(Norway and Iceland). From 2008 to 2010 nine additional EU-states joined up 
(i.e. all the new member states except Bulgaria, Romania and Cyprus).
7
 There is 
also data on the new member states’ visa-issuing practice in the years before they 
fully joined Schengen. The database, furthermore, contains information on the 
United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US). 
 
The database covers all sending countries. In the case of Germany, for example, 
the database contains information on the mobility barrier faced by all non-German 
nationals. For each receiving state there is information on 198 potential sending 
countries. The list of world countries is based on European visa legislation. 
                                                 
7
 The new member states joined late December 2007. In the database they are coded as being 
members from 2008 and onwards. 
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The data sources are as follows. I measured the receiving countries’ visa 
requirements using legislative acts and background government papers setting out 
changes in the rules (OJEU 2001, 2003, 2006, 2009a, 2010a, 2010b; Siskin 2004, 
2005, 2006, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011; TSO 2006a, 2006b, 2009; UKBA 2007). 
Information on visa-issuing practices were taken from government overviews 
detailing the number of visas applied for, issued and refused at different 
consulates abroad or for different nationalities (COM 2011a; Council 2006b, 
2007b, 2007c, 2007d, 2008b, 2009, 2010b; DOS 2011a, 2011b; UKBA 2008, 
2009a, 2009b). The extent of consular services abroad, finally, was measured 
using a set of tables on diplomatic representation in third countries put together by 
the Council’s General Secretariat (Council 2002, 2004, 2005, 2006a, 2007a, 
2008a, 2010a). This information describes both where the member states have 
their own consular representation for the purposes of visa-issuing and the 
locations in which they are represented by another member state. Norway, for 
example, handles visa applications on behalf of Sweden in several sending 
countries. 
 
The database thus primarily relies on administrative data collected and published 
by public authorities. This influences data validity in different ways. Firstly, the 
figures depend on the methods and concepts used by national agencies, and the 
resources they allocate to the task. These choices and potential shifts in 
procedures are not immediately apparent. Some of the differences in the statistics 
might thus reflect variation in techniques of data collection and not control 
practices as such. Secondly, the purpose with which the data is made available 
might give governments an incentive to manipulate the figures. For example, US 
visa refusal rate data is linked to discussions about granting a country a visa-
waiver. This could give authorities a reason to misreport particularly low or high 
rates, if wider foreign policy interests are at stake. In the Schengen setting, visa 
figures are used to foster transparency in implementation practices. Member states 
might thus be tempted to distort figures to prevent criticism from their peers. 
These issues highlight the importance of analysing the data critically and 
triangulating findings based on the database with other studies. 
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The coding was generally done in two steps. I first converted raw tables contained 
in PDF files (about 100 pages each) to excel using a software tool developed by 
the company ABBYY. Second, using ASP.NET computer scripts I then imported 
the excel files to a database (cf. Høyland et al. 2009). All raw-files and computer 
scripts are available on the web-site. I checked the accuracy of the conversion 
process by comparing selected parts of the content of the original data with the 
final version in the database. The reliability of the database is high. There is full 
transparency of the coding, and other researchers should arrive at near identical 
results if they repeated the data generation process. 
 
The coding process is detailed in the thesis’ appendix one (the database 
construction codebook) as well as in the background files on the website. 
 
4.2 Using the database 
I use the database to investigate the character of the European border regime. How 
open is the border in practice and what dynamics of governance are at play? What 
nationalities face no visa requirements, and why? In what sending countries do we 
see a lenient enforcement of the rules, and what factors can account for this? Are 
there differences between the member states? Is religion and level of democracy 
relevant factors in accounting for the openness of the borders? Does the regime 
mostly resemble a civic or ethnic ideal-type? How extensive is the consular 
cooperation among the member state? Do we see that participation in Schengen is 
able to alter domestic visa-issuing practices? Is the mode of implementation 
primarily conflictual, cooperative or neither? To probe these questions the 
database contains four main variables. These are set out and discussed in detail 
below. 
 
Visa requirements 
This part of the database provides a set of tools for identifying variation in visa 
requirements. It lists information on particular sending and receiving countries 
and shows trends over time. Whether or not a visa requirement is in force is an 
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important starting-point when assessing and explaining the openness of Europe’s 
borders.  
 
Visa-issuing practices 
This section contains statistics on the number of visas applied for, issued and 
refused. This data enables an estimation of travel flows and an investigation of 
variation in the restrictiveness of visa-issuing practices. It is for example possible 
to explore data on Algerians seeking to visit France. 
 
The restrictiveness of a receiving country’s visa issuing practice is estimated in 
existing research using the visa refusal rate or its mirror image, the recognition 
rate (Guild 2010; Mau 2010). The refusal rate is calculated as the number of 
refusals divided by the total number of visa decisions (refused plus issued). The 
key idea behind this measure is that it provides an approximation of how strictly 
the issuing criteria are enforced when applications are processed. The larger the 
share refused the fewer persons is deemed to fall within the scope of what 
constitutes a legitimate traveller. The higher the share of rejections the more 
restrictive the rules are enforced. This indicator resembles the use of recognition 
rates to compare asylum systems (Neumayer 2005). The refusal rate captures 
important variation in the enforcement of visa rules which is otherwise simply 
ignored. There are, however, a set of challenges with the measure. 
 
Firstly, in many cases it is difficult to hand in an application. For example, in 
conflict countries it might be associated with considerable dangers to travel to a 
consulate.
8
 Embassies can also outright refuse to accept applications from persons 
with certain types of passports and only allow holders of diplomatic passports to 
lodge requests. In some sending countries purpose limitations might be in place: 
applications are only allowed for visits concerning for example family or 
business.  
 
                                                 
8
 There might also be limitations of internal mobility and international travel in some countries 
(e.g. through exit visas).  
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Secondly, the visa fee, documentary requirements and the strain of the process as 
such also deter some from applying. Self-selection dynamics are a general 
methodological problem. It refers to systematic differences between those who 
choose to undertake an action and those who do not (Nakosteen and Zimmer 
1980). The citizens who attempt to travel are in many situations unlikely to be 
representative of the population at large. Refusal rates thus might give a good 
picture of the ability of applicants to move, but the assessment does not 
necessarily hold for all nationals.
9
 The size of the self-selection bias is likely to 
vary with the refusal rate. That is, if there is a high rejection rate the incentive to 
apply is lower, and the expected benefits of travel must therefore be larger before 
a visit is attempted. In this way refusal rates have a ‘deterrence’ effect. A rejection 
rate of, for example, 50% not only means that a high proportion of visitors are 
denied access but also that many are discouraged from applying in the first place. 
The number of applications would thus be systematically lower than the demand 
for visas making the refusal rate a conservative estimate.
10
  
 
The pre-screening and self-selection dynamics introduce a potential bias in the 
estimate. In some sending countries the refusal rate might be low but the mobility 
barrier in practice high, if receiving states have directed particular attention 
towards preventing people from applying in the first place. This means that 
caution should be exercised when comparing refusal rates across countries. 
 
                                                 
9
 Self-selection dynamics has been particularly debated in migration studies in the context of 
earning assessments (Barham and Boucher 1998). Is migration to the economic benefit of those 
who decide to move? What is the impact of movement on the sending country? A key problem in 
answering these questions is self-selection. One way to do this would be to compare the income of 
those who left with those who stayed behind.  But this seems clearly problematic, as it would 
appear likely that the two groups differ significantly: the migrants might, for example, have more 
educational resources than the others. A straightforward comparison would get the estimate 
somewhat wrong as the two groups are not comparable. The self-selection issue is particularly 
problematic as migration data are in general only available at a highly aggregated level (Gamlen 
2010). Residence statistics and census data, for example, usually only operate in broad categories 
not allowing for detailed controls of socio-economic differences. 
10
 The deterrence effect of refusal rates might not take a linear form. It could also be an effect 
which works in steps and intervals (approximating an exponential function). In the 0-10% refusal 
rate band, for example, people find that they have a fair chance of getting a visa. In the span 
between 10% and 40% the costs begin to appear much larger as it becomes a clear possibility that 
the application is refused. Finally, above 40% the effect increases drastically as the chance of 
getting a visa now appears dim.  
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Thirdly, the raw visa data contains information on the visa-issuing practice of the 
member states’ consulates abroad. The statistics thus capture the practice of, for 
example, the French consulate in Morocco. This involves a set of further 
challenges. Applications are submitted to the consulates by persons residing in the 
country regardless of their citizenship. Thus, all visa requests are not necessarily 
made by nationals of the country where the consulate is located. The global 
amount of migrants is low, and in most countries migrants only constitute a 
relatively small share of the population (UN 2009). In general, it can therefore be 
assumed that applications are made by nationals. But in a few countries – for 
example in many Golf states – the share of migrants is high. Applications can also 
under some circumstances be submitted by citizens of nearby states. If, for 
example, a European country is not represented in a third country it can refer 
travellers to the consular services in neighbouring states. In areas where consular 
coverage is scarce the application pool to a consulate might therefore also contain 
requests from nationals of other states. Consequently, some caution must be 
exercised when interpreting the statistical figures from a few of the consulates. It 
is, however, possible to clearly identify the cases and include a check for them in 
the analysis. Broader analyses of all third countries are hence not likely to be 
affected by the problem. 
 
Fourthly, the comparability of the permit could be a source of bias (cf. Gamlen 
2010: 10). The Schengen visa permits are similar in the way that they provide 
access to the entire European territory to conduct a visit of a maximum period of 
three months. This makes them as such comparable. They might, however, vary in 
their precise format. Some visas are only valid for a brief period. Others allow for 
multiple entries over several years.  
 
The refusal rate, all in all, provides a reasonable estimate of the restrictiveness. 
But it is likely to contain a bias. The stability of the measure could be further 
assessed and potentially improved by cross-checking the results with future 
studies using other methodologies. The Mobility Barriers Index described in more 
detail below tries to at least partly address these problems. 
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Consular services: access and cooperation 
The database also identifies variation in consular representation. It provides 
overviews of where the receiving states have diplomatic representation for visa-
issuing purposes. What Schengen countries are represented where? Are there 
some sending countries where it is not even possible to hand in visa applications? 
This section also gives information on the consular cooperation between European 
Union Schengen states. Member states are not represented in all third countries. 
Germany, France and Italy are present in the majority of foreign states. The 
consular services of the remaining member states are much less comprehensive. 
They rely to a large extent on mutual cooperative agreements. I use the data to 
calculate how many cooperative agreements a member state has entered into, 
where and with whom. 
 
The Mobility Barriers Index 
In several situations a sole focus on either visa requirements, visa issuing 
practices or consular services are likely to be problematic. For example, a 
conclusion on the effect of an independent variable (such as religion) on mobility 
barriers might be biased if it is only based on the subset of countries facing a visa 
requirement and ignore those without. Similarly, as we have seen an exclusive 
focus on the restrictivity of refusal rates could give a biased picture because it 
ignores cases where absence of consular representation makes it very difficult to 
hand in visa applications.  
 
To take this into account when assessing restrictiveness, I have constructed an 
index over mobility barriers. It is an ordinal scale with four categories. A score of 
0 indicates that there are no barriers to the mobility from a sending country to a 
receiving country in a given year. 1 means that there are low barriers; 2 medium; 
and 3 high.  
 
The index was set up stepwise. I started by coding all cases where no visa 
requirement was in force as instances of no barriers (score 0). For the remainder 
of cases I started by looking at the visa refusal rate. If the figure was below 5% 
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(corresponding approximately to the first inter-quartile of the total dataset) I 
assigned a score of 1 to the case (low barrier). If the figure was between 5% and 
20% (second and third inter-quartiles) I assigned the value 2 (medium barrier). 
Finally, where the figure was above 20% (the fourth inter-quartile) I coded a 3 
(high barrier). In the cases characterized by no access to consular services I 
assigned a score of 2 (medium barrier). Hence, in this way the index addresses the 
problem which lack of consular representation can create in the data, as identified 
above. 
 
I then turned to the problem that the refusal rate does not measure the ways in 
which receiving countries are able to prevent applications from being lodged in 
the first place. To take this into account I inspected visa application figures and 
developed a model of the expected amount of applications for a given pair of 
receiving and sending country considering their population sizes and the travel 
distance between them. This model was then used to reassess the cases assigned a 
score of 1 and 2. If the number of received applications was considerably lower 
than expected (20% of the estimate) I moved the case one up, e.g. from score 2 to 
3. This approach is not without problems. Even very low application figures could 
in principle be a result of a low demand for travel and not barriers put in place by 
receiving states. Nevertheless, it is a clear improvement of leaving the issue 
unaddressed. In particular, introducing the penalty score provides a better estimate 
for conflict-ridden countries such as Iraq where most receiving states accept few 
applications. 
 
All in all, the database provides comprehensive comparative empirics on the 
implementation of the Schengen rules by European public authorities. 
Additionally, it provides information on two selected outsiders (the United 
Kingdom and the United States). Each of the papers makes use of different 
segments of the dataset to answer their specific research questions.  
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Limitations of the database 
The database is a well-suited tool for answering the research questions raised in 
the thesis as well as exploring other related questions framed at the country-level. 
There are, however, limitations which are important to bear in mind. The dataset 
only contains aggregate information on visa policy and practice and it is therefore 
not possible to investigate individual-level factors. Variation in, for example, 
socio-economic characteristics in a group of applicants cannot be identified. 
Similarly, the database is unable to pin-point differences between categories of 
applicants. For example, as business travellers are registered together with family 
visitors and tourists it is not possible to assess to what extent they are treated 
differently. Another limitation of the database is that it currently only covers the 
period from 2005 to 2010. This means that it is not possible to trace, for example, 
if there is a contemporary trend for mobility barriers to increase or decrease in 
Europe and the US.  
 
5. Plan of the thesis 
The thesis is structured as three independent papers. The introduction here has 
presented the shared theme, research questions, analytical framework and dataset 
informing each of them. To avoid overlap, I do not set out these elements in detail 
again in the individual analyses.  
 
Paper one focuses on the restrictiveness and selectivity of the border regime. It is 
a theory testing paper. I start by adapting two existing different approaches – 
interest group and constructivist security theory – to the case of border control and 
visas, and devise a set of hypotheses for evaluating the models. The paper then 
presents comprehensive empirics on differences in the openness of Europe’s 
external border to visitors of different nationalities, and uses linear regression 
models to test the explanatory purchase of the two models.  
 
Paper two maps out patterns of cooperation within the common policy. Here the 
overall analytical strategy is more explorative and less tied up with the testing of 
specific hypotheses. I identify the extent to which the members draw on each 
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other’s consular facilities for issuing visas abroad and use network analytical tools 
to ascertain if there are any clusters of states involved in particularly intensive 
interaction. Having set out the main empirical trends, I develop and assess the 
strength and weakness of different rationalist and constructivist explanations of 
the empirical trends.  
 
Paper three discusses cooperation and restrictiveness together. The overall logic 
of this analysis is to focus on the importance of a key factor, namely participation 
in the common border regime, and assess its impact on the openness of domestic 
borders to visitors from outside the European Union. Drawing on rational choice 
and sociological institutionalism I develop two rival models of the likely effect of 
EU-integration in this field. The potential impacts are probed empirically using 
data from the Eastern enlargement. I set up a quasi-experimental study where I 
analyse trends in visa-issuing by the new member states before and after the 
expansion of the free travel area, and contrast these with practices in the old and 
partial Schengen members as well as the UK and the US.  
 
The conclusion summarises the main contributions of each paper, and discusses 
the findings in the context of the overall theoretical framework. I position the 
border regime on the revised openness and governance dimensions and evaluate 
what overall type it is. In doing so I also assess the stability of the regime, and set 
out different scenarios for how it could evolve depending on future decisions of 
policymakers. I end by highlighting avenues and questions for further research.  
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PAPER ONE 
 
Wanted and unwanted travellers: explaining variation in the openness of the 
European Union’s external border 
 
 
Abstract 
Security theory plays a central role in contemporary analyses of European 
migration control. So far, however, the framework has not been subjected to 
systematic, comparative empirical testing nor has the strength of potential 
alternative explanations been assessed. In addition, the explanatory purchase of 
the approach has recently been put into question as authors have pin-pointed 
events seemingly at odds with theoretical expectations. This paper seeks to 
advance the debate through a large-N analysis of variation in the openness of 
Europe’s external border to short-term visitors. Drawing on a comprehensive 
dataset detailing the visa requirements, issuing practices and consular services of 
EU destination states it conducts a test of the security explanation contrasted with 
an alternative interest group perspective. I show that business interests have a 
liberalizing impact on the European visa regime. Yet variation in the barriers to 
mobility imposed by EU states remains first and foremost explainable by a fear of 
immigration. Against recent critics this paper thus argues that security theory 
continues to provide the most convincing account of variation in the 
restrictiveness of border control practices in Europe. 
 
Keywords 
European Union (EU), securitization, interest group theory, Border control, 
Schengen, Visa, External border 
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1. Introduction 
From the 1980s and onwards European cooperation in the field of immigration 
policy has expanded considerably (Geddes 2003: 126).  Spurred mainly by the 
wider initiative of establishing a single market, integration has in particular moved 
forward in the area of border control (Monar 2001). In order to facilitate the free 
movement of goods and persons within Europe checks at internal frontiers have 
now been all but dismantled and the member states instead share a single external 
border (Bertozzi 2008). 
 
The gradual development of a common European border has generated 
considerable academic debate (Anderson 2000; Bigo and Guild 2005; Grabbe 
2000; Lavenex 2001; Ruben 2008). One of the key questions explored is the 
restrictiveness of the new policy. Are we witnessing the construction of a 
‘Fortress Europe’? How can we account for the ease with which some groups of 
persons can access European territory and the considerable barriers others face? 
Why has the entry rules been liberalized at EU’s eastern borders whereas tight 
policing remain in place towards the Southern Mediterranean countries? 
Answering such questions is important. Border policies have a considerable 
impact on bilateral trade and travel (Neumayer 2010, 2011). Tight restrictions 
could also engender feelings of exclusions and in this way impair relations across 
borders. They can, furthermore, severely hamper the ability of refugees to access 
the protection regimes of destination states (Collinson 1996; Hatton 2004; 
Lavenex 2001). Identifying the causes and drivers of restrictiveness allows us to 
better explain when tight control is likely to be in place and thereby suggest 
potential pathways towards liberalization. 
 
The aim of this paper is to contribute to this research strand focused on 
understanding variation in the openness of Europe’s border. Specifically, I seek to 
map out how open the external border is to short-term visitors of different 
nationalities and test two alternative explanations of the variation in 
restrictiveness we observe. I do so through a large-N quantitative analysis of 
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trends in European visa-issuing practices from 2005 to 2010, relying on an 
original dataset based on public government data (Hobolth forthcoming).  
 
The empirical focus of the analysis is short-stay visas. These form a key part of 
the external border policy (Bigo and Guild 2005; Brochmann 1999a: 307). For the 
majority of the world’s population the borders of Europe are first encountered at 
consulates abroad during the visa application process (Guild 2001, 2003). In this 
pre-screening significantly more people are refused entry to the EU compared to 
the number of people turned away once they reach the territorial border (Council 
2010b; Eurostat 2010b).  
 
The existing literature has found that EU’s policy is best characterized as a filter: 
the openness of the border varies for different groups (Apap and Carrera 2004; 
Bigo and Guild 2005; Huysmans 2000, 2006; Melis 2001; van Houtum and 
Pijpers 2007). In order to account for the pattern of exclusion and inclusion 
researchers have mainly turned to constructivist security theory (Bigo 2000; 
Buzan et al. 1998; Wæver 1997). This approach suggests that the mobility barriers 
different groups of travellers face follow the extent to which they are cast as 
threats and dangers in European public discourses legitimizing exceptional control 
measures (Karyotis 2007; Karyotis and Patrikios 2010). Visitors from for example 
refugee-producing countries face a restrictive border regime paralleling the 
current construction of asylum-seekers as threats to welfare states and national 
identities in Europe (Huysmans 2000).  
 
The extent to which EU border practices do indeed align with these expectations 
has not, however, been systematically tested. Existing research primarily consists 
of single or small-N country case studies and explorative analyses of different 
policy initiatives and wider developments without an explicit methodological 
basis (Bigo and Guild 2005; Boswell 2007; Brochmann 1999b; Ette and Faist 
2007; Guiraudon 2003; Karyotis 2007; Neal 2009; Wolff 2008). While this body 
of analyses has generated considerable insights the wider applicability of the 
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findings are thus unclear, and in some studies lack of transparency makes it 
difficult to identify the grounds for and limits of the conclusions. 
 
In addition to these methodological limitations recent research has questioned the 
explanatory purchase of security theory. Analysing the establishment of the EU’s 
border agency – Frontex – Neal (1995: 333) shows that its final mandate was very 
limited testifying to a “failure” to securitize migration in Europe. Studying the 
response to recent terrorist attacks Boswell (2007: 606), in a similar vein, disputes 
the level of securitization of border and migration control. Rather to the contrary, 
she argues, “European governments had an obvious interest in keeping open 
mobility for the purposes of business, tourism and study” (2007: 600). This too 
raises doubt about the ability of security approaches to account for variation in the 
restrictiveness of European border control.  
 
This paper seeks to move forward the explanatory discussion. Theoretically, I 
clarify and set out the security approach taking into account recent criticisms. The 
current debate highlights the need for a better understanding of how threat 
constructions link up with administrative control practices. It also points to the 
need for researchers to consider alternative explanations, and I therefore also set 
out a model focusing on business interests as a key driver of the European border 
policy. Empirically, I test the relative strength of these two theories drawing on 
comprehensive visa-issuing information. This data allows us to conduct new and 
broader comparisons of the restrictiveness of European border control. 
 
The key finding of the paper is that there is both a liberalizing and restricting logic 
at play in the common border regime with the latter stronger than the former. The 
openness of Europe’s border varies with the extent to which travellers are from 
country groups generally cast as threats in European public discourses – namely 
poor, Muslim-majority and refugee-producing states. To some extent, however, 
strong commercial interests in tourism and bilateral trade are able to at least 
partially override these fears and result in somewhat less restrictive practices. 
There is thus evidence of business constraints at play in the border policy. All in 
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all, the analysis supports a continued focus on migration fears when studying 
European border control, but also suggests a need to incorporate additional factors 
in the model. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. In the next and second section I introduce and 
discuss two different theoretical models explaining variation in border 
restrictiveness and derive a set of testable hypotheses. The third section presents 
the research design. The following parts contain the empirical analysis. Finally, I 
conclude. 
 
2. Theorizing border policy 
In this section I develop two models aimed at explaining variation in the openness 
of Europe’s external border to short-term visitors. The first account I set out is 
based on interest group theory (Facchini et al. 2011; Freeman 1995, 2006; 
Somerville and Goodman 2010; cf. Wilson 1980).
11
 This approach is widely used 
to study Western migration policies and I therefore start here. The main prediction 
I derive is that the level of restrictiveness will follow the strength of business 
interests in more open borders. Moving on from this I develop a model based on 
constructivist security theory (Bigo and Guild 2005; Buzan et al. 1998; Huysmans 
2006; Munster 2009). The expectation from this perspective is that the variation in 
openness will vary with the extent to which different groups and nationalities are 
cast as threats in European public discourses. 
 
Interest group theory 
The primary advocate of an interest-group focused approach to migration studies 
is Freeman (1992, 1994, 1995, 1998, 2006). He argues, following Wilson (1980: 
366-372), that we can explain state policy by investigating what distribution of 
costs and benefits it entails. If a policy has both concentrated costs and benefits it 
                                                 
11
 Freeman (1995: 883) originally presented his approach as a “political economy model”. I follow 
Cornelius and Rosenblum (2005: 106) in referring to it as an interest group perspective because 
this label somewhat better captures the analytical focus and liberal-expansionist orientation of the 
theory. 
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is likely to be structured by proper interest group politics.
12
 Because both 
proponents and opponents of the policy are clearly defined they will organize and 
struggle over the direction of policy. In situations where costs as well as benefits 
are diffuse majoritarian politics will take place. Policy will in this case be settled 
by the initiative which can command the most substantial popular support. If 
society at large gains yet costs are borne by well-defined groups entrepreneurial 
politics should explain outcomes. Because opposition is likely to be highly 
organized changes will only come about if persons in key positions become 
preoccupied with the case and try to push an agenda of change. Client politics, 
finally, should take place if a policy has concentrated benefits for a set of clearly 
defined groups and diffuse costs. The majority bearing the costs are unlikely to 
organize in opposition and the benefiting groups will therefore drive and set 
policy. 
 
Freeman (1995: 886) first applied this theory to labour migration and argued that 
it was a case of client politics. A few well-organized interest groups set policy in a 
closed setting cooperating with the responsible officials. The concentrated 
benefits of a liberal policy mainly fall upon employers whereas the costs are born 
by the population at large (1995: 885).
13
 There is no well-defined constituency 
which have an incentive to form and lobby for restrictive counter-measures. 
Labour-intensive firms, for example, have strong motivations to advocate for 
access of low-skill migrants to fill vacant positions and keep wages down. Any 
downward pressure on salaries and potential capacity pressure on public services 
such as health care and education are, by contrast, borne by a diffuse wider 
majority.
14
  
 
                                                 
12
 Please note that I refer to the whole approach as interest group politics though this is also a 
specific sub-type in the original model. 
13
 Conceptualizing migration using the language of cost-benefit is not unproblematic. It might 
reinforce a presentation of migration as a negative ‘problem’ (a cost).  
14
 Expanding on and criticizing this model Money (1999) argues that costs are not necessarily 
diffuse as migrants tend to cluster in particular areas and cities. Specific local politicians and 
officials thus experience the impact of mobility and will organize and lobby for national policies. 
Their ability to do so is, in turn, determined by the extent to which their constituencies are crucial 
for the outcome of domestic elections. This model would appear particular well-suited for states 
using first past the post electoral systems. The vast majority of European states, however, use 
variants of proportional representation where individual constituencies matter less. 
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As with labour migration, travel restrictions can be seen as a case of client politics 
(Freeman 2006: 235).
15
 Concentrated interests – such as the tourism sector – 
benefit from liberal rules. The costs of open access are diffuse. They are, 
additionally, unclear and indirect in the form of potentially increased levels of 
irregular migration and protection seekers arriving at the border. Hence, it would 
seem likely that policy is set in a closed arena involving key lobbying interests. 
 
The model thus appears to be overall applicable to the case of border policy. 
There is, however, also a challenge in applying it. This follows from, as 
emphasised in the previous section, that a basic feature of contemporary visa 
regimes is that they distribute access unevenly for different nationalities. The 
openness differs between sending countries. How can this dynamic element be 
taken into account? 
 
Freeman briefly discussed a somewhat similar challenge in the case of labour 
migration: The theory did not as such seem able to explain that restrictiveness 
varied over time. He therefore argued that the interest of the electorate could play 
a more substantial role during recessions as politicians would find it necessary to 
respond to public concerns about job security by limiting immigration. Although 
intuitively plausible this argument has a set of problems. It cannot account for 
variation in a state’s openness to applicants from different sending countries. 
Furthermore, it significantly limits the explanatory scope of the model. It implies 
that client politics operate under strong constraints. When the economy is 
booming voters do not care about entries giving businesses free room to decide. 
This, however, is not the case during recessions. The salience of migration is 
thereby turned into the key variable of interest.  
 
An alternative way of allowing for diverse outcomes is to dispense with the 
assumption that border and migration policy is always best characterized as client 
politics. This is the route I follow. Freeman would have pursued this approach if 
he had argued that businesses lose interest in importing workers during economic 
                                                 
15
 Freeman (2006: 235f) discusses in some detail how travel visas can also be seen as a case of 
majoritarian and entrepreneurial politics. 
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downturns. This implies that labour migration ceases to be client politics. Instead, 
it shifts to a majoritarian mode as potential benefits are now also diffuse. Policy 
will then be set following the preference of the electorate in general. 
 
The key question is thus under what conditions it is likely that we will observe 
client politics. Let us start by looking at each main pro-access actor in turn. One 
of the major beneficiaries of a liberal travel visa policy is the tourism industry. 
From their perspective visitors from abroad are a source of potential income. The 
tourism sector thus has a direct interest in lobbying authorities in order to ensure 
easy passage for international travellers. But their motivation to do so is likely to 
be considerably higher for third countries which are major suppliers of tourists. A 
case in point is Denmark. Here, the hotel and tourism organizations have 
participated in working groups negotiating the Danish policy. One of their main 
aims has been to liberalize rules for current and potential emerging markets such 
as China (MFII 2010). Hence, when a third country is a major potential source of 
tourism commercial interests will lobby and we will see client politics rather than 
majoritarian. This yields hypotheses 1:  
 
H1: The higher the tourism expenditure of a sending state, the lower the 
barrier to mobility imposed by the receiving country 
 
Firms trading and operating across borders are likewise highly interested in 
securing easy arrivals. Their business is disrupted by cumbersome entry 
formalities making travel more difficult for customers, partners and employees 
abroad. Swedish transnational companies, for example, have successfully lobbied 
for the establishment of fast-track procedures at consulates in China (EMM 
2011a). Their business activities were disrupted by visa rules making it 
complicated for local workers to travel to headquarters in Sweden. Such dynamics 
suggests that the more trade there is with a third country the more companies 
would seem likely to organize and work for an open access policy, so again we 
will have a case of client politics. From this I derive hypotheses 2: 
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H2: The higher the level of trade between a sending state and the receiving 
country, the lower the barrier to mobility imposed by the receiving country 
 
In addition to the tourism industry and businesses, migrant communities would 
also seem likely to lobby for access for friends, contacts and relatives from home 
(Wong 2006; cf. Bermeo & Leblang 2009). Ethnic minority groups not only lobby 
on issues such as non-discrimination and better work-place conditions in their 
new country of residence but also advocate easier entry for nationals from their 
former home state.  Hypothesis 3 is thus: 
 
H3: The higher the number of migrants from a sending state residing in the 
receiving country, the lower the barrier to mobility imposed by the receiving 
country 
 
These three hypotheses assumes that the preference of the electorate gravitate 
towards restriction. That is, in the absence of client politics the policy line will be 
restrictive. This starting-point appears overall plausible. Visitors might overstay 
their visas or work without permit leading to potential job losses for native 
workers and a downward pressure on wages and work conditions. The assumption 
nevertheless is contestable. In several cases the majority preference might not 
necessarily be for a high level of control. For example, when it comes to arrivals 
from New Zealand and the United States a liberal stance could be a ‘win-win’. 
There is little risk of irregular migration from these countries as their level of 
development is high, and there is therefore no particular reason for the majority to 
be sceptical of the access of visitors per default. In the empirical analysis I return 
to this question and discuss potential ways in which this aspect can be taken into 
account. 
 
All in all, from an interest group perspective we would expect that travel visa 
policy shifts in a liberal direction as tourism, bilateral trade and migrant 
communities gain weight and client politics becomes dominant. To the extent we 
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observe such outcomes it strengthens the explanatory purchase of the theoretical 
model. I now turn to the security approach. 
 
Security theory 
Constructivist security theory is widely used to analyse European migration policy 
(Anderson et al. 2000; Bigo 2000; Heisler and Layton-Henry 1993; Huysmans 
2000; Karyotis and Patrikios 2010). There are two main approaches: the 
Copenhagen and the Paris school. Both start from the assumption that security 
threats are not objectively given but constructed by political actors (Howarth 
2000). To what extent, for example, traffic accidents, climate change or terrorism 
comes to be viewed as security problems is not mainly a function of their inherent 
traits but rather of political contestation.  
(Allison and Zelikow 1999) 
The Copenhagen School studies the process by which a person, group or event 
becomes securitized in public discourses (Buzan et al. 1998; Wæver 1997). 
Securitization is defined as the escalation of an issue above ‘normal politics’ to 
the status of an existential threat requiring urgent response. If it is not addressed 
immediately it will be too late. If this move is successfully made it becomes 
possible to enact and pursue policies, such as emergency laws, which would 
otherwise be unacceptable in liberal states. The Paris School analyses the struggle 
over the definition of threats between security agencies (Bigo 2000; cf. Allison 
and Zelikow 1999). Public political statements are viewed as of less importance. 
In order to understand why particular threats emerge and with what effects we 
should focus at the bureaucratic level. The main actors of interests are for example 
police, customs and intelligence services acting and competing in a field of 
security professionals.  
 
Neither the Copenhagen nor the Paris School argues that security politics must 
lead to particular policy outcomes. Whereas the client politics mode in the interest 
group account is linked with liberal results a similar expectation of restrictive 
practices does not flow from security politics. If a group of travellers is not 
constructed as a danger this is simply a case of lacking or failed securitization. A 
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politician did not have the necessary standing to get a development accepted as 
threatening or he or she did not even articulate the issue in these terms; one 
bureaucratic agency lost out to another over what risk should be given attention. 
Boswell (2007: 591-594) thus somewhat misrepresents security theory when she 
stipulates that it argues that the preference of politicians and officials is to 
securitize issues. The Copenhagen School is not based on the assumption that 
policymakers have a built-in preference for securitization. The Paris School would 
suggest that some agencies have an interest in emphasising the importance of 
particular types of threats to improve their own position but that other agencies 
would struggle against this. Hence, Boswell’s key finding that terrorism was not 
strongly linked with migration after 9/11 in Europe is not as such at odds with 
security theory.  
 
Boswell’s criticism nevertheless hints at a limitation of current security theory. Its 
relative strength is difficult to assess because a wide range of trends and outcomes 
are in line with it. The approach has been developed as a general interpretative 
framework rather than a classical causal explanatory theory. It has roots in post-
structuralism and its proponents are often somewhat sceptical of the extent to 
which social science should aim at assessing causality (Campbell 1998; Hansen 
2006). In addition, the main focus of the theory has been to understand how 
events and issues come to be established as security problems. Less theoretical 
and empirical attention has been given to empirically assessing the effects of such 
constructions. To the extent it is covered in the framework, it is indirectly as an 
indicator of successful securitization.  
(Bourbeau 2011; Finnemore and Sikkink 2001) 
It is, however, possible to take security theory in an explanatory direction by 
reinterpreting it in line with mainstream constructivism (Finnemore and Sikkink 
2001; cf. Bourbeau 2011). Here, the emphasis is on evaluating the strength of the 
models based on ideational factors relative to other theories. One way of doing so 
is to focus on the relationship between public discursive threat constructions, 
policies and administrative practices. Discourses constrain and enable officials to 
pursue different types of policies. Restrictive migration control practices are thus 
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explained as the outcome of a successful securitization of particular groups of 
foreigners and types of mobility as a threat to the survival of Western states and 
nations.  
 
Set up in this way the security model thus expects a tight link between public 
threat constructions and visa practices. The more a particular nationality or group 
of countries aligns with what is cast as dangerous the higher the level of 
restriction we should observe. In contemporary Europe, then, what are the major 
patterns of threat constructions in the field of migration and mobility?  
 
Bigo and Guild repeatedly refers to poverty (2005: 234, 236, 241-footnote 20, 
245, 254, 258). The fear of the outsider is to a wide extent a fear of the poor. 
Impoverished third country nationals, they argue, are presented as a danger to the 
upkeep of welfare states by increasing demand for social services. From this 
follows that citizens of affluent countries should have easier access to Europe than 
nationals of poor states. Hypothesis 4 is thus: 
 
H4: The higher the income level of a sending state, the lower the barrier to 
mobility imposed by the receiving country 
 
Alongside poverty Bigo and Guild also state that war-ridden, unstable and 
refugee-producing countries in conflict are constructed as risks (2005: 236, 241-
footnote 20). Several authors link the fear of asylum seekers with visa policy (Bø 
1998: 201f; Brochmann 1999a: 307f; Huysmans 2000: 763; Ucarer 2001: 295f). 
Brochmann, for example, mention the Bosnian war as a case where “a fear of 
being the preferred target for war refugees turned into a ‘domino effect’ of visa 
conditions in the receiving countries throughout Europe” (1999a: 307). The recent 
‘Arab Spring’ has provoked restatements of similar concerns in Europe of being 
overrun by asylum-seekers (DMO 2011). This construction of asylum seekers as a 
threat yields hypothesis 5: 
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H5: The lower the number of asylum applications from nationals of a sending 
state, the lower the barrier to mobility imposed by the receiving country 
 
Guild (2009: 184) further identifies religion and ethnicity as important. The 
reference to religiosity parallels the wider intense and frequently hostile Western 
debate about Islam (cf. Salehyan 2009). Neither East-Asians nor persons from 
South America are cast as threats. It is foremost a question of a European fear of 
Muslims. Hypothesis 6 is thus: 
 
H6: If the majority of the population in a sending state is not Muslim, the 
barrier to mobility imposed by the receiving country is lower 
 
Taken together we would thus expect travellers from third countries which are 
poor, Muslim and a source of refugees to be interpreted within a threat frame and 
hence often denied access. To the extent these three hypotheses find support in the 
data security theory would seem to provide a convincing explanation of European 
visa practices. 
 
In sum, the interest group and security theories provide different explanations of 
the pattern of European visa restrictiveness. They put emphasis on different 
factors as the key drivers of policy. In the next sections I present the research 
design and data I use to test the hypotheses. 
 
3. Research design 
I investigate the hypotheses via a large-N cross-sectional quantitative analysis. 
The statistical method drawn upon is linear regression modelling (Agresti and 
Finlay 1997: 382-437). PASW Statistics 18 (SPSS) was used to compute the 
statistics. This approach is well-suited for my purposes because a wide dataset 
allows for a comprehensive assessment of the strength of the theories. It would be 
more difficult to generalise any findings on the explanatory purchase of the 
models if only a set of cases was analysed. The drawback is that the precise causal 
mechanisms involved are only studied with reference to their observable 
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implications on control practices. In the following I describe the dataset and the 
coding of the different variables before I go on in the next sections to present and 
discuss the results of the empirical analysis. Further information, including the 
robustness tests and detailed statistical read-outs, are available from the database 
website. 
 
The data source for the analysis is a new European Visa Database (Hobolth 
forthcoming).
16
 Existing datasets only cover visa requirements and thereby leaves 
out potentially substantial variation in practices. The majority of countries in the 
world are on the EU’s visa list, but as we shall see in the descriptive analysis there 
are very considerable differences in how restrictively the rules are enforced.  
 
The visa dataset contains information on the visa requirements, issuing-practices 
and consular representation abroad of EU states across all sending countries. It 
thus provides the necessary information on the dependent variable, i.e. the 
restrictiveness of European border policy for visitors of different nationalities. 
The raw data source is official government overviews published by the Council of 
the European Union and the European Commission.  
 
The unit of analysis is pairs of receiving (European Union) and sending (third 
country) states per year.
17
 For each country-year pair I assess the restrictiveness of 
the travel policy and code the values on the independent variables. The time 
period I focus on is 2005 to 2010. This is the main period in which systematic 
data is available on the dependent variable. The receiving states covered in the 
analysis are the participants in the common visa policy. This includes all EU-
states except the United Kingdom and Ireland as well as the non-EU states 
Norway, Iceland and Switzerland.
18
 
                                                 
16
 The information in the database can be explored via www.mogenshobolth.dk/evd.  
17
 The aggregation of the data to state-level means a loss of within-country regional variation. In 
some countries, India for example, the visa-issuing practice can vary considerable depending on 
precisely where in the country the consulate is located. In order to study this variation it would be 
necessary to account for differences in, for example, income-level within countries by using 
variables measured at the regional level. 
18
 Switzerland signed up in 2008. The 2004 and 2007 enlargement countries had to comply with 
EU’s visa list from their time of accession but were allowed to maintain independent visa-issuing 
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The list of sending states is based on the states and territories specified in EU’s 
common visa policy (OJEU 2001). In the analysed time-period Serbia and 
Montenegro split into two separate states and Kosovo seceded from Serbia. I have 
handled this by re-coding the data from the earlier years. Hence, I consistently use 
separate entries for “Serbia”, “Montenegro” and “Kosovo”. In total the number of 
observations included in the analysis is 20.884, but due to missing data on the 
independent variables the N is lower in the actual models (approximately 6.000 to 
14.000).  
 
The main models include all cases in a single regression using dummy variables 
for each year and receiving state. To further test the stability of the results I have 
also conducted separate quantitative tests for each receiving state.  
 
For methodological reasons the income, trade, tourism and asylum variables are 
transformed using a natural log. This is necessary because they are skewed to the 
right, and a log transformation is thus a good option for ‘pulling in’ outliers and 
ensuring that the variable complies with the requirement of a normal distribution 
(Agresti and Finlay 1997: 561). This recoding, however, also makes theoretical 
sense. It accounts for the very likely difference in relative effects. If, for example, 
a poor country becomes 10% more affluent this is likely to make a very 
substantial difference on living conditions. A rich country increasing its wealth by 
a similar factor is unlikely to experience the same degree of change.  
 
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable is the Mobility Barriers Index contained in the visa 
dataset. This indicator aims to capture the extent to which policy barriers are put 
into place to prevent the movement of nationals of a given sending state to a 
receiving country. It is a four point scale ranging from 0 (no barriers) to 3 (high 
barriers). A score of 0 is assigned if no visa requirement is in place. 1 is set for the 
                                                                                                                                     
criteria pending full participation in the internal free movement area. Cyprus, Romania and 
Bulgaria remain partially outside whereas the remaining new member states became full 
participants in late 2007. The dataset includes information on the new member states from their 
time of EU-membership and thus not only from the date they fully joined Schengen. 
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low range of visa refusal rates (0-5%), 2 for the medium range (5-20%) and 3 for 
the high range (above 20%).
19
 This follows the low, medium and high inter-
quartile ranges in the dataset. The groups are thus coded in a manner similar to, 
for example, how income clusters and country development levels are measured.  
 
The index combines information on visa requirements with issuing practices. An 
alternative to this would be to focus solely on for example refusal rates. Doing so, 
however, introduces a potential bias in the result. The conclusions on the effect of 
a particular variable might be skewed if the group of countries not even facing a 
visa requirement is not taken into account. 
 
Using the index, additionally, takes into account a set of scenarios. These are 
particular relevant for better assessing the restrictiveness in the case of asylum 
origin countries. Firstly, in some sending states a receiving country might not 
even have consular representation for visa-issuing purposes. In order to lodge a 
visa application it is, thus, in principle necessary to travel to a neighbouring state. 
Here, the index assigns a score of 2. Secondly, in some cases the member states 
might refuse altogether to receive request for e.g. tourist visas or require 
applicants to possess certain types of passports. These forms of barriers are not 
well picked up by solely looking at refusal rates. The rejection rate might be low 
but this is in fact due to the strong mechanisms sometimes put in place prior to 
applications entering the system. The index tries to take this into account by re-
assessing the scores based on application figures. If these are very low compared 
with population size and travel distance the index is moved one up. For example, 
a score of 2 is converted into a 3.
20
  
 
                                                 
19
 The visa refusal rate is calculated as the number of refused visas as a share of the total number 
of visa decisions (refused and issued).  
20
 I measured whether or not the application numbers were very low using a model based on travel 
distance and the population size of the sending and the receiving country. Application figures are 
highly structured and with just these variables a considerable amount of variation in the data could 
be accounted for. This model estimate was then used to assess whether a score in a given country 
was very low (below 20% of the expected). 
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The disadvantage of the indicator is that it reduces the amount of variation on the 
dependent variable. I therefore also check the results using the visa refusal rate as 
an alternative indicator.  
 
Independent variables 
Tourism: I measure tourism using World Bank statistics on the total tourism 
expenditure of a country (WB 2010a). The data is collected as part of the “World 
Development Indicators” series. This variable captures how many resources the 
citizens of a country use abroad on accommodation, transport, leisure etc. This 
would seem potentially somewhat difficult to measure, but the variable should at 
least get the relative ranking of the countries right. It should thus give a fairly 
robust indication of how attractive a state is relative to others as a potential source 
of income for the domestic tourism industry.  
 
Bilateral trade: I code the amount of trade between the European states and third 
countries using mainly information from the International Monetary Fund coded 
by the Correlates of War project (Barbieri and Keshk 2012; Barbieri et al. 2009). 
The data was downloaded per year and country for all products and services and 
covers both import and export. These measures are used in international trade 
negotiations warranting for their general accuracy.  
 
Migrant communities: I assess the number of migrants from a sending country 
residing in a receiving state using the Global Bilateral Migration Database 
developed by the World Bank (WB 2012). The data aims to capture the number of 
foreign-born persons residing in a state drawing on census and population 
registers. I use the latest information provided for the year 2000. Due to the many 
and diverse data sources measurement problems might exist in certain cases 
calling for some caution in interpreting the results.  
 
Income: I quantify income using annual World Bank statistics on the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) per capita adjusted for differences in purchasing power 
(PPP) measured in constant 2005 international dollars (WB 2010a). This measure 
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should thus allow for good cross-country comparison because differences in 
country size (per capita), exchange rates (constant international dollars) and 
purchasing power (PPP) has been accounted for. The data was downloaded from 
the World Bank’s statistical database (the “World Development Indicators” 
series). 
 
Muslim and non-Muslim countries: To what extent a country has a Muslim 
majority is coded using data from the CIA’s World Factbook and the US 
Department of State’s 2009 report on International Religious Freedom (CIA 2010; 
DOS 2010). The latter was used to cross-check and fill-in the data from the 
factbook. In general, the variable is thus measured using official census data. For 
several countries the reliability of census data is questionable, particularly when it 
comes to sensitive issues such as religion. There are also likely to be cross-
national variation in the ways religious beliefs are surveyed. I first coded the 
percentage of the country’s total population which is Muslim (0-100). I 
subsequently recoded this into a dichotomous variable (51-100 Muslim majority, 
0-50 not Muslim majority). There is a small group of countries (Burkina Faso, 
Eritrea, Nigeria, Guinea-Bissau, Kazakhstan and Bosnia and Herzegovina) 
slightly below the cut-off mark. Of these particularly Nigeria and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina are interesting since they are often associated with Muslims in 
European public debate. To ensure consistency of the analysis these are, however, 
not coded as Muslim. Chad, by contrast, is the only country slightly above the cut-
off mark. 
 
The number of asylum applications: I measured the size of asylum flows using 
UNHCR statistics on the number and nationality of first instance asylum 
applications (UNHCR 2010). Because of the considerable controversy 
surrounding the question of refugees and asylum these data might contain several 
problems caused by, for example, differences in reporting by the states. It is, 
however, the best global source available.  
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Control variables 
Other factors alongside those already discussed and explicitly theorized could 
influence state decision-making on border openness. These elements should be 
controlled for to reduce the risk of omitted variable bias. That is, the findings 
might be spurious as key factors are left out of the model. I therefore include a 
range of control variables: geographical distance, colonial ties, level of democracy 
and population size of sending state. Starting with distance, this might be a factor 
in different ways. A liberal practice towards neighbour countries might be part of 
a foreign policy strategy of ensuring peaceful regional relations. Colonial ties 
might, in a similar way, influence policy as states might give preferential 
treatment to former subject countries. Level of democracy could also be relevant. 
Just like democracies do not tend to engage in war with each other, they might 
tend to give easy access to citizens of fellow liberal states. Finally, the larger the 
country in terms of population the greater – other things being equal – might be 
the risk of illegal asylum and the potential for trade and tourism.  
 
In addition to these variables concerned with differences between sending 
countries, I also include a set of factors controlling for variation between 
receiving states. These are the size of the tourism industry in receiving states, the 
level of extra-European trade in receiving states and the vote-share of far-right 
parties. Including these in the analysis ensures that potential key differences 
between European states are picked up. 
 
The data sources for these variables are set out in annex one. Here there is also 
summary statistics on all the variables. The following section contains the results 
of the empirical analysis. If nothing else is indicated in footnotes to individual 
tables the source is the dataset. I start out with a descriptive overview of the EU’s 
visa regime and then proceed to discuss and test the strengths and weaknesses of 
the theoretical models. 
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4. An overview of the European visa regime  
The figures on the following pages provide a comprehensive summary of key 
features of the European visa regime as of 2010. Table 1 contains visa application 
statistics, refusal rates and information on consular services per receiving EU 
country. Table 2 sets out similar statistics for 169 sending foreign countries 
outside the EU (and the European Economic Area – EEA). In 2007 and 2008 the 
composition of the Schengen area changed considerably as ten new states joined. I 
therefore focus on 2010 and provide the overview for the entire, enlarged free 
travel area. Map 1 illustrates the variation in refusal rates detailed in table 2. Table 
4 in the annex contains information on trends in applications and refusal rates 
from 2005 to 2010. The overall picture is identical for the different years although 
the average refusal rate has decreased very slightly from 15% in 2005 to 13% in 
2010.  
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Receiving country
Population 
(1000s) Applied for Issued Refused
Issued per 
1000 inhb. Global Average Independent Cooperation None
Mobility 
Barrier
Northern Europe
Denmark 5.550 78.886 71.406 6.538 12,9 8% 14% 31 49 49 1,6
Finland 5.365 1.016.582 1.003.987 12.595 187,1 1% 21% 29 40 60 1,5
Iceland 320 562 549 13 1,7 2% 2% 1 64 64 1,5
Norway 4.883 131.100 119.692 11.408 24,5 9% 24% 45 34 50 1,6
Sweden 9.380 200.546 177.160 14.929 18,9 8% 14% 34 50 45 1,5
Western Europe
Austria 8.394 271.787 260.525 11.262 31,0 4% 9% 37 63 29 1,5
Belgium 10.712 201.048 162.860 38.188 15,2 19% 21% 47 54 28 1,6
France 62.787 2.038.327 1.854.219 184.108 29,5 9% 8% 96 6 27 1,4
Germany 82.302 1.785.415 1.659.410 126.005 20,2 7% 14% 85 18 26 1,6
Luxembourg 507 6.933 6.735 198 13,3 3% 6% 3 96 30 1,6
Netherlands 16.613 369.558 338.878 24.338 20,4 7% 14% 57 38 34 1,5
Switzerland 7.664 374.429 362.021 12.408 47,2 3% 4% 54 0 75 1,4
Eastern Europe
Czech Republic 10.493 538.915 512.599 26.316 48,9 5% 17% 44 0 85 1,6
Estonia 1.341 120.467 116.631 3.836 87,0 3% 13% 8 39 82 1,6
Hungary 9.984 248.177 237.571 9.010 23,8 4% 14% 33 25 71 1,6
Latvia 2.252 138.498 134.988 3.510 59,9 3% 12% 10 31 88 1,5
Lithuania 3.324 275.153 271.468 3.455 81,7 1% 13% 12 13 104 1,5
Poland 38.277 687.976 668.616 19.360 17,5 3% 16% 44 0 85 1,7
Slovakia 5.462 57.260 55.470 1.790 10,2 3% 14% 22 0 107 1,5
Southern Europe
Greece 11.359 611.127 589.314 18.754 51,9 3% 14% 36 59 34 1,5
Italy 60.551 1.322.392 1.266.004 56.388 20,9 4% 10% 67 33 29 1,5
Malta 417 40.401 37.226 3.175 89,3 8% 16% 8 47 74 1,5
Portugal 10.676 116.435 103.113 8.563 9,7 8% 13% 29 69 31 1,5
Slovenia 2.030 49.302 47.664 1.638 23,5 3% 5% 10 72 47 1,5
Spain 46.077 1.121.131 971.838 65.232 21,1 6% 13% 64 39 26 1,5
Total 416.720 11.802.407 11.029.944 663.017 26,5 6% 13% 906 939 1380 1,5
Table 1
2010 visa statistics per receiving country
Short-stay visas Visa refusal rate Consular coverage
Source: European Visa Database, see research design section
Mogens Hobolth 
  Page 65 of 244 
  
Sending country
Population 
(1000s) Applied for Issued Refused
Issued per 
1000 inhb. Global Average Independent Cooperation None
Mobility 
Barrier
Africa
Algeria 35.468 296.963 209.277 78.179 5,9 27% 27% 16 5 4 2,7
Angola 19.082 52.012 46.463 5.193 2,4 10% 17% 8 9 8 2,2
Benin 8.850 12.637 9.825 2.808 1,1 22% 25% 5 11 9 2,5
Botswana 2.007 2.559 2.485 74 1,2 3% 4% 2 14 9 1,7
Burkina Faso 16.469 17.809 15.702 1.881 1,0 11% 19% 5 12 8 2,1
Burundi 8.383 2.582 2.018 564 0,2 22% 12% 2 8 15 2,4
Cameroon 19.599 40.471 33.058 7.325 1,7 18% 34% 7 9 9 2,5
Cape Verde 496 15.007 12.301 2.455 24,8 17% 20% 3 7 15 2,0
Central African Republic 4.401 4.693 3.940 753 0,9 16% 16% 1 11 13 2,0
Chad 11.227 7.791 7.339 452 0,7 6% 6% 1 10 14 2,0
Comoros 735 5.008 3.090 1.918 4,2 38% 38% 1 9 15 2,4
Congo 4.043 19.011 16.296 2.715 4,0 14% 21% 3 8 14 2,1
Congo (Dem. Rep. Of) 65.966 24.813 14.021 10.453 0,2 43% 41% 10 6 9 2,5
Côte d´Ivoire 19.738 42.848 36.235 6.378 1,8 15% 24% 7 9 9 2,4
Djibouti 889 4.167 3.637 530 4,1 13% 13% 1 10 14 2,0
Egypt 81.121 131.777 118.263 11.555 1,5 9% 14% 23 2 0 2,2
Equatorial Guinea 700 11.198 10.032 326 14,3 3% 4% 2 10 13 1,6
Eritrea 5.254 2.810 2.391 416 0,5 15% 16% 3 15 7 2,2
Ethiopia 82.950 14.581 11.821 2.646 0,1 18% 23% 15 6 4 2,6
Gabon 1.505 18.945 17.464 1.451 11,6 8% 8% 3 7 15 2,0
Gambia 1.728 - - - - - - 0 0 25 2,0
Ghana 24.392 22.940 16.406 6.452 0,7 28% 30% 8 12 5 2,8
Guinea 9.982 19.334 15.820 3.580 1,6 18% 36% 3 5 17 2,2
Guinea-Bissau 1.515 4.235 3.409 1.170 2,3 26% 24% 3 9 13 2,3
Kenya 40.513 27.509 23.666 3.677 0,6 13% 16% 18 6 1 2,2
Lesotho 2.171 - - - - - - 0 0 25 2,0
Liberia 3.994 - - - - - - 0 0 25 2,0
Libya 6.355 58.083 54.119 3.242 8,5 6% 7% 14 6 5 1,9
Madagascar 20.714 27.407 25.350 2.057 1,2 8% 7% 4 14 7 2,0
Table 2
2010 visa statistics per sending country
Short-stay visas Visa refusal rate Consular coverage
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Sending country
Population 
(1000s) Applied for Issued Refused
Issued per 
1000 inhb. Global Average Independent Cooperation None
Mobility 
Barrier
Malawi 14.901 1.573 1.482 91 0,1 6% 5% 2 14 9 1,8
Mali 15.370 19.648 14.074 5.403 0,9 28% 34% 6 8 11 2,6
Mauritania 3.460 13.309 11.860 836 3,4 7% 12% 3 8 14 2,1
Mauritius 1.299 - - - - - - - - - 0,0
Morocco 31.951 332.044 288.961 36.937 9,0 11% 22% 16 6 3 2,4
Mozambique 23.391 9.228 8.895 196 0,4 2% 3% 9 9 7 2,0
Namibia 2.283 8.750 8.564 141 3,8 2% 2% 4 13 8 1,6
Niger 15.512 7.940 7.533 391 0,5 5% 6% 2 10 13 2,0
Nigeria 158.423 76.832 51.700 22.579 0,3 30% 37% 17 6 2 2,7
Rwanda 10.624 4.464 3.254 1.125 0,3 26% 20% 3 12 10 2,3
Sao Tome and Principe 165 2.516 2.330 96 14,1 4% 4% 1 10 14 2,0
Senegal 12.434 69.925 51.984 16.445 4,2 24% 35% 10 9 6 2,7
Seychelles 87 - - - - - - - - - 0,0
Sierra Leone 5.868 - - - - - - 0 0 25 2,0
Somalia 9.331 - - - - - - 0 0 25 2,0
South Africa 50.133 169.789 167.417 1.926 3,3 1% 2% 18 6 1 1,4
Sudan 43.552 11.666 9.785 1.625 0,2 14% 12% 8 11 6 2,1
Swaziland 1.186 - - - - - - 0 0 25 2,0
Tanzania 44.841 10.315 9.657 591 0,2 6% 6% 10 9 6 2,0
Togo 6.028 11.361 10.546 815 1,7 7% 10% 2 8 15 2,0
Tunisia 10.481 111.222 98.349 12.764 9,4 11% 24% 16 7 2 2,4
Uganda 33.425 8.995 7.755 1.216 0,2 14% 13% 6 11 8 2,0
Zambia 13.089 3.708 3.294 106 0,3 3% 3% 7 10 8 1,7
Zimbabwe 12.571 5.057 4.962 87 0,4 2% 2% 9 8 8 1,8
Middle East
Armenia 3.092 33.085 29.332 3.753 9,5 11% 12% 6 15 4 2,0
Azerbaijan 9.188 37.698 35.753 1.944 3,9 5% 6% 11 13 1 1,7
Bahrain 1.262 14.674 14.487 187 11,5 1% 1% 3 14 8 1,3
Georgia 4.352 59.298 50.347 8.937 11,6 15% 17% 11 11 3 2,2
Iran 73.974 176.386 151.383 23.103 2,0 13% 17% 19 6 0 2,4
Iraq 31.672 18.936 17.869 873 0,6 5% 9% 8 4 13 2,0
Short-stay visas Visa refusal rate Consular coverage
Table 2 (visa statistics per sending country, continued...)
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Sending country
Population 
(1000s) Applied for Issued Refused
Issued per 
1000 inhb. Global Average Independent Cooperation None
Mobility 
Barrier
Israel 7.418 - - - - - - - - - 0,0
Jordan 6.187 38.186 33.746 2.761 5,5 8% 10% 14 9 2 1,9
Kuwait 2.737 82.160 80.570 1.330 29,4 2% 2% 13 10 2 1,1
Lebanon 4.228 71.058 66.380 4.087 15,7 6% 7% 13 10 2 1,7
Oman 2.782 14.705 14.509 136 5,2 1% 1% 6 5 14 1,6
Palestinian Authority 4.039 - - - - - - 0 0 25 2,0
Qatar 1.759 40.032 39.321 400 22,4 1% 4% 9 10 6 1,4
Saudi Arabia 27.448 174.619 168.734 4.633 6,1 3% 6% 18 6 1 1,7
Syria 20.411 47.590 37.850 8.168 1,9 18% 22% 17 7 1 2,5
Turkey 72.752 599.359 558.781 36.922 7,7 6% 10% 23 2 0 2,0
United Arab Emirates 7.512 162.160 153.693 7.611 20,5 5% 8% 16 7 2 1,7
Yemen 24.053 7.901 7.082 622 0,3 8% 13% 6 10 9 2,1
Europe
Albania 3.204 90.612 73.863 13.626 23,1 16% 19% 15 8 2 2,2
Andorra 85 - - - - - - - - - 0,0
Belarus 9.595 500.976 496.358 4.473 51,7 1% 2% 11 12 2 1,2
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3.760 100.782 94.924 5.763 25,2 6% 4% 16 8 1 1,7
Croatia 4.403 - - - - - - - - - 0,0
Macedonia 2.061 - - - - - - - - - 0,0
Holy see 1 - - - - - - - - - 0,0
Kosovo 1.837 72.866 62.927 9.910 34,3 14% 21% 9 2 14 2,2
Liechtenstein 37 - - - - - - - - - 0,0
Moldova 3.573 51.816 45.641 5.917 12,8 11% 13% 7 11 7 2,0
Monaco 35 - - - - - - - - - 0,0
Montenegro 631 - - - - - - - - - 0,0
San Marino 32 - - - - - - - - - 0,0
Serbia 8.019 - - - - - - - - - 0,0
Ukraine 45.448 984.142 941.885 37.347 20,7 4% 4% 22 2 1 1,6
Central Asia
Kazakhstan 16.026 100.100 96.363 3.611 6,0 4% 9% 17 7 1 1,4
Kyrgyzstan 5.334 5.768 5.075 693 1,0 12% 12% 1 13 11 2,0
Short-stay visas Visa refusal rate Consular coverage
Table 2 (visa statistics per sending country, continued...)
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Sending country
Population 
(1000s) Applied for Issued Refused
Issued per 
1000 inhb. Global Average Independent Cooperation None
Mobility 
Barrier
Russia 142.958 4.245.774 4.143.558 56.433 29,0 1% 2% 24 1 0 1,0
Tajikistan 6.879 2.630 2.511 119 0,4 5% 5% 1 13 11 2,0
Turkmenistan 5.042 4.594 4.452 142 0,9 3% 3% 3 12 10 2,0
Uzbekistan 27.445 18.727 17.074 1.653 0,6 9% 9% 8 16 1 2,0
East & Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam 399 - - - - - - - - - 0,0
Cambodia 14.138 4.458 3.941 517 0,3 12% 12% 2 12 11 2,0
China (PR) 1.341.335 843.115 796.726 39.569 0,6 5% 6% 25 0 0 1,8
Hong Kong S.A.R. 7.053 - - - - - - - - - 0,0
Indonesia 239.871 97.862 94.201 2.681 0,4 3% 4% 17 7 1 1,6
Japan 126.536 - - - - - - - - - 0,0
Korea (North) 24.346 576 436 76 0,0 15% 33% 4 10 11 1,9
Korea (South) 48.184 - - - - - - - - - 0,0
Laos 6.201 3.385 3.335 50 0,5 1% 4% 2 9 14 1,8
Macao S.A.R. 544 - - - - - - - - - 0,0
Malaysia 28.401 - - - - - - - - - 0,0
Mongolia 2.756 7.225 6.370 855 2,3 12% 17% 3 13 9 2,0
Myanmar 47.963 2.743 2.612 131 0,1 5% 5% 3 12 10 2,1
Papua New Guinea 6.858 790 790 0 0,1 0% 0% 1 13 11 1,4
Philippines 93.261 77.333 70.259 6.442 0,8 8% 11% 12 9 4 2,0
Singapore 5.086 - - - - - - - - - 0,0
Taiwan 23.114 197.675 197.271 383 8,5 0% 1% 14 0 11 1,5
Thailand 69.122 169.867 158.079 11.114 2,3 7% 7% 19 5 1 1,7
Timor-Leste 1.124 510 258 2 0,2 1% 1% 1 4 20 1,8
Vietnam 87.848 50.399 45.784 4.085 0,5 8% 9% 17 6 2 2,1
South Asia
Afghanistan 31.412 6.098 4.607 1.429 0,1 24% 10% 8 4 13 2,2
Bangladesh 148.692 14.010 11.021 2.926 0,1 21% 30% 8 11 6 2,3
Bhutan 726 - - - - - - 0 0 25 2,0
India 1.224.614 449.590 420.023 28.878 0,3 6% 12% 21 4 0 2,2
Maldives 316 - - - - - - 0 0 25 2,0
Table 2 (visa statistics per sending country, continued...)
Short-stay visas Visa refusal rate Consular coverage
Mogens Hobolth 
  Page 69 of 244 
 
Sending country
Population 
(1000s) Applied for Issued Refused
Issued per 
1000 inhb. Global Average Independent Cooperation None
Mobility 
Barrier
Nepal 29.959 9.095 7.979 1.099 0,3 12% 15% 5 12 8 2,0
Pakistan 173.593 52.339 37.416 14.581 0,2 28% 37% 17 7 1 2,9
Sri Lanka 20.860 18.380 13.441 4.917 0,6 27% 24% 7 14 4 2,6
Australia - Oceania
Australia 22.268 - - - - - - - - - 0,0
Fiji 861 1.886 1.859 27 2,2 1% 1% 1 13 11 1,4
Kiribati 100 - - - - - - 0 0 25 2,0
Marshall Islands 54 - - - - - - 0 0 25 2,0
Micronesia 111 - - - - - - 0 0 25 2,0
Nauru 10 - - - - - - 0 0 25 2,0
New Zealand 4.368 - - - - - - - - - 0,0
Northern Marianas 61 - - - - - - 0 0 25 2,0
Palau 20 - - - - - - 0 0 25 2,0
Solomon Islands 538 - - - - - - 0 0 25 2,0
Tonga 104 - - - - - - 0 0 25 2,0
Tuvalu 10 - - - - - - 0 0 25 2,0
Vanuatu 240 338 337 1 1,4 0% 0% 1 10 14 1,6
Western Samoa 183 - - - - - - 0 0 25 2,0
Central America and Caribbean
Antigua and Barbuda 89 - - - - - - - - - 0,0
Bahamas 343 - - - - - - - - - 0,0
Barbados 273 - - - - - - - - - 0,0
Belize 312 - - - - - - 0 0 25 2,0
Costa Rica 4.659 - - - - - - - - - 0,0
Cuba 11.258 30.637 27.308 2.527 2,4 8% 13% 16 8 1 1,9
Dominica 68 - - - - - - 0 0 25 2,0
Dominican Republic 9.927 25.793 18.356 6.934 1,8 27% 27% 6 14 5 2,6
El Salvador 6.193 - - - - - - - - - 0,0
Grenada 104 - - - - - - 0 0 25 2,0
Guatemala 14.389 - - - - - - - - - 0,0
Haiti 9.993 6.756 5.045 1.711 0,5 25% 17% 3 12 10 2,5
Table 2 (visa statistics per sending country, continued...)
Short-stay visas Visa refusal rate Consular coverage
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Sending country
Population 
(1000s) Applied for Issued Refused
Issued per 
1000 inhb. Global Average Independent Cooperation None
Mobility 
Barrier
Honduras 7.601 - - - - - - - - - 0,0
Jamaica 2.741 3.582 3.394 154 1,2 4% 12% 4 7 14 1,8
Nicaragua 5.788 - - - - - - - - - 0,0
Panama 3.517 - - - - - - - - - 0,0
Saint Kitts and Nevis 52 - - - - - - - - - 0,0
Saint Lucia 174 1.365 1.350 15 7,8 1% 1% 1 11 13 1,5
Saint Vincent and Gren. 109 - - - - - - 0 0 25 2,0
Trinidad and Tobago 1.341 6.093 5.984 79 4,5 1% 1% 4 12 9 1,5
North America
Canada 34.017 - - - - - - - - - 0,0
Mexico 113.423 - - - - - - - - - 0,0
United States of America 310.384 - - - - - - - - - 0,0
South America
Argentina 40.412 - - - - - - - - - 0,0
Bolivia 9.930 9.097 6.807 2.124 0,7 24% 15% 6 12 7 2,3
Brazil 194.946 - - - - - - - - - 0,0
Chile 17.114 - - - - - - - - - 0,0
Colombia 46.295 97.859 85.153 10.936 1,8 11% 14% 13 9 3 2,1
Ecuador 14.465 27.657 21.763 5.700 1,5 21% 14% 5 7 13 2,1
Guyana 754 - - - - - - 0 0 25 2,0
Paraguay 6.455 - - - - - - - - - 0,0
Peru 29.077 46.155 40.144 5.349 1,4 12% 14% 14 9 2 2,0
Suriname 525 17.573 16.597 951 31,6 5% 3% 2 14 9 2,0
Uruguay 3.369 - - - - - - - - - 0,0
Venezuela 28.980 - - - - - - - - - 0,0
Total 6.374.240 11.802.407 11.029.944 663.017 1,7 6% 13% 906 939 1380 1,5
2010 visa statistics per sending country
Short-stay visas Visa refusal rate Consular coverage
Source: European Visa Database, see research design section
Table 2 (visa statistics per sending country, continued...)
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Map 1: Variation in visa refusal rates per sending country (own rendering based on the data used for this paper) 
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Turning to table 1 we see, firstly, that there are differences between the receiving 
states in terms of the number of applications they process. A significant part of 
this variation can be attributed to country size: France, Germany, Italy, Spain and 
Poland alone receive 7 out of the 12 million visa applications submitted at 
Schengen consulates. This aspect is taken into account in the column with the 
number of visas issued per 1000 inhabitants. On average, a Schengen member 
issue 27 travel visas per thousand citizens. Finland, Estonia, Lithuania and Malta 
are significantly above this level. This is mainly due to applications from Russia 
and – in the case of Malta – from Libya. At the lower end we find Iceland which 
issues a very small number of visas. 
 
The table contains two measurements of refusal rates. The ‘global’ column 
calculates the refusal rates as the share of visas refused out of the total number of 
visa decisions. The ‘average’ column computes it as the mean of the refusal rate 
of each sending country. The global measure is in general significantly lower 
because it is influenced by key outlier countries, first and foremost Russia, where 
member states have a lenient practice. EU-states in general receive a vast amount 
of visa applications at their Russian consulates and these are seldom turned down. 
This causes the global figure to come out at a low level. The average measure, in 
contrast, is per sending state and is therefore not sensitive to variation in 
application numbers. It therefore gives a better impression of the overall 
restrictiveness from the perspective of individual sending states (cf. Neumayer 
2005). Focusing on this measure, we see that the EU mean is 13%. Iceland, 
Luxembourg, Switzerland, Slovenia appear to be somewhat below this trend. 
Finland, Norway and Belgium appear somewhat above it. However, there is 
substantial variation within each receiving state depending on the origin of the 
visa applications. 
 
The consular coverage columns give an overview of the diplomatic representation 
of the member states abroad. In how many sending countries do they have 
independent representation, make use of another Schengen state or are not 
represented at all? France, for example, operates own consulates in 96 countries, 
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is represented by another Schengen member in 6 and does not have a presence in 
27. In general, the larger EU-states have an extensive network of own visa-issuing 
facilities. The smaller members have fewer independent diplomatic 
representations but make extensive use of cooperative agreements (see paper two).  
 
The last column in table 1 contains the average mobility barrier score for each 
EU-state. This measure takes into account the consular cooperation and cases of 
non-representation. When these aspects are taken into account the average 
restrictiveness of the EU-states is largely similar at about a 1.5 level; midway 
between a low and medium mobility barrier.  
 
Moving on to table 2 and map 1 they indicate, first and foremost, that there are 
major differences between sending states in terms of visa applications, refusal 
rates, consular coverage and the overall mobility barrier. In 2010 refusal rates 
ranged from 0% (Papua New Guinea) to 43% (Democratic Republic of Congo). 
Applications ranged from 338 (Vanuatu) to 4.2 million (Russia). In China all 
member states had independent diplomatic representation; in Somalia and Sierra 
Leona no consulates were open for receiving visa applications. Two receiving 
states had visa facilities in Cambodia with 13 other Schengen members relying on 
these and 11 without any representation at all in this state. 
 
All in all, the descriptive statistics highlights the manifold variation within the 
visa regime. In particular, there appears to be very substantial differences between 
sending states. Compared to this, the variation across receiving countries looks to 
be fairly small and mainly concern the amount of visa applications received and 
not the restrictiveness as such. In the next section I test the two theoretical models 
set out above and assess to what extent they are able to account for the variation in 
the restrictiveness of the EU’s external border. 
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5. Explaining variation in openness 
In this section I attempt to explain the variation in the openness of Europe’s 
external borders to short-term visitors. The first part of the analysis tests the two 
theoretical explanations. The second part discusses the robustness of the results. 
 
Testing the theories 
To what extent are the models able to explain variation in the restrictiveness of 
destination states? As set out in the previous section I use the mobility barriers 
index to assess the level of openness. Nationals of countries such as Canada, Chile 
and Japan face few if any policy barriers to their mobility. They do not need a visa 
to travel to Europe yielding a score of 0 on the index. At the other end of the 
spectrum we find countries such as Afghanistan, Algeria and Iraq. Citizens of 
these states require a visa to travel to Europe and the rules are very tightly 
enforced resulting in a high barrier (score 3). Nationals of Oman, Seychelles and 
Indonesia need a visa but applications are seldom refused. They hence face a low 
barrier. In between we find states such as Vietnam, India and Peru where travel is 
restricted through a visa requirement and the rules neither tightly nor lightly 
enforced (score 2). Can we account for some of this variation using the security 
and interest group theories? Do they allow us to make a better assessment of the 
likely mobility barriers in place than merely looking at the average tendencies in 
the data? 
 
Table 3 below presents the main results of the multivariate regression analyses. I 
have taken into account possible clustering tendencies in the data by including 
each year and receiving state as a control variable (e.g. Belgium yes/no). This 
helps to ensure that the assumption of independent observations can be upheld 
(“homoscedasticity”). If this was not possible the results would be very uncertain 
(Agresti and Finlay 1997: 534). I have tested each theoretical model using a 
separate regression and run a combined test including all variables. The key 
results are as follows: 
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Starting with regression 1 this is the test of the interest group model. We can see 
that two of the key variables – tourism expenditures and bilateral trade levels – 
have a significant effect on the openness of the border in the expected direction. 
The higher the tourism expenditure of the nationals of a sending state the less 
restrictive the mobility barrier. A similar pattern is picked-up by the regression in 
the case of trade. The effect of the variables is non-linear. For example, initial 
shifts away from lower levels of trade have a much more considerable impact than 
moves from a high to an even higher amount of trade. 
 
The size of the diaspora from a third country is significant but not in the direction 
expected by interest group theory (not supporting H3). The larger the diaspora in a 
member state the higher the refusal rate. Thus, minority communities would not 
seem able to lobby for a lower refusal rate for visitors from their former home 
state. This result is puzzling from the interest group perspective. It suggests that 
Constant 2,45 ** 4,57 ** 5,34 **
Tourism expenditure (mio., current US $) (ln) -0,15 (-0,40) ** 0,03 (0,08) **
Bilateral trade (mio., current US $) (ln) -0,03 (-0,12) ** -0,06 (-0,25) **
Migrant community (ln) 0,08 -0,36 ** 0,03 (0,12) **
Income (GDP/capita, PPP, int 2005 $) (ln) -0,36 (-0,46) ** -0,31 (-0,46) **
Muslim-majority country (yes/no) 0,43 (0,21) ** 0,23 (0,14) **
Asylym applications in total (ln) 0,02 (0,06) ** 0,03 (0,10) **
Extra-EU trade as share of GDP 0,01 (0,09)
Tourism receipts as share of GDP -0,03 (-0,10)
Far right vote share - - -
Colonial ties 0,14 (0,03) **
Democracy score (Freedom House) 0,10 (0,20) **
Distance from sending to receiving country -0,15 (-0,13) **
Population size of sending country -0,03 (-0,08) **
Observations
R
2
Regression 3
Table 3
Testing the theories
SOURCE: The European Visa Database and other datasets. See the research design section of the paper.
Regression 1 Regression 2
NOTES: Information on the year and receiving country fixed effects are not reported in the table. The base is 
the year 2009 and the receiving country Germany. Standardized beta coefficients are in parenthesis.
** Statistically significant at 0.01% level. * statistical significant at 0.05% level
7.850
17%
15.098
33% 42%
6.917
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the diaspora variable to a wider extent works as a part of a security explanation. A 
large diaspora could make it easier for visitors with the same nationality to 
overstay their visa thus triggering a fear of irregular migration. 
 
Overall, the data thus lends support to H1 and H2 and not H3. The impact of 
tourism and trade is substantial. Let us first look at tourism. In 2005, for example, 
Russian nationals spent approximately 18.305 million current US dollars on 
tourism. This makes it a major tourism market. The model predicts a resulting 
reduced mobility barrier by about 1,4 points. As the scale runs from 0 to 3 this is a 
large effect. The impact of bilateral trade is also substantial but smaller. Import 
and export between Germany and Russia totalled about 40.098 million current US 
dollars the same year making it a top five trading partner. Here, the model predicts 
a reduced barrier of approximately 0,3 points. This difference in the size of the 
effects makes sense from the interest group perspective. Tourism involves one 
distinct set of actors with a strong incentive to lobby on the issue as it is their core 
activity. Businesses involved in cross-border transactions are in general, in 
contrast, somewhat more diverse. Hence, we should expect the tourism sector to 
be more organized and active on the issue compared with general business 
associations and large firms as such. The Russian migrant community in Germany 
is at about 0,98 million increasing the mobility barrier by 1,1 points. Taking the 
three effects together the interest group model estimates a low to medium policy 
barrier to mobility in the case of Russia (a score slightly below 2). This tails with 
what we observed in the year in question, but throughout the period scores were in 
general somewhat lower. 
 
To take another example let us look at Lebanon. Tourism was in 2005 at 3.565 
million estimated to reduce the barrier by 1,2 points. Trade was at 643 million 
translating into a reduction of 0,2 point. The Lebanese migrant community in 
Germany is at about 52.000 increasing the barrier by 0,9 points. Lebanon is thus 
estimated to face a medium barrier (score 2) – similar to what we observed in the 
period.  
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The model is, however, more often off the mark than correct in its estimations. It 
is near impossible for it to predict the absence of a visa requirement. To reach this 
level requires very large values on the tourism and trade scores not actually 
observed in the time-period. At the top-end the model rarely predicts a high 
mobility barrier because it is very sensitive to small initial increases in the amount 
of tourism. It thus often arrives at the prediction of a medium mobility barrier. 
This is a fine prediction but often not much of an improvement from simply 
looking at the average tendencies in the data. All in all, the model is able to 
account for 17% of the variation in the dataset. 
 
Moving on to the security explanation, we see that income has a statistically 
significant and sizable negative impact on mobility barriers. The richer the 
sending country the lower the impediments to mobility set up by the receiving 
state (supporting H4). Muslim majority countries face a barrier substantially above 
average controlling for other factors (supporting H5). The amount of asylum 
application from a third country also has a statistically significant effect 
(supporting H6). As the flow of refugees from a sending state increase the 
restrictiveness picks up. Thus, the three key observable implications of the 
security model are evidenced in the data. 
 
What are the substantial implications of the model? To probe this let us again look 
at a set of cases. Brunei, Singapore, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates are all 
very high-income countries with a GDP per capita in 2005 of between 44.000 to 
49.000 international dollars (Germany in the same year had a GDP per capita of 
about 32.000). They are not source countries of refugees and this hence does not 
affect the openness of the border. An income level this large is estimated to 
reduce the mobility barrier with about 3,9 points yielding the model to predict 
visa-free access. Kuwait and the Emirates, however, are also Muslim-majority 
countries. This is estimated to increase the barrier by 0,4 points putting the 
countries into the low barrier category. These estimations are also what we see in 
practice. Brunei and Singapore enjoy visa-free travel to Europe whereas nationals 
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of Kuwait and the Emirates need a visa to travel but face a relatively lenient 
enforcement of the rules.  
 
In general, a GDP/capita of above 10.000 qualifies a state as having a high income 
level. 31 sending countries reached this threshold in 2005. Of these 15 faced a 
visa requirement. Eight of them had a Muslim-majority and this factor is picked 
up by the model as the key reason for the increased barrier to mobility they face. 
The high income level should lead us to expect an open border but because of 
their religious make-up visitors are still somewhat interpreted within a framework 
of threats and dangers. Most of the remaining seven cases fall at the lower end of 
the high-income group. The security model here captures the mobility barrier 
correctly solely by looking at their lower wealth. Only two cases are not estimated 
well by the model. These are Equatorial Guinea and Mauritius. Here, the interest 
group theory has a better prediction. As small countries of limited interest as 
tourism markets and no strong trading ties it predicts a medium barrier (a score of 
2), which is also what was observed in 2005. The security model puts the two 
cases in the low barrier category (score 1). 
 
Let us now turn to the variable on asylum seekers. In 2005 the UNHCR registered 
that Afghan nationals lodged about 13.000 asylum applications around the world. 
This is estimated to increase the mobility barrier by about 0,2 points. As a poor 
Muslim-majority country the model in total predicts that the policy barrier to 
mobility in the case of Afghanistan should be high. This is borne out by the data. 
In the same year citizens of Rwanda and Togo lodged a largely similar amount of 
asylum applications. As non-Muslim countries the model estimates a medium 
barrier. In practice, however, the restrictiveness was at a high level. Here we thus 
see that the different threat constructions at the centre of the security theory – 
poverty, refugees and Muslims – might interact with each other in different ways. 
Amongst poorer countries religious make-up and refugee outflows, either separate 
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or in combination, might be equal ways of reaching the outcome of a high 
mobility barrier.
21
  
 
The effect of asylum applications quickly reaches its maximum effect in the 
model. At 1.000 applications the effect is at 0,1. It then climbs very slowly. In the 
case of Myanmar, at 55.774 the largest origin country of asylum seekers in 2005, 
the effect is at 0,2. Theoretically, this suggests a somewhat different securitization 
dynamics in the cases of refugees and poverty. The latter impacts the mobility 
barrier gradually. The former has more of an either-or impact. Even a relatively 
small amount of protection seekers substantially increases the mobility barriers, 
but this effect then remains relatively constant regardless of further shifts to even 
higher asylum application numbers. 
 
All in all, the security model provides a good account of key patterns in the data. 
It is able to account for 33% of the variation in the dataset. It thus fits 
considerably better with the data than the interest group perspective. There are 
substantial differences left unaccounted for suggesting space for improvement and 
the relevance of potential alternative accounts. The model detects, as discussed, 
key differences in the policy barrier to mobility in place against the group of high 
income countries. It is also able to pin-point some variation amongst poorer 
countries but here with somewhat less success.  
 
The third regression combines all the variables in a single analysis and includes 
all the control variables. Here we see that all variables are again statistically 
significant. The direction of their effect is unchanged but for tourism expenditure. 
It thus does not appear to be a stable predictor. The liberalizing dynamic now 
mainly seems to result from trading interests, somewhat puzzlingly compared to 
what we should expect theoretically. This model has a better overall fit with the 
data being able to explain 42% of the variation in the dataset. Yet the strength of 
the full regression is not that higher than the security model alone. Hence, the 
                                                 
21
 Multiple pathways to similar results are not easily picked up by a general regression model, 
suggesting that for example that a Qualitative Comparative Analysis could produce interesting 
results (Ragin 2000). 
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simple securitization perspective might be preferable. The increased complexity 
resulting from the additional variables does not yield a major improvement of 
explanatory purchase.  
 
The change in the direction of the effect of the tourism variable points to a 
potential problem of multicollinearity in the data. Income levels, tourism and 
trade are somewhat correlated with each other. As the relative wealth of a country 
increases, there is a tendency for trading levels to increase and the state becoming 
a more attractive tourism market. Especially tourism and income has a tendency 
to follow each other. This creates a challenge of causal over-determinism. To 
some extent we observe that the mobility barriers decrease as a sending country 
becomes a more attractive tourism market. As such this supports the interest 
group thesis. However, as increases in tourism are correlated with increased 
wealth the reduced barrier can also be in line with the security perspective. This 
model interprets the trend as evidence of a gradually weaker framing of these new 
arrivals within a discourse of threat to European welfare states.  
 
To further probe this question I assessed the effect of the variables considering 
countries in different income groups separately. Within each country cluster the 
tourism, income and trade variables are to a less extent mutually correlated. Doing 
so reveals a similar liberalizing effect of tourism and trade especially among 
higher income countries. The impact is less clear in the other country groups. This 
is not simply a reflection of lower income countries being irrelevant. The group 
covers states such as Indonesia, Philippines, India and Ukraine which are 
important tourism markets and trading partners. The data thus suggests that client 
politics operate under significant constraints and is mainly able to exercise an 
impact when migration fears are of a somewhat smaller concern. 
 
Finally, when we look at the control variables level of democracy has a significant 
and sizable impact. Higher levels of democracies are associated with lower 
mobility barriers. We also see that distance, population size and colonial ties 
matter. The further away the larger the country the more liberal the visa regime. 
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Previous colonies are not treated preferentially but on the contrary face more 
restrictive border control than others.  
 
Turning to the control variables testing for differences between the destination 
states, the model finds that the size of domestic tourism and export sectors are not 
significant. The far right vote share variable could not be estimated. There is, in 
general, limited variation in mobility barriers between the receiving countries and 
the variable is unable to make sense of the few cases where we observe notable 
differences. To illustrate, Belgium and Italy have respectively the most restrictive 
and liberal visa-issuing practice within Schengen. Yet in both the far right has an 
overall similar vote share of about 10%. This is not to rule out per se that far right 
politics have an influence. But if so, it would require different research strategies 
to identify such as quantitative analysis over time or comparative case studies. 
 
To sum up, the empirical analysis evidences that European visa practices are 
influenced in a liberal direction by tourism and business interests lobbying for 
easy access. This, however, looks to be counterbalanced by fears of asylum claims 
and immigration from poor, Muslim countries which often outweigh commercial 
interests and generate restrictive practices. Both the interest group and the security 
theory have explanatory purchase, but securitization of migration seems to be a 
more powerful logic than business interests. Finally, other factors also play a role 
especially the level of democracy of a sending country. 
 
Robustness checks 
I have used a set of alternative models to check the stability of the results. First of 
all, I have run separate regression analysis for each destination country. This 
should help identify if the results are driven by a particular subset of cases. It also 
provides an indication of whether the significance, effect magnitude and overall 
explanatory purchase of the theoretical models are very different between 
destination countries. Doing so did not reveal uncertainty about the overall 
tendencies discussed above. We do see variance between member states in the 
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size of the effect of the variables but the main results of the analysis appears 
stable. 
 
Additionally, I have run separate analyses using visa requirement, visa refusal rate 
and numbers of visas issued as the dependent variable. Such an analysis could 
reveal potential problems with the coding of the mobility barriers index. The 
results were again largely similar. That is, the findings provided good support for 
the security model and some evidence in favour of the interest group perspective. 
Using the index captured a stronger effect of the asylum variable. This suggests 
the importance of taking ‘deterrence’ mechanisms into considerations. Looking 
solely at visa refusal rates, for example, Somalia drops out from the analysis 
because the member states do not have any consular representation in the state for 
visa-issuing purposes.  
 
Finally, I compared the findings of the simply Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
analysis with a more complex Generalized Linear Regression Model (GLM). 
Doing so should reveal if results are heavily tied up with the choice of statistical 
method. Again, the results were largely identical. 
 
These checks thus give reason to expect that the analysis has captured key 
patterns, and are not the result of problematic variables or tendencies in the data 
causing estimation problems.  
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper I have explored similarities and differences in the openness of the 
EU’s external border to visitors of different nationalities. The analysis was based 
on a new migration control database covering visa requirements, access to 
consular visa services and information on the short-term visas applied for, issued 
and refused in the period from 2005 to 2010.  
 
I showed that the variation in the barriers to mobility put in place by receiving 
countries can best be explained by security theory. The model derived from 
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interest group theory did, however, also have some purchase. There is thus both a 
liberalizing and a restrictive dynamic at work in the border regime. Assessing the 
relative explanatory power of these two theories I argued that although business 
lobbying is evidenced, the main patterns in the data primarily support a security-
centred explanation of European migration control practices. Especially travellers 
from poor, Muslim and asylum producing countries seem to be refused access to 
European territory.  
 
Security explanations have been predominant in the field of European migration 
control studies generating valuable research. Yet with a predominance of 
explorative and conceptual case studies the empirical basis and methodological 
underpinnings of the approach have been somewhat uncertain. The extent to 
which the theory can account for variation in the restrictiveness of border 
practices has not been systematically assessed. Nor has the strength of alternative 
accounts been tested. The recent attempt by some scholars to critically challenge 
this paradigm is thus a welcome call for nuance and further empirical analysis. 
However, the findings of this paper underlines the importance of a continued 
focus on the restrictive security logics of European policy, while keeping in mind 
that liberalizing dynamics are also operating. 
 
Additional analysis could probe the precise causal mechanisms at work, and 
explore further the robustness and wider applicability of the conclusions. It could 
be interesting, for example, to examine through qualitative studies how precisely 
public threat constructions impact on the control practices on the ground. The 
seemingly minor role of business lobbying could also be probed in more detail. 
The comparative perspective provided in this paper offers a good background for 
selecting cases for in-depth study. It could also be worthwhile to theorize further 
how levels of democracy influences border regimes. One could imagine, for 
example, that it forms part of self-other constructions of liberal states (cf. Wendt 
1999) influencing their perception of foreign travellers.  
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The database deployed for this article also open up other avenues of research. The 
visa information could be used to probe the effect of Schengen membership by 
analysing how the visa-issuing practice of new and old EU member states altered 
when the free travel area expanded (see paper three). The dataset also contains 
information on the non-Schengen members the United Kingdom and the United 
States providing an opportunity for a wider comparative perspective on migration 
control in contemporary Europe. 
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Annex 
 
 
 
The control variables were put together in the following way:  
 
Geographical distance was computed mathematically as the distance between the 
capitals of the sending and the receiving country in kilometres using the 
Haversine formula and the latitude and longitude of the cities. The precise 
procedure followed is detailed in the database codebook.  
 
Colonial ties was coded by checking whether or not a sending country was a 
colony of a receiving state using information from Oxford’s Dictionary of World 
History and Dictionary of Contemporary World History (Oxford 2010a, 2010b). I 
initially coded the duration in years of the colonial period and subsequently 
recoded this variable into a binary measure (colony of receiving state yes/no).  
 
The level of democracy was measured using the Freedom House Index (FH 2012). 
The index measures freedom in a country on two separate dimensions: political 
Variable N Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Deviation
Mobility Barriers Index 18.650 1,6 2,0 0,0 3,0 0,9
Tourism expenditure (mio., current US $) (ln) 16.326 6,0 5,9 -0,7 11,7 2,2
Bilateral trade (mio., current US $) (ln) 10.358 2,7 2,9 -2,3 11,5 3,3
Migrant community (ln) 19.695 3,4 3,6 -2,3 14,5 3,9
Income (GDP/capita, PPP, int 2005 $) (ln) 17.948 8,4 8,4 5,2 11,3 1,2
Muslim-majority country (yes/no) 20.171 0,3 0,0 0,0 1,0 0,5
Asylym applications in total (ln) 17.493 6,1 6,6 -2,3 12,0 2,9
Extra-EU trade as share of GDP 15.439 5,4 5,0 1,0 34,0 4,9
Tourism receipts as share of GDP 20.171 3,4 2,0 1,0 15,0 2,6
Far right vote share 20.171 7,0 6,0 0,0 30,0 6,4
Colonial ties 20.171 0,0 0,0 No Yes 0,1
Democracy score (Freedom House) 19.492 3,7 3,5 1,0 7,0 1,9
Distance from sending to receiving country 20.171 8,7 8,8 1,3 9,9 0,7
Population size of sending country 19.814 8,4 8,8 -2,3 14,1 2,4
Summary statistics
Table 4
SOURCE: The European Visa Database and other datasets. See the research design section of the paper.
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rights and civil liberties. The former includes, for example, the right to vote and 
the latter freedom of speech. The scale runs from 1 (highest degree of freedom) to 
7 (lowest degree of freedom). In the analysis I use the average score of a sending 
country across both dimensions.  
 
The population size of sending states was measured using figures from the United 
Nation’s population division (UN 2011). In a few cases data was missing and I 
had to rely on other sources and estimation procedures. These are detailed in the 
database codebook.  
 
The size of the tourism industry in receiving states was assessed via the World 
Bank data used also to calculate the tourism potential of sending countries. This 
data is thus described further in the main text. To estimate the size of the industry 
I used the data on receipts (in current USD) and divided this by the GDP of the 
countries. Doing so should identify the overall share of the economic activity in 
the receiving states originating from tourism in the different years.  
 
The level of extra-European trade in receiving states was measured using the 
global bilateral trade dataset already described in the research design section. For 
each receiving state and year I isolated the export to outside the EU/EEA area (in 
current USD) and, as in measuring the tourism sector, divided this by the GDP of 
the country. This variable should thus capture the extent to which the overall 
economy relies on exports to outside of the EU.  
 
The vote-share of far-right parties in the receiving states was calculated drawing 
on the Parliament and Government Composition Database (ParlGov 2012). This 
dataset includes comprehensive information on the vote share of different parties 
for all the receiving states in the analysed time period. In the dataset there is a 
classification of party families including a group called ‘right-wing’. I took this as 
a starting-point and cross-checked the coding drawing on general research into the 
far right (Norris 2005; Spanje 2011). This revealed some potential problematic 
groupings and I thus recoded a set of cases, such the Freedom Party in Austria, as 
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belonging to the family of right-wing parties. The precise transformations are 
detailed on the database website. After having done so I imported the data on 
these parties vote share in elections relevant for the investigated time period. For 
each country I computed a combined score. That is, if more than one party was 
categorised as right-wing I calculated a total vote share of all the far right parties.  
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PAPER TWO 
 
European visa cooperation: interest politics and regional imagined 
communities 
 
 
Abstract 
Since the early 1990s the European Union has struggled to increase integration in 
the sovereignty sensitive areas of justice and home affairs and foreign policy. The 
aim of this paper is to enhance our understanding of what patterns of cooperation 
have been established between the member states, and why. I do so by analysing 
the case of short-stay visa policy. Visas are a corner stone of EU’s border control 
and moreover an instrument of diplomacy. As a field where harmonization is in 
general considerable it is an ‘extreme case’ well-suited for drawing out empirical 
patterns and developing theoretical concepts.  
 
The paper is based on a network analytical approach and a new dataset of all the 
EU/Schengen countries’ mutual consular visa assistance agreements from 2005 to 
2010. I show that cooperation is intensive and that the member states mainly share 
sovereignty in four regional clusters – a Nordic, Benelux, Southern European and 
emerging Central Eastern. France and Germany are at the centre of the network. 
Analysing rival rationalist and constructivist explanations, I find that the latter 
provides the most convincing account of the patterns in the data. I put forward a 
new concept of ‘regional imagined communities’ which explains cooperation by 
the existence of shared identities owing to regional commonalities in language 
and state-building histories. The term improves our understanding of European 
integration in visa policy, and could hold wider potential for explaining dynamics 
of collaboration in other sovereignty sensitive policy areas. 
 
Keywords 
Regional imagined communities, intensive transgovernmentalism, justice and 
home affairs, European foreign policy, Schengen, visa, consular cooperation 
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1. Introduction 
From the beginning of the 1990s and onwards the European Union has established 
still closer cooperation in the controversial areas of justice and home affairs and 
foreign policy (Howorth 2001; Lavenex and Wallace 2005).  
 
Yet because of the sovereignty-sensitive character of the policy fields integration 
has in both cases stopped short of full supranational and hierarchical governance 
(Lavenex 2009: 256f). Cooperation has instead primarily been marked by 
“intensive transgovernmentalism” (Lavenex 2010; Wallace 2010: 93; Wallace and 
Giegerich 2010: 210).
22
 This term captures the existence of substantial and dense 
collaboration strongly dominated by the member states. The supranational 
institutions, such as the European Commission, Parliament and the Court of 
Justice, only play a minor role (Wallace 2010: 92f).
23
 Pin-pointing the overall 
importance of state governments existing research has, however, not investigated 
in detail the constraints and structures in their mutual interaction.
24
 In this paper I 
aim to contribute to the existing literature by investigating what patterns of 
cooperation have been established between the member states in a particular 
sovereignty sensitive policy area, and why.  
 
The case I study is European consular cooperation abroad in visa matters. Visas 
grant or deny individuals legal access to state territories (Guild 2009: 118f). 
Establishing and enforcing visa restrictions are matters of diplomacy and foreign 
relations, as well as central instruments in relation to internal security and the 
control of illegal migration (Martenczuk 2009). It is thus a case on both interior 
and foreign policy cooperation. Visas are, additionally, an example of a 
                                                 
22
 Wallace (2010) classifies intensive transgovernmentalism as one policy-making mode alongside 
four other used in the EU: the classical community method, the EU regulatory mode, the EU 
distributional mode and policy coordination. Tömmel (2009) operates with four types of European 
governance: hierarchical, negotiation, competition and cooperation. In her framework intensive 
transgovernmentalism could be seen as a hybrid of negotiation and cooperation. 
23
 Transgovernmentalism can also be defined as a situation where actors from diverse ministries 
and levels of government cooperate directly with their counterparts in other European states 
without explicit national coordination and control from for example foreign ministries (Bigo 2000; 
Lavenex 2009: 258; Mérand et al. 2010). 
24
 An exception to this trend has been the general observation that cooperation is limited by the 
need for a converging interest of all members and that as a result political agreements reached 
tends to reflect the lowest common denominator (Lavenex 2009: 266). 
Mogens Hobolth 
  Page 90 of 244 
sovereignty-sensitive policy area where the member states have established 
especially strong cooperation (Lavenex and Ucarer 2002: 6).
25
 It is thereby an 
‘extreme case’ (Flyvbjerg 1991: 150) and as such able to bring out empirical 
patterns otherwise not easily identifiable. In that way it provides a good basis for 
theoretical development (George and Bennett 2005: 75).  
 
Based on a new, comprehensive and original dataset of consular visa cooperation 
agreements and a network analytical method I advance two empirical arguments 
and one theoretical: 
 
Firstly, the EU-states cooperate intensively abroad in visa matters. Outside 
Europe, the average Schengen member has independent visa-issuing consular 
representation in about 50 countries, relies on cooperative agreements in 50 and is 
not represented in 70 states.  
 
Secondly, the structure of the cooperation largely follows regional clusters within 
Europe. The Nordic countries, Benelux, Southern Europe and to some extent also 
the new Central and Eastern member states all cooperate internally. France and 
Germany tie the clusters together as the centre of the network. Thus, the Schengen 
states mainly cooperate in the visa entry control process within tight regional 
circles.  
 
Thirdly, while both realism (Waltz 1979) and liberal intergovernmentalism 
(Moravcsik 1993) are able to explain important parts of the empirical pattern, 
constructivism (Jepperson et al. 1996) on the whole goes furthest in accounting 
for the network structure. In particular, I put forward a concept of ‘regional 
imagined communities’ (cf. Anderson 1991) as a central factor in explaining the 
cooperation. This notion, I suggest, could have a wider analytical potential as a 
tool for understanding integration in other sovereignty-sensitive areas. 
                                                 
25
 Lavenex (2010: 462) characterizes asylum and visa policy as the areas of justice and home 
affairs where the member states has gone the furthest in transferring “comprehensive 
competences” to the EU. These two areas “are gradually moving towards more supranational 
structures” although there is still not a “single official ‘common policy’” (Lavenex 2009: 255). 
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. I start out by presenting the 
case and existing research on visa cooperation abroad. Then the data and methods 
used are presented. I subsequently conduct the empirical analysis and discuss 
three theoretical explanations of the patterns of cooperation identified. Finally, I 
conclude and set out the wider implications of the findings. 
 
2. EU visa policy cooperation 
Today, with the dismantling of almost all internal borders in Europe considerable 
political and administrative resources are invested in attempts to strengthen and 
harmonise the control of the EU’s external border (Thielemann and Sasse 2005). 
Short-stay visas are a centre-piece of these efforts (Bigo and Guild 2005). For the 
nationals of the approximately 130 countries currently on EU’s common visa list 
the first and main check of their eligibility to enter the EU occurs at consulates 
abroad during the application procedure (Guild 2003). Visas thus aim to ensure 
that travellers are pre-screened before they arrive at the territorial border.  
 
Visa requirements also play a role in diplomatic relations (Martenczuk 2009; 
Stringer 2004). Travel restrictions can be imposed on some third countries and not 
others as part of a differentiation between allies and adversaries. They are used as 
a ‘carrot’ and ‘stick’ and can be imposed or lifted as a concession to another 
partner or to signal a bi-lateral worsening or improvement of relations. As part of 
the EU enlargement process, for example, visa restrictions have been gradually 
liberalized for most of the countries in the Balkans (Trauner 2009: 75-77).  
 
The EU has attempted to encourage different forms of administrative cooperation 
in the visa-issuing process to ensure a uniform application of the shared visa 
legislation. The European Commission has promoted the idea of joint application 
processing centres (see for example COM 2007b). The common rules also 
encourage local consular officials to meet and exchange data. Finally, a member 
state can make a bilateral agreement transferring fully or partly the visa-issuing 
process in a specific country or city to another Schengen member represented at 
the location (OJEU 2000, 2009b). These options for cooperation abroad have been 
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partially analysed both within the justice and home affairs and the foreign policy 
literature.  
 
The justice and home affairs literature has in general shown considerable interest 
in visas and consular cooperation abroad (cf. Bigo and Guild 2005; Guild 2003; 
Pijpers and van der Velde 2007). It has, however, mainly focused on the overall 
legal framework and policy documents. Systematic empirical studies of the 
practice of consular visa cooperation have not been carried out within this 
literature.  
 
Foreign policy analysts have largely focused on the creation of institutional 
structures of cooperation in Brussels, or on changes in the central offices of 
national foreign ministries as a result of EU integration (Carlsnaes et al. 2004). A 
few authors have also devoted some attention to European diplomatic and 
consular networks abroad.  
 
Rijks and Whitman (2010: 39-41) analyse overall aspects of European diplomatic 
cooperation. They note that this concept is somewhat vague and propose a 
distinction between sharing “facilities” (buildings, support staff) and 
“capabilities” (diplomatic tasks, consular services). They state that the sharing of 
facilities and capabilities have not yet been much of a success. The attempts to 
construct joint visa application centres have not gained particular momentum.  
 
Fernandez (2006) uses an Europeanization framework to analyse local consular 
cooperation and investigate how and to what extent the member states regularly 
meet and exchange information. Based primarily on an analysis of EU evaluation 
reports and policy documents she concludes that results have been “mixed” 
(Fernández 2006: 16f). On the one hand there has been an incorporation of EU 
rules and norms in local practices. But, on the other hand, resistance and lack of 
convergence remains due to the sensitivity of the area. 
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In sum, the member states have over the years harmonized overall approaches in 
the area of visas, a policy central to both foreign relations and internal security 
and migration control. Both the justice and home affairs and the foreign policy 
literature have taken an interest in the consular cooperation abroad in visa matters. 
The few analyses conducted so far indicates, however, that at this administrative 
level cooperation remains more limited. In the next section I set out the data and 
methods I utilize to contribute to our existing knowledge of European consular 
cooperation abroad in visa matters. 
 
3. Data and methods 
I measure the structure and extent of cooperation abroad using a new dataset 
covering the bilateral visa representation agreements entered into by the member 
states. I do not investigate meetings and exchange of data between officials in 
third countries (‘local consular cooperation’) or the establishment of joint 
embassy compounds (‘shared visa application centres’).  
 
The rules governing the bilateral agreements are set out in the common visa code 
(OJEU 2009b).
26
 The specific form of cooperation can vary within a given 
bilateral agreement. There can, for example, be rules on costs-distribution and 
consultation for certain categories of applicants. I only measure the overall 
existence of agreements. This entails that the indicator might capture somewhat 
different forms of bilateral cooperation. For my purposes, however, what matters 
is less the precise nature of the agreement but whether or not some form of 
collaboration takes place.  
 
The data source for the analysis of the representation agreements is the overviews 
produced by the Council’s General Secretariat until April 2010 (“Annex 18” 
                                                 
26
 The 2009 visa code replaced, with minor changes, the previous regulations about bilateral 
agreements specified in the so-called Common Consular Instructions (CCI). This document laid 
out the rules and norms for the entire visa issuing process (Council 2004). The main difference 
between the old and the new regulations were the introduction of somewhat more detailed and 
explicit requirements about how the agreements should be legally formulated. 
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tables).
27
 These were based on notifications by the member states of the cities 
abroad in which they had independent representation or relied on a visa-issuing 
agreement.  
 
I have coded six versions of the consolidated overviews at yearly intervals starting 
in October 2004 and ending in April 2010 (Council 2004, 2005, 2006a, 2007a, 
2008a, 2010a). The amount of cooperation changes throughout a given year. I 
used the consolidated version closest to January as an indicator of the approximate 
setup for the year in question. For example, the consolidated version from 
November 2005 is used as the best possible indicator of the cooperative setup 
throughout the whole of 2006. 
 
For the different years the dataset covers all members of the Schengen 
cooperation, and all third countries abroad. One of the major events in the period 
was the enlargement of the Schengen area from 15 member states to 24 in late 
2007. The dataset contains three measurements before the enlargement of 
Schengen and three afterwards. In 2008 Switzerland also joined bringing the total 
membership up to 25.
28
 
 
The core of the dataset is two tables. The first contains a list of all the member 
states’ own visa-issuing representations abroad per country, city and year. The 
raw data contains footnotes about the extent of consular services – if for example 
visas are solely issued to diplomatic personnel. I have only used a simple coding 
of whether or not a country has a visa facility at the location. For all six years this 
yields 9.472 observations. The second table contains a list of each cooperative 
agreement between two member states per city, country and year. The total count 
                                                 
27
 According to article 53(a) of the new visa code the member state must now inform the 
Commission of the existence of bilateral agreements, which is then obliged to publish the 
overview of agreements (COM 2010a; OJEU 2009b). 
28
 I use the following member state acronyms: AT: Austria, BE: Belgium, DE: Germany, DK: 
Denmark, EL: Greece, ES: Spain, FI: Finland, FR: France, IS: Iceland, IT: Italy, LU: Luxembourg, 
NL: Netherlands, NO: Norway, PT: Portugal, SE: Sweden, HU: Hungary, LV: Latvia, MT: Malta, 
SI: Slovenia, EE: Estonia, LT: Lithuania, PL: Poland, CZ: Czech Republic, SK: Slovakia, SZ: 
Switzerland. 
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of agreements is 6.852. If a cooperation agreement ended during a year, I included 
it if it lasted for more than half of the year in question.  
 
The main method I utilize to investigate the data is network analysis (Scott 2000; 
Wasserman and Faust 1994). This technique is especially well-suited for 
identifying and clarifying the structure of relationship between actors by 
modelling their mutual contact. The analytical unit in network analysis is pairs of 
actors – for example two countries and the amount of contact between them. For 
the purpose of the network analysis I thus recoded the data into bilateral pairs of 
member states. For each year I measured the total number of agreements between 
them. This measure is directional (Wasserman and Faust 1994: 273). There are 
not necessarily a symmetric number of agreements between two actors. In 2010, 
for example, Sweden relied on Norwegian consular services in 17 cities abroad; 
Norway was represented by Sweden in 14 locations.  
 
I conduct the empirical analysis over time highlighting changes and continuities in 
the cooperation. Although the analysed period is relatively short – six years – an 
analysis over time is mandated because of the considerable shift in membership in 
the middle of the period with the enlargement of the Schengen area. 
 
The two main network analytical tools are sociometrices and graphs (Scott 2000: 
8-16). Sociometrices are tables detailing the relationships between the actors. 
Network graphs give an overview of the content of the tables by displaying the 
actors (nodes) and their interaction (relations) in such a way that the actors with 
the highest amount of mutual contact are clustered together. I mainly use network 
graphs in the analysis. I constructed the graphs using the visualization software 
ORA developed by the Center for Computational Analysis of Social and 
Organizational Systems at the Carnegie Mellon University (Casos 2010). The 
positioning of the different actors on the graphs is in general stable, but the 
location of a node can vary slightly if the data is open for varying mathematical 
solutions. Sociometrices setting out the detailed content of the dataset are included 
in annex one to the paper. 
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A key consideration in the construction of the graphs is to what extent all relations 
between actors should be modelled or only significant or strong ties. I have 
chosen to operate with a threshold as this makes it possible to better identify 
trends in the data. As cut-off point I consistently use the mean number of 
agreements between any two member states in the different years. The threshold 
for inclusion is thereby in practice nine (2005-2009) or eight (2010) agreements.  
 
The use of the mean guarantees the reliability of the analysis. It also ensures that 
only dense network links are included in the analysis. As the Schengen members 
on average have about 50 mutual cooperative agreements a relation encompassing 
eight or nine relations is a major tie. Yet a case could also be made for a lower 
threshold of inclusion. The median points in the dataset in the different years are 
four (2005-2009) and three (2010). This tells us that minor bilateral relations are 
common in the network. Following the mean does not fully take this into account. 
I assessed the practical impact of the choice of cut-off point by constructing 
network graphs using different settings. This robustness test is described further in 
the empirical analysis. The overall conclusion is that the pattern is stable.
29
 
 
In the next sections I present the results of the main analysis. 
 
4. The extent of the European consular cooperation in visa policy 
Table 1 presents an overview of the extent of the European consular cooperation 
in the area of visa policy at the beginning of 2010: 
 
                                                 
29
 The dataset, robustness tests and the statistical read-outs are available on the database website. 
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Table one shows that the Schengen states in general strongly rely on cooperative 
arrangements. On average, the European states have independent representation in 
51 third countries, relies on their partners in 49, both forms in 2 and do not have a 
consular presence at all in 67 states. Cooperative representation is thus almost as 
common as having independent visa issuing facilities in a third country. There are, 
however, considerable differences between the member states. France, Germany 
and Italy are independently represented in over 100 countries. Iceland and 
Luxembourg have almost no visa-representations. The vast majority of the EU-
states have independent representation in visa matters in 40 to 60 third countries.  
Member state Independent Cooperative Both None
Europe / Schengen average 51 49 2 66
Austria 50 80 6 33
Belgium 64 72 3 30
Czech Republic 66 0 0 103
Denmark 39 65 4 61
Estonia 10 56 3 100
Finland 46 52 1 70
France 125 12 2 30
Germany 116 24 1 28
Greece 57 74 5 33
Hungary 46 27 5 91
Iceland 0 90 1 78
Italy 102 35 0 32
Latvia 14 34 2 119
Lithuania 21 16 0 132
Luxembourg 4 129 3 33
Malta 11 70 3 85
Netherlands 80 54 3 32
Norway 44 58 6 61
Poland 63 1 0 105
Portugal 50 85 1 33
Slovakia 37 0 0 132
Slovenia 16 88 5 60
Spain 96 45 0 28
Sweden 46 62 3 58
Switzerland 77 0 0 92
European consular representation in third countries in visa matters
SOURCE: 2010 data from annex 18 of the Common Consular Instructions (Council 2010b). The 
dataset covers 169 third countries outside the Schengen area.
Table 1
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In the next section I investigate in closer detail the precise structure and 
development of the cooperation in the analysed period. 
 
5. The structure of the consular cooperation 
This section discusses the results of the network analysis focusing on the main 
tenets of the consular network before and after the enlargement of the Schengen 
area in December 2007. Figure one to three below shows the structure of the 
cooperation in the period from late 2004 until the Schengen enlargement:  
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Figure 1 
Consular cooperation 2005 
 
NOTES: Data from 2004.10.11. Relations with a weight below 8.7 (the mean number cities 
abroad covered by an agreement between two member states) excluded. These are viewed as 
insignificant. The arrows show the direction of the relationship. Finland is not included because 
none of its relations has a weight above the cut-off point. Size of the Schengen area: 15 member 
states. 
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Figure 2 
Consular cooperation 2006 
 
NOTES: Data from 07.11.2005. Links with a weight below 8.9 excluded as insignificant (see 
explanatory comments to figure 1). Size of the Schengen area: 15 member states. 
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Figure 3 
Consular cooperation 2007 
 
NOTES: Data from 16.10.2006. Links with a weight below 8.7 excluded as insignificant (see 
explanatory comments to figure 1). Size of the Schengen area: 15 member states. 
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Figure 1, for 2005, shows France at the centre of the network. All the other 
member states rely on France to represent them in a significant number of 
locations abroad (above 8).  Germany is also highly central but not to the same 
extent. This is primarily because Italy and the Nordic countries – except for 
Norway – solely interact with France. Thus, only 11 countries rely on Germany’s 
consulates for representation abroad. 
 
Italy is somewhat isolated in the network as it only cooperates with France, and 
the other member states do not in general rely on its otherwise extensive consular 
services. Finland is excluded altogether from the picture because it only has a 
marginal number of ties with the other member states.  
 
The remaining member states cluster in three sub-groups. There is, firstly, a 
Nordic group consisting of Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. Iceland relies 
on all the other Scandinavian countries. Denmark cooperates with Norway and 
Sweden. Norway and Sweden, finally, do not cooperate with each other and thus 
occupy opposite ends of the Nordic sub-group. The Scandinavian countries are 
primarily connected to the rest of the network through France. The second 
grouping is the Benelux countries. The Netherlands is the primary actor in this 
group with Luxembourg and Belgium relying on its representations. The Southern 
European cluster is slightly more complex. At the centre of it is Spain, which 
Greece and Portugal rely on. Austria also belongs to this group because of its ties 
with Spain. Italy, as noted, is not a part of the Southern group. 
 
In 2006, as shown in figure 2, Finland entered the network connected to Germany 
and Netherlands. It did not join the Nordic group perhaps testifying to its peculiar 
relation to the other Scandinavian countries. Italy established ties with Germany.  
 
Figure 3 illustrates that in 2007 Finland began to cooperate with Sweden moving 
it towards the Nordic group. It also, however, had relations with the Netherlands. 
This pulled the Netherlands somewhat away from the other Benelux countries. 
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The centrality of Germany, finally, increased as Sweden established a connection 
with it. 
 
In sum, in the years prior to the enlargement of Schengen the consular cooperation 
between the member states occurred in a stable and recurrent structure. France 
was at the centre of the network. Germany similarly occupied a key role, but was 
less central because it did not cooperate with most of the Nordic countries. Italy 
had a somewhat secluded role only linked with France and partially Germany. 
The Nordic countries – but Finland – cooperated in a distinct sub-group as did the 
Benelux countries. The Southern European countries, and Austria, finally 
clustered together. The pattern of cooperation thus largely followed regional 
geographical groupings in Europe.  
 
Figure four to six shows the structure of the consular network after the Schengen 
enlargement. 
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Figure 4 
Consular cooperation 2008 
 
NOTES: Data from 17.12.2007. Links with a weight below 8.8 excluded as insignificant (see 
explanatory comments to figure 1). Hungary and Latvia are not shown because none of their 
relations had a weight above the cut-off point. Estonia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Slovakia 
and Poland were not part of any cooperative agreements at all. Size of the Schengen area: 24 
member states. 
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Figure 5 
Consular cooperation 2009 
 
NOTES: Data from 01.12.2008. Links with a weight below 8.4 excluded as insignificant (see 
explanatory comments to figure 1). Poland is not shown because none of its relations had a weight 
above the cut-off point. The Czech Republic and Slovakia were not part of any cooperative 
agreements at all. Size of the Schengen area: 24 member states. 
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Figure 6 
Consular cooperation 2010 
 
NOTES: Data from 04.30.2010. Links with a weight below 7.5 excluded as insignificant (see 
explanatory comments to figure 1). Poland and Switzerland are not shown because none of their 
relations had a weight above the cut-off point. The Czech Republic and Slovakia were not part of 
any cooperative agreements at all. Size of the Schengen area: 25 states. 
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The post-enlargement figures in general show a process of change from 2008 to 
2010, and the added complexity of the network resulting from the larger 
membership. 
 
Initially, as illustrated in figure 4, the Schengen enlargement only entailed 
changes in the Southern cluster of the network. Malta established ties with Italy 
and Austria; Slovenia with Austria, Portugal, Italy and Germany. Compared with 
the Nordic and the Benelux groups the Southern cluster thus became more diverse 
and less clearly structured. The remaining new members did not enter into 
agreements. 
 
A year later, in 2009, the Southern European network gained a clearer structure. 
In general, it was connected to the rest of Europe through Germany and France. 
Slovenia, however, also had direct ties with the Netherlands. Additionally, the 
Baltic States and Hungary entered the network. But in contrast with the Nordic 
and the Benelux states the Baltic States did not establish a sub-group. Estonia 
established ties with Finland and Germany, Lithuania with Hungary, and Latvia 
with Hungary and Germany. In the Nordic cluster, Norway and Sweden started to 
cooperate. Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia were still not a part. The new 
members of the network mainly established ties with Germany moving the centre 
away from France.  
 
The data for 2010, finally, shows several changes. The main trend was the 
establishment of Hungary as the centre of a new Central-Eastern cluster covering 
Slovenia, Lithuania and Latvia but not Estonia. Estonia is only indirectly 
connected to the cluster through a new link with Slovenia, but it also initiated a 
new relation with Spain. Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia did not 
participate in the network at all. The Netherlands appeared to be gradually 
becoming a minor Northern centre in its own right. Spain, finally, became more 
clearly positioned as the main actor in the Southern cluster. 
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In sum, the network of consular cooperation in visa matters shows considerable 
continuity before and after the Eastern enlargement of Schengen but also new 
tendencies. The Nordic and the Benelux clusters remain intact, and the Southern 
seems to have been strengthened by the addition of Malta, Slovenia and Italy. 
Two main other post-Enlargement changes are the emergent creation of a Central-
Eastern cluster, and a shift in the centre of the network towards Germany.  
 
How robust are the overall empirical findings to the use of different cut-off points 
in constructing the graphs? To examine this I ran a series of tests plotting first the 
network without a threshold and then gradually moved upwards until all bilateral 
links were excluded. In doing so, I also explored to what extent the use of the 
median instead of the mean altered the picture significantly. The robustness test 
revealed that the regional pattern in the data is very stable with two exceptions. 
First, the Benelux cluster is somewhat sensitive to the threshold. At low levels the 
grouping becomes integrated into the centre or Southern part of the network. This 
is especially the case after the enlargement of Schengen. A reverse dynamic is 
also at play, however. The Benelux cluster is one of the last groups to disappear as 
the threshold is increased. Second, at low cut-off points an emerging Eastern 
cluster is visible already in 2008. The test also shows that conclusions about 
individual member states can be uncertain. For example, whether or not a 
Schengen country is deemed to be a part of the network in a given year sometimes 
depend on the cut-off point. Similarly, findings on specific cooperative links can 
be sensitive. Still, all in all the main trends in the data are solid. 
 
In the next section I discuss different possible explanations of the pattern of 
cooperation.  
 
6. Explaining the extent and pattern of cooperation 
There is a wide range of theories of European integration (Rosamond 2000). 
Three of the main contemporary approaches are realism (Hill 1998; Hoffmann 
1966; Howorth 2001; Waltz 1979), liberal intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik 
1993; Moravcsik and Nicolaïdes 1999) and constructivism (Bretherton and Vogler 
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2006; Buzan et al. 1998; Neumann 2002). In the following sections I use these 
three theories to develop a set of explanations of the visa cooperation abroad, and 
discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the accounts.  
 
A realist explanation 
Realism is a key theory of international relations (Legro and Moravcsik 1999: 5), 
and is often used in studies of especially European foreign policy (Hill 1998; 
Howorth 2001). It is a rich and varied approach.
30
 My analytical starting-point is 
neo-realism and its picture of world politics as an international anarchy populated 
by sovereign states (Keohane 1986: 7; Waltz 1979: 7). The interest of the state is 
in this account defined as survival (Waltz 1979). Concerned first and foremost 
with securing their own continued existence the states will attempt to balance each 
other so that no actor becomes powerful enough to conquer the others. What 
determines policy is solely the overall distribution of material capabilities in the 
system of states – not ideologies, historical ties or domestic politics. International 
relations are hence highly competitive and mistrustful. Consequently, neo-realism 
is sceptical about the possibility of cooperation in global politics. This is 
especially the case for the larger and more powerful states, which are the 
analytical focus of the theory (Keohane 1986).  
 
Applied to EU visa policy, this line of explanation directs our attention towards 
the structure and extent of cooperation between the major member states. These 
are France and Germany and, albeit to a lesser extent, Italy, Spain and Poland. 
The first two form the centre of the network with a range of smaller countries 
relying on their consular representations. This is in line with realist expectations. 
It is more difficult to explain why Germany makes use of some French consulates, 
but this might still be seen as a relatively insignificant level of cooperation. 
Poland does not cooperate at all, again supporting the realist account. Spain is a 
local centre of the Southern cluster though it also relies on Italian, French and 
German facilities. The latter is difficult to explain but could reflect that Spain is a 
less powerful state. The same would hold for Italy and its increased dependence 
                                                 
30
 For a critical discussion of different lines of argument within realism see Legro and Moravcsik 
(1999). 
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on France and Germany. Finally, it might be an anomaly that the smaller EU-
states cooperate intensively with each other, but then again they are not overall 
significant in international relations.  
 
Neorealism thus offers a fairly convincing explanation of the position of the major 
states. It is not, however, concerned with minor states and therefore does not 
provide an account of their cooperation. Yet most EU countries are small and they 
are responsible for a substantial amount of the visas issued. Hence to understand 
European visa cooperation these member states’ practices should also be 
explained.  
 
If we shift the focus to classical realism (Rose 1998; Rynning 2011) smaller states 
reappear as relevant objects of analysis. Moreover, the geopolitics of territory, 
population flows and frontiers become important (Ashley 1987; Rudolph 2003; 
Wæver 1992a: 172). States have a reasonably fixed location and their interests are 
therefore to a large extent driven by which countries they find themselves 
bordering. Thus, organised crime or social upheaval in a neighbour country is a 
security concern for a state as it could threaten the stability of the border area. 
This territorial dimension was largely absent in the neorealist model with its 
structuralist focus on global power relations (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 11).
31
 
 
The classical, geopolitical realist explanation directs our attention to the EU states 
which share territorial borders with third countries. This shifts the focus to the 
Southern and Eastern clusters. The former have strong interests in trade and 
migration control towards Northern Africa. The latter shares similar concerns in 
relation to Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. Yet, common interests do not 
equal a preference for cooperation. On the contrary, where concerns run high a 
realist account predicts that states would opt to retain independent policy-making 
capabilities. This is precisely what a closer look at the data suggests. Though 
Southern Europe cooperates intensively they do not collaborate when it comes to 
                                                 
31
 Mouritzen (1997: 80) argues that geographical location is entirely absent from the neo-realist 
model because it was originally based on an analogy to the micro-economic concept of a market, 
an idea which does not involve territory. 
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their immediate North African and Middle-Eastern neighbours. Here they have 
independent consular representation in visa matters. The same is the case for the 
Eastern cluster with regards to their bordering states. Where national interests are 
at stake we thus, as expected, find that the states have chosen to retain their 
capacity to conduct independent migration control. Classical geopolitical realism 
can therefore explain the visa strategy of small and larger EU members located in 
the territorial periphery of the union towards their neighbours. Other patterns of 
cooperation and non-cooperation fall outside the scope of this account.  
 
This somewhat narrow focus is itself a limitation of the explanation. What is more 
troubling is that movement and trade are not as tied to geographical proximity as 
they might have been once. Today, transport is easy facilitating flows of money 
and persons across large distances (Neumann and Gstöhl 2006: 13). The 
cooperation between EU member-states in relation to remote third countries thus 
needs to be accounted for. A realist reply to this criticism could be that the 
substantial amount of collaboration within the regional clusters concerns third 
countries of little relevance to state interests. But this is not the case. Within the 
Southern and Eastern groups states rely on each other’s consulates in immigration 
sending countries like Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and Iran and a key trade 
partner such as India. This questions the classical realist account. 
 
Realism, in sum, is able to explain some of the central dynamics in the structure 
and extent of cooperation. Specifically, it provides an account of the position of 
the main players. Yet the key pattern in the data – regional clusters – is not 
adequately accounted for.  
 
Liberal intergovernmentalism 
Liberal intergovernmentalism is a central approach in European studies mainly 
developed by Moravcsik (1993, 2003). The theory models EU-politics as a two-
level game (cf. Putnam 1988). In a first round of domestic politics – primarily 
involving economic interest groups – the preference of a member state towards a 
given issue is formed. In a second stage at the EU-level the state then negotiates 
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rationally with the other EU-members to achieve an outcome as close as possible 
to this interest. The international bargaining process occurs in a dense net of 
institutional rules and norms where the member states can make credible 
commitments and link diverse issues to enable more players to be accommodated 
(cf. Keohane 1984).  
 
A member state thus settles on its visa policy preference in the national stage of 
the game. Should the overall approach be liberal or restrictive? Key actors are 
economic interest groups – major companies, trade organizations and the tourism 
industry. Because of their interest in easy travel for tourists and business partners 
we would expect them to lobby for a liberal policy: extensive consular 
representation abroad and generous visa issuing practices. National politicians 
seeking re-election can also play a role at this level, Moravcsik emphasises (1993: 
483f). When migration is a highly salient issue governments could have an 
interest in a restrictive policy. Thus for example in countries with strong anti-
immigration parties protecting the borders could be central to appeasing popular 
concerns and winning votes.  
 
In the subsequent European stage of the game the government then identifies and 
aligns with other member states with a similar policy preference. Countries with a 
liberal approach to migration control would be expected to cooperate with other 
liberal players. The restrictive states should similarly collaborate with each other.  
 
The Southern cluster in the network lends some support to this explanation. In 
especially Greece, Malta, Spain and Portugal tourism constitute a considerable 
part of the domestic economies (WB 2010b). Tourism is also significant, though 
to a lesser extent, in Austria. Although intra-European visits are likely to be a 
major part of this, especially the larger Southern countries attract guests from all 
over the world. It would therefore seem likely that the tourism industry here is 
able to lobby the government and work for a liberal visa policy. These member 
states would thereby end up pursuing a similar liberal interest. This in turn can 
explain why they cooperate with each other at the European level. 
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Yet tourism is not a major industry in the other member states and this factor 
therefore cannot account for the other clusters. What about bilateral trading 
interests? Extra-European trade constitute a considerable (above 15%, 2009 
figures) share of the GDP of Belgium, the Netherlands, Hungary, Slovenia, 
Slovakia, Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia (Eurostat 2010a, 2011). Thus, in these 
countries companies and trade organisations would seem likely to have a 
particularly strong interest in an open access policy. We should therefore expect 
them to push their governments in this direction. A common domestic interest in 
liberal visa policy could explain the significant cooperation between these states. 
It cannot, however, account for why there are two distinct clusters – Benelux and 
the Eastern group – and not just one large cluster. But the Central and Eastern 
members have only recently joined the common visa policy. If this trade-based 
liberal account is correct we should thus expect cross-cluster relations to develop 
in the coming years. There remains the Nordic group. These countries do not have 
a similarly high level of external trade. Hence it makes sense that they do not form 
a part of the others clusters. But in the absence of a strong external trade interest it 
is difficult to explain why they should cooperate intensively with each other. 
 
To what extent can national partisan politics supplement this explanation and 
account for especially Nordic alignment? Radical right-wing parties are 
particularly strong electorally in Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, 
Norway and France (Lubbers et al. 2002: 357; Rydgren 2008: 737f). From the 
perspective of domestic electoral politics it is thus understandable that Denmark 
and Norway would cooperate. Their reliance on restrictive France is to be 
expected as well. The recent collaboration between Norway and the Netherlands 
equally makes sense. It is, however, difficult to see why Norway and Denmark 
would align with liberal Sweden. Instead, we should expect to see cooperation 
with Austria, while Sweden should rely on pro-migration Spain. National 
partisanship thus can provide some explanation of Nordic cooperation, but face 
significant counter evidence. 
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Summing up, liberal intergovernmentalism offers a convincing account of the 
Southern cluster and to some extent also the Eastern and Benelux groups. It is less 
able to explain Nordic cooperation. Nor does it account for the role of Germany 
and France as network centres. 
 
A constructivist approach 
Constructivism is the major alternative to realist and liberal approaches within 
international relations and European foreign affairs studies (cf. Smith 2001). The 
general starting-point is the meta-theoretical claim that the world does not have 
meaning independently of the language we use to describe it (Campbell 1998: 4). 
From this follows that we should be analytically interested in and study the ways 
in which different discourses and practices give significance to and allows us to 
interpret actions and events (Larsen 1999: 453; cf. Neumann 2002). Instead of 
merely assuming that state interests are objectively given we should focus on how 
construction of identities shapes the formation of interests (Ringmar 1996; Weldes 
1996).  
 
The analytical ambition of constructivist approaches varies. Hansen (2006; for a 
discussion see Wendt 1998) argues for the “impossibility of causality” and pleads 
for a sole focus on the “constitutive” effects of discourses and practices. We can 
thus investigate how shared constructions make events and actions meaningful, 
but we cannot attribute a causal role to ideas (cf. Neumann 1994). Wæver (1998) 
pleads for a focus on “negative predictions” emphasising that discourse analysis 
should not be used in attempts to explain what will happen but only to map out the 
field of actions that would not be meaningful and hence are unlikely to occur. 
Jepperson, Katzenstein and Wendt (see also Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; ) argue 
that “ideational” factors can and should be included in causal analysis alongside 
“material”. Thus, for any given political situation we can investigate the 
independent and relative causal importance of shared beliefs in bringing about the 
outcome. I follow this latter causal, explanatory approach. I view discourses and 
practices as constitutive of shared identities. These identities, in turn, can be 
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included as an ideational variable in causal analysis and used to explain events 
and actions. 
 
The focal point for constructivist analyses of identity and international policy was 
initially the nation-state (Berger 1996; Campbell 1998; Katzenstein 1996; Larsen 
1999; Wæver 1998; Weldes 1996). But what, from a constructivist perspective, is 
a nation? According to Anderson’s (1991) now classical argument the nation is an 
“imagined community”. In a complex historical analysis Anderson shows how a 
common linguistic space, the nation, was created through the development of new 
forms of mass-communication and state administrative practices and came to be 
experienced by its members as a community. Despite the impossibility of ever 
meeting more than a fraction of one’s compatriots, citizens feel a sense of 
commonality. We thus, Anderson emphasises, distinguish members from non-
members and are often willing to make heavy sacrifices for a community that is 
seen as a sovereign political entity. Another way of putting this is that national 
belonging is part of our identity and shapes in crucial ways how we act and 
interact. 
 
As Neumann (1994: 58) points out, however, not only nations but also regions can 
be seen as imagined communities. This suggests that we can push this line of 
argument beyond the nation state (cf. Bellamy 2004: 31f; Held 1998: 19) and 
apply it to policy cooperation at a regional level. In all likelihood, regions are 
imagined as less thick (Walzer 1994) communities than the nation. Still, they 
could exhibit similar features. To illustrate, let us take the case of the Nordic 
regional cluster. 
   
The Nordic region is characterized by strong linguistic similarities (Wæver 1992b: 
95). The Swedish, Danish and Norwegian languages are very alike, and there is a 
widespread assumption in the populations that it is easy to understand each other. 
Finnish and Icelandic differ markedly but Swedish and Danish respectively are 
common second languages in these two countries. Moreover, universalistic 
welfare states developed in all of the countries in the same period with similar 
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administrative practices and technologies (Miles 2010: 186). Analyses of general 
societal discourses show that the Nordic countries do indeed share a perception of 
each other as coming from stable, small, rule-of-law welfare states (Hansen and 
Wæver 2001). That is, they recognize in each other a certain commonality as a 
basis for trust. In this way the Nordic region resembles Anderson’s national 
imagined community, although it is arguably thinner and does not entail as strong 
ideas about sovereignty or patriotism. 
 
The Nordic case suggests that the patterns of visa cooperation can be explained as 
a result of ‘regional imagined communities’. Shared perceptions of likeness in 
terms of especially language and state structures generate trust which facilitates 
collaboration on sensitive issues. Within the regions the member states can 
meaningfully share and transfer sovereignty over decisions concerning which 
persons should be allowed or denied entry to their territory. But can this account 
be generalized beyond Scandinavia or do we need another approach to understand 
the remaining patterns? 
 
Let us look at the other groupings in the network one by one. The Benelux cluster 
– which is strong and persistent – is characterized by linguistic diversity 
(Vanhoonacker 2003: 14). But this language diversity is a shared feature and cut 
across state boundaries. The Netherlands and Belgium also share a colonial past 
and all three countries have a long history of state-building in the light of 
vulnerability to European warfare.  
 
The Southern group has important similarities but many differences as well 
(Featherstone and Kazamias 2001: 3f; Heywood and McLaren 2010: 170f). There 
are strong commonalities between the Spanish, Portuguese and Italian languages. 
But the linguistic differences to Greece and Austria are considerable. The state-
building trajectories of Spain and Portugal are again quite similar with an early 
colonial expansion, a strong Catholic church and a recent history of fascism. 
Greece, Italy and Slovenia exhibits some like features. But Malta and Austria are 
the odd ones out.  
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The Eastern cluster displays substantial linguistic diversity, but also shares a 
recent history of Communism, peaceful revolution and EU-accession central to 
the state-building of these countries (Hamilton 1999: 136; Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier 2005: 2). All in all, the explanatory model has some purchase for the 
other clusters, but also limitations. It seems very likely that some forms of 
regional imagined communities do exist which facilitates cooperation, but that 
these are less tightly knit than the Nordic group. 
 
What about France and Germany? Their consular facilities are made available to 
and used by almost all other EU-countries. The two states do not rely on the 
services of others. As centres of the network the region to which they belong is 
therefore Europe as such (cf. Wæver 2001: 39f). In the case of France this is 
understandable given its recent past as colonial world power which formed the 
making of the French nation-state. In its own understanding France is still a global 
actor with a civilizing mission. Only now this role is played out through a 
European Union shaped in the image of and revolving around France (Wæver 
1998). In Germany the nation-state was fundamentally reconfigured after the 
Second World War. Its administration was rebuilt and discourses of German 
identity underwent significant changes. Only as a peaceful part of Europe could 
Germany redeem itself after the atrocities of the gas chambers. Offering assistance 
to smaller EU members can be seen as way of enacting this role of an 
institutionally embedded friendly regional power (Katzenstein 1997; Wæver 
1998). The European Union from its earliest days has been created around an idea 
of a French-German centre (Cole 2010). Bureaucratic structures both within the 
EU and in individual member states are to large extent influenced by the traditions 
of these two core countries. French and German are leading administrative and 
diplomatic languages in the EU spoken widely in most member states, especially 
by officials. Taken together, this explains why so many smaller member-states 
avail themselves of the consulates of France and Germany.  
 
The ‘regional imagined communities’ concept thus offers a very convincing 
explanation of Nordic cooperation and the role of EU core countries. It finds 
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support in the remaining patterns as well. The latter, however, suggest that the 
account demands more commonality in language and nation-state history than can 
be observed.  
 
Constructivist arguments are not solely about identity. A different strand focuses 
on norms (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). This prompts us to ask if the network 
structure could be the result not of imagined communities but of a looser set of 
institutionally embedded practices. It might be that for some reason the member 
states got in the habit of cooperating mainly with their neighbours and that this 
has gradually evolved into standard operating procedures and norms of 
appropriateness (Allison and Zelikow 1999; March and Olsen 1989). But this 
raises the question of what triggered the pattern of cooperation in the first place. 
The answer could be a common policy preference. As we saw in the previous 
sections shared interests can account for important parts of the findings. But in 
that case policy interests would seem to do the analytical work leaving little role 
for standard operating procedures. Only if norms and preferences begin to diverge 
and we see continued cooperation would the norms-based constructivism have 
purchase. The data period, however, makes it difficult to trace such potential 
shifts.  
 
Another trigger could be regional imagined communities. If state officials share a 
sense of belonging with their counterparts in neighbour countries this could spur 
cooperation which would then gradually become a standard of good practice. At 
first, this would again seem to make the norms-argument redundant as the 
common identity now drives the explanation. But in the cases where the imagined 
community looks rather too thin to account for all cooperation, as in the case of 
Southern Europe for example, the norms argument could carry important weight. 
Some commonalities in language and history prompt initial cooperation which 
then becomes institutionalized. In this way the two different constructivist 
accounts supplement each other. 
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Regional patterns of cooperation have also been identified as a component of the 
legislative decision-making process of the European Union, and identity-driven 
factors have been put forward as important in explaining these (Elgström et al. 
2001; Kaeding and Selck 2005; Mattila and Lane 2001; Naurin 2008). This could, 
on the one hand, suggest that visa collaboration is an ‘isomorphism’ (DiMaggio 
and Powell 1983) from more well-established practices. If member-states 
cooperate regionally in one area this could inspire the same behaviour in other 
fields. With some administrative practices established broadening the cooperation 
would be comparatively easy. On the other hand, the presence of regional 
cooperation across a diverse range of issues and arenas suggests that some form of 
imagined community is at play. Again, if countries see their neighbours as more 
like themselves than other member-states and hence more trustworthy this would 
account for why these norms of appropriateness arise in the first place. 
 
In sum, the concept of regional imagined communities provides a good account of 
the structures in the network. Especially if combined with a norms-based 
constructivism it provides the most extensive explanation of the patterns. 
 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper I have investigated the structure and extent of the consular 
cooperation in visa matters among the Schengen-members in the period from 
2005 to 2010. The aim was to further our understanding of intensive 
transgovernmentalism – the main type of policy-making in the area of interior and 
foreign affairs. I did this by investigating what patterns of cooperation has been 
established between the member states in this selected sovereignty sensitive 
policy area, and why. To carry out the analysis I utilized a new dataset of consular 
visa representation agreements, and a network analytical approach to investigate 
the patterns in the data.  
 
I showed, firstly, that the member states strongly rely on cooperative 
arrangements. To a large extent they use each other’s consular services abroad in 
the visa-issuing process. The average Schengen member is independently 
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represented in approximately 50 countries, via a cooperative agreement in 50 and 
not represented at all in 70.  
 
The network analysis showed, secondly, that cooperation throughout the period 
was structured in distinct clusters: a Nordic, Benelux, Southern-European and an 
emergent Central-Eastern. France and Germany were at the centre of the network. 
There were few ties across the clusters. Northern and Southern Europe, in 
particular, did hardly cooperate at all. 
 
Drawing on three main theories within European and international studies I 
discussed what could explain this pattern of cooperation. I focused on assessing 
the merits of realist, liberal intergovernmentalist and constructivist perspectives.  
 
Realism emphasises the difficulties of cooperation in inter-state affairs. This 
provided an explanation of the position of the larger member states. Realist theory 
could also account for why smaller border-states are independently represented in 
neighbouring third countries. But the overall regional patterns remained puzzling.  
 
The liberal intergovernmentalist account focused on the national formation of 
preferences about migration control, and predicted that the member states would 
cooperate with others sharing a similar liberal or restrictive approach. This 
argument found particular support in relation to the Southern cluster where the 
importance of tourism constitutes a likely significant common interest. The liberal 
account also found some support in the rest of the patterns, but faced important 
counter-trends. 
 
The constructivist argument explained cooperation as rendered feasible by the 
existence of shared identities owing to regional commonalities in language and 
state-building histories. These constructions make it possible for the member 
states to trust and cooperate with each other. I proposed the term ‘regional 
imagined communities’ to capture and explain the geographical clusters of 
cooperation. This concept was particularly well-suited to account for Nordic 
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collaboration and the central role of Germany and France. It could also go some 
way in explaining the remaining relations. But here the commonalities were 
weaker. This suggested the need for a supplementary norms-based constructivism 
working in conjunction with thin imagined communities.  
 
The case of visa policy was selected as an example of EU-integration spanning 
interior and foreign policy. As an area where the member states have established 
particularly widespread cooperation it is an ‘extreme case’. It enables us to 
identify patterns and dynamics which are likely to be at play in other sovereignty 
sensitive areas, albeit in more inchoate and therefore less easily observable form. 
The case of visa cooperation suggests that ideational factors such as regional 
imagined communities are important in facilitating cooperation, but that common 
interests are of some relevance as well. Further studies of, for example, judicial 
and diplomatic collaboration could throw additional light on the relative 
explanatory potential of preferences and identities in explaining patterns of 
interaction between the member states. This could also help to establish the extent 
to which regional groupings characterize the intensive transgovernmentalism of 
foreign policy and justice and home and affairs cooperation. 
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Annex 1: Socio-metrical overviews 
 
AT BE DE ES FR IT NL PT LU DK FI NO SE EL IS
AT 5 25 14 32 1 2 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
BE 1 14 5 23 1 29 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
DE 0 1 1 16 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ES 0 2 14 40 1 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FR 0 0 5 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
IT 0 1 8 2 18 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
NL 0 8 14 5 23 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
PT 1 0 19 26 44 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
LU 1 76 14 5 23 1 32 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
DK 2 0 5 0 10 0 4 0 0 4 10 12 0 0
FI 1 2 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 5 2 6 0 0
NO 0 1 10 0 13 2 9 1 0 8 4 4 0 0
SE 2 1 7 4 13 5 7 1 0 4 4 5 0 0
EL 2 2 10 17 38 7 2 7 0 0 0 0 0 0
IS 0 0 3 0 17 1 4 0 0 51 6 16 10 0
Sociometric 1. Consular visa representation agreements in 2005
SOURCE: The General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, Council (2004). Data from 2004.10.11.
NOTES: Reading the table from the rows it can be identified which partners a member state relies on. Germany, for 
example, (DE) used France's (FR) consular services in 16 locations abroad. Similarly, Sweden relied on Netherlands in 7 
cities. Starting from the columns it can be found which partners relies on a member states. The column with Sweden 
(SE) shows, e.g., that IT, DK, FI, NO and IS use Swedish consular services in varying degrees. Please note that member 
states not participating in any agreements at all are not shown. 
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AT BE DE ES FI FR IT NL PT LU DK NO SE EL IS
AT 5 27 14 1 32 1 2 6 0 0 0 0 0 0
BE 1 16 5 0 24 1 28 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
DE 0 1 1 0 17 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
ES 0 2 15 0 40 2 1 3 0 1 0 0 0 0
FI 2 1 9 4 0 2 13 2 0 5 2 6 0 0
FR 0 0 5 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
IT 0 1 9 2 0 18 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
NL 0 10 15 5 0 23 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
PT 1 0 19 26 0 50 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
LU 1 81 16 5 0 24 1 31 1 0 0 0 0 0
DK 2 0 6 0 4 10 0 5 0 0 10 12 0 0
NO 0 1 11 0 4 14 2 9 1 0 8 4 0 0
SE 2 1 7 4 5 13 5 7 1 0 4 5 0 0
EL 2 3 12 17 0 39 8 2 7 0 0 0 1 0
IS 0 0 4 0 6 17 1 4 0 0 57 17 11 0
Sociometric 2. Consular visa representation agreements in 2006
SOURCE: The General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, Council (2005). Data from 2005.11.07.
NOTES: See sociometric 1.
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AT BE DE ES FI FR IT NL PT LU DK NO SE EL IS
AT 6 27 14 1 30 1 3 6 0 0 0 0 0 0
BE 1 16 5 0 25 1 28 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
DE 0 1 1 0 17 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
ES 0 1 13 0 42 2 2 3 0 1 0 0 0 0
FI 2 1 11 4 0 2 13 2 0 5 4 10 0 0
FR 0 0 5 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
IT 0 2 9 2 0 19 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
NL 0 10 16 5 0 23 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
PT 1 0 17 26 0 51 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
LU 1 81 17 5 0 24 1 30 1 0 0 0 0 0
DK 2 0 6 0 4 11 0 5 0 0 10 13 0 0
NO 0 1 10 0 3 11 2 8 1 0 9 8 0 0
SE 1 1 9 4 4 12 5 7 1 0 4 6 1 0
EL 1 2 11 17 0 39 8 2 7 0 0 0 1 0
IS 0 0 4 0 5 17 1 4 0 0 55 18 12 0
SOURCE: The General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, Council (2006). Data from 2006.10.16.
Sociometric 3. Consular visa representation agreements in 2007
NOTES: See sociometric 1.
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AT BE DE ES FI FR HU IT NL PT SI LU DK NO SE EL IS LV MT
AT 5 28 14 1 28 1 1 3 6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
BE 1 16 6 0 25 0 1 27 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DE 0 1 1 0 18 0 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ES 0 1 11 0 41 0 2 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FI 2 1 11 4 0 0 2 13 2 0 0 6 4 10 0 0 0 0
FR 0 1 5 2 0 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
HU 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
IT 0 2 9 2 0 19 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
NL 0 9 15 5 0 23 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
PT 1 1 17 27 0 44 0 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SI 17 3 11 0 0 0 6 11 0 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
LU 1 69 15 5 0 24 0 1 31 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DK 2 0 13 0 4 11 0 0 5 0 0 0 10 15 0 0 0 0
NO 0 1 10 0 4 11 0 2 8 1 0 0 10 8 0 0 0 0
SE 1 1 8 4 5 12 0 6 7 1 0 0 5 5 1 0 0 0
EL 1 2 11 17 0 38 0 7 2 7 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
IS 0 0 4 0 5 17 0 1 4 0 0 0 48 18 11 0 0 0
LV 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MT 29 0 0 0 0 0 0 47 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sociometric 4. Consular visa representation agreements in 2008
SOURCE: The General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, Council (2007). Data from 2007.12.17. 
NOTES: See sociometric 1.
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AT BE DE ES FI FR HU IT NL PT SI LU DK NO SE EE LV EL LT IS MT PL
AT 5 28 14 1 28 1 1 3 6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
BE 1 16 6 0 25 0 1 27 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DE 0 1 1 0 18 0 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ES 0 1 10 0 35 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FI 2 1 13 4 0 0 2 13 2 0 0 5 4 9 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
FR 0 2 5 2 0 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
HU 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 1 0 0 0
IT 0 2 9 2 0 19 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
NL 0 9 15 5 0 23 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PT 1 2 17 27 0 43 0 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SI 17 3 11 0 0 8 6 12 12 11 0 3 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 4
LU 1 69 14 5 0 24 0 1 31 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DK 2 0 14 0 3 10 1 0 5 0 1 0 19 19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
NO 0 1 10 0 4 11 0 2 8 1 0 0 13 17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SE 1 1 9 4 4 10 1 5 7 1 0 0 11 14 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
EE 0 0 15 0 11 0 6 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0
LV 0 0 14 0 0 1 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
EL 1 2 10 17 0 37 0 7 2 7 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
LT 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
IS 0 0 4 0 5 16 0 1 4 0 0 0 39 22 18 0 0 0 0 0 0
MT 27 0 0 10 0 0 0 51 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sociometric 5. Consular visa representation agreements in 2009
SOURCE: The General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, Council (2008). Data from 2008.12.01. 
NOTES: See sociometric 1.
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AT BE DE ES FI FR HU IT NL PT SI SZ LU DK LT NO SE EE LV EL IS MT PL
AT 5 27 14 1 28 2 1 3 6 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
BE 1 15 7 0 28 0 1 22 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DE 0 1 1 0 18 0 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ES 0 1 10 0 30 0 2 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FI 1 1 13 4 0 2 2 13 2 0 0 0 4 0 4 8 2 0 0 0 0 0
FR 0 2 5 3 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
HU 4 2 12 0 3 0 0 4 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0
IT 0 2 9 2 0 19 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
NL 0 9 14 5 1 24 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
PT 0 2 16 26 0 42 0 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SI 17 3 12 10 0 13 8 11 11 8 0 0 3 0 0 0 1 5 0 0 0 4
SZ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
LU 1 69 14 5 0 25 1 1 31 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DK 1 0 14 0 3 12 1 0 4 0 1 0 0 1 20 16 0 0 0 0 0 0
LT 4 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
NO 0 1 10 0 4 11 1 2 8 1 0 0 0 13 1 14 0 0 0 0 0 0
SE 0 1 9 4 4 10 1 5 6 1 0 0 0 11 0 17 0 1 0 0 0 0
EE 2 0 15 14 11 0 7 0 3 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 4 0 0 0 0
LV 0 0 16 0 0 1 14 0 7 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
EL 1 2 10 17 0 34 1 7 2 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
IS 0 0 4 0 4 16 0 1 4 0 0 0 0 40 0 22 16 0 0 0 0 0
MT 26 0 0 10 0 0 0 47 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sociometric 6. Consular visa representation agreements in 2010
SOURCE: The General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, Council (2010b). Data from 2010.04.30.
NOTES: See sociometric 1.
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PAPER THREE 
 
Europeanization of domestic border control policies: the case of short-stay 
visas 
 
 
Abstract 
Over the past decades Europe has gradually developed an internal free travel area 
(Schengen). This has generated considerable controversy. One criticism is that it 
leads to an aggregation of migration fears among member states and thereby 
results in more closed borders for visitors from the outside. Though this argument 
is frequently voiced in the literature, its precise theoretical and empirical basis has 
not undergone much scrutiny. The aim of this paper is to further theorise and test 
the claim of a restrictive impact.  
 
Drawing on institutional theory I develop two rival accounts of the effect of EU-
integration in the area of borders. The rational choice view stresses preference 
divergence, zero-sum interactions and an asymmetric control situation. The ‘logic 
of consequentiality’ suggests no impact of integration. The sociological model, in 
contrast, emphasises restrictive role expectations within Schengen and strong 
diffusion mechanisms. The ‘logic of appropriateness’ is one of tight control. I test 
these two rival models through a quasi-experimental Europeanization study of 
visa policy and the 2007 expansion of the Schengen area. I show that enlargement 
had a marked restrictive effect on the visa-issuing practices of the new member 
countries. These changes were significantly different from what we saw in the 
same period among the old and partial Schengen states as well as the UK and the 
US. Hence, the data primarily supports the sociological model and questions the 
purchase of the rational choice account. This finding lends support to the 
argument that Schengen has a restrictive domestic impact. 
 
Key words 
Institutional theory, quasi-experiment, Schengen, visas, Europeanization  
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1. Introduction 
In today’s Europe internal border controls have largely been dismantled (Bertozzi 
2008).
32
 As a result, people can in principle travel freely between most European 
countries.
33
 The states instead share a single external border and have adopted 
common rules and norms for its control. This free travel area is usually referred to 
as the Schengen cooperation. 
 
The consequences of the Schengen system for the ability of third country 
nationals to enter Europe are a topic of concern in the academic literature. 
Integration is generally expected to have a marked restrictive impact on the 
openness of the external border (Bigo and Guild 2005; Meloni 2005; Munster 
2009; Neumayer 2006; Pijpers and van der Velde 2007). Different reasons are 
offered in support of this claim.  
 
One argument is that EU-integration creates a restrictive ‘race to the bottom’ 
(Carrera et al. 2011).
34
 Yet how this race should work tends to be unclear. In the 
wider EU literature the expression refers to a process of competitive de-regulation 
(Kvist 2004). For example, as it becomes easier for companies to move abroad 
this creates a pressure to lower domestic taxes and lessen workplace rules. 
Countries will thus undercut each other to attract capital creating a downward 
spiral of de-regulation. In the context of Schengen a restrictive race to the bottom, 
if it is to make sense, must be a quite different spiral of re-regulation. The member 
states start to take into account the migration fears and security concerns of each 
other leading to an aggregation and pooling of entry requirements. This entails 
higher levels of state control and more comprehensive restrictive rules and 
practices. More importantly, race to the bottom evokes rational choice: the logic 
                                                 
32
 All EU-states except the United Kingdom and Ireland take part in the border cooperation. 
Iceland, Norway and Switzerland also participate even though they are not members of the EU. 
Denmark is associated on special terms due to its opt-out of all other supra-national justice and 
home affairs policies. Liechtenstein has requested membership but negotiations have so far not 
progressed far. 
33
 Whether or not internal movement has become ‘free’ is contested in the literature. Some 
analysts argue that with the Schengen cooperation the old, systematic internal border control has 
merely been replaced with new forms and sites of control, for example inspection of passports at 
hotels and spot-checks at train stations  (Crowley 2001; Atger 2008).  
34
 For an analysis and criticism of the race to the bottom argument in the context of EU asylum 
policy see Thielemann and El-Enany (2011). 
Mogens Hobolth 
  Page 130 of 244 
of deregulation is an outcome of altered incentives for rational actors. Yet in the 
case of Schengen, it is not immediately clear why it should be in the interest of 
states to pay heed to the restrictive preferences of their partners.  
 
Another case for a restrictive impact advanced in the literature is that the 
Schengen system is based on ‘mutual recognition’ (Meloni 2009). This too is 
meant to capture the idea of a pooling and aggregation of entry requirements. But 
again the terminology is unhelpful. In EU-studies mutual recognition describes a 
system by which states agree to respect the legality of the decisions of each other 
irrespective of differences in the domestic rules through which these come about 
(Lavenex 2007). Mutual recognition in this respect thus implies that if Germany 
issues an entry visa, France should recognize the validity of the permit even if 
French consulates would have denied a similar application. This idea is very 
different from that of pooling and combining rules which entails that Germany 
should not have issued the visa if it went against the preferences of France. 
 
Other accounts are developed within critical security theory (Bigo 2002; 
Guiraudon 2003; Munster 2009; Huysmans 2006). From this perspective, EU-
integration is argued to trigger restrictiveness in two different ways. The first is 
venue-shopping. National officials interested in pursuing a restrictive line can turn 
to the EU and via this arena escape the constraints of domestic institutions and 
actors (courts, NGO’s) pushing for liberal practices (Guiraudon 2003). The 
second is through information technologies. The establishment of databases, in 
particular, have created a ‘stock exchange of fears’ spreading discourses and 
articulations of threats across member states (Bigo 2002). Both of these arguments 
suggest interesting lines of inquiry but are not without problems. Why is it, 
precisely, that domestic officials should always be interested in pursuing a 
restrictive approach? If for example important trading interests are at stake other 
priorities could be paramount. Is it reasonable to expect that the introduction of 
new databases almost automatically have a practical impact? Changing 
established practices and mainstreaming the use of new technology are often 
difficult and meet with considerable resistance. 
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Furthermore, the impact of EU-integration on the openness of domestic borders 
has not as yet been subjected to systematic empirical testing. Various studies have 
substantiated the idea of a restrictive effect by referring to the establishment of the 
EU’s common visa list (Neumayer 2005; Bigo and Guild 2005; Meloni 2009). 
They have noted that the list expanded considerably during the negotiations. This 
argument, however, overlooks that the member states had very different starting-
points. By the mid-1990s, for example, the Swedish visa list contained 
approximately 110 countries whereas the French had about 150 (OJEU 1996). The 
final EU-list of about 130 countries therefore meant restriction of the former but a 
liberalization of the latter. It is thus not apparent what the overall impact of the 
harmonisation of visa requirements was and which dynamics characterized the 
process. In addition, changes in the visa list tell us little about the impact on 
domestic practices. EU-legislation in general suffers from considerable 
implementation gaps (Falkner et al. 2005; Mastenbroek 2003; Toshkov et al. 
2010). In the case of Schengen, moreover, common rules leave considerable 
discretion to national public authorities (Berg and Ehin 2006).  
 
The aim of this paper is to advance existing research by theorising and empirically 
examining the effect of the Schengen cooperation on the openness of Europe’s 
borders to international visitors. I focus on a key element of the common border 
policy: the shared rules for issuing visas (Council 2008a; OJEU 2009; Meloni 
2009). The question I ask is to what extent, if at all, participation in Schengen has 
had an impact on national control practices, and if so, in what direction and why. 
Using rational choice (Shepsle and Weingast 1987) and sociological 
institutionalism (March and Olsen 2008) I develop two rival accounts of the likely 
effects of EU-integration.  
 
Drawing on rational choice institutionalism I argue that Schengen implementation 
is characterized by an ‘asymmetric control situation’. A liberal state can pursue a 
lenient application of the common rules unilaterally. It does not need the 
cooperation of partner states for doing so. In contrast, restrictive states are 
dependent on the partners to achieve effective control. Otherwise, persons can 
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simply enter through one of the other states. Yet achieving this cooperation is 
likely to be difficult as the states are engaged in a zero-sum game. There are only 
costs and no gains for the liberal state to adapt. Cooperative practices could 
nevertheless emerge if strong sanctions, side-payments or tit-for-tat interactions 
are possible. Yet none of these are central to Schengen. The ‘logic of 
consequentiality’ thus suggests that integration has no impact on domestic visa-
issuing practices.  
 
Following sociological institutionalism I develop an alternative explanation of the 
impact of EU-integration. I identify clearly defined norms and role expectations 
within the Schengen regime pointing in the direction of restrictive practices. 
Furthermore, I argue that there are well-developed and comprehensive 
mechanisms in place for ensuring the diffusion and uptake of such norms by 
potentially recalcitrant domestic actors. Information exchange, informal 
evaluations and local consular cooperation create transparency and enable the 
naming and shaming of deviating interpretations of the common rules. There is 
little room for escaping predominant role expectations. The ‘logic of 
appropriateness’ is one of tight control and hence Schengen participation should 
have a marked restrictive effect on member states. 
 
I test these two alternative models using a quasi-experimental (Meyers 1995; 
Shadish, Cook & Campbell 2002) Europeanization study (Radaelli 2003). The 
idea behind this research design is to assess the causal effect of EU-integration by 
contrasting developments in a group which experienced a change with a set which 
did not. To do this I draw on data from the Eastern enlargement of the Schengen 
area. In December 2007 nine new EU member states joined Schengen and became 
full participants in the EU’s visa regime. Prior to this they followed the same visa 
list and issued visas of the same format. But they were free to use different, and 
perhaps more liberal, criteria for issuing visas as their permits only gave access to 
national territory. When they became full members internal border control was 
lifted, and they had to shift to the common issuing rules as their visas became 
valid for travel to the entire Schengen area. 
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The expansion of the free travel zone makes for a natural experiment. The effect 
of cooperation can be studied by examining how the new member states’ practices 
potentially altered after the expansion. This shift can then be compared with 
trends among old and partial members of the visa regime as well as the non-
members United Kingdom and the United States. If changes took place among 
new members, and not in the other groups, this supports the argument that there is 
an impact of EU integration which cannot be reduced to the effect of other factors. 
 
Using this research design I show that the visa-issuing practice of the new 
member states shifted in a restrictive direction following their full Schengen 
membership. This trend is markedly different from what we in general observed 
among the old and partial members as well as the UK and the US. Hence, the 
empirics strongly suggest that the restrictive change in the new member states was 
not due to external events such as the global financial crisis. Rather, it was 
brought about by Schengen participation. The data thus supports the sociological 
institutionalist model. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. In the next and second section I discuss and set 
out two models of the impact of integration. The third and fourth parts present the 
research design and data. In the fifth section I conduct the empirical analysis. 
Finally, I conclude. 
 
2. Theorizing the impact of EU integration on border control 
How can we understand the potential effects of European integration on the 
openness of domestic borders for international visitors? In this section I set out 
two different models drawing on institutional theory (Hall and Taylor 1996). The 
first is based on rational choice institutionalism (Garrett and Tsebelis 1996; North 
and Weingast 1989; Shepsle and Weingast 1987) and the second follows 
sociological institutionalism (Checkel 2001; DiMaggio and Powell 1983; March 
and Olsen 2008). Both perspectives take as their starting-point that institutions 
have an important effect on behaviour but differ in their understanding of what an 
institution is and how it works.  
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The paper investigates government decisions on the relative openness of external 
borders. I focus on situations where a visa obligation is in place. This might be the 
case for varying reasons. A permit could be required to prevent irregular 
migration. It could also reflect a foreign policy dispute between a sending and 
receiving country (Stringer 2004). In the context of regional integration, a visa 
might be required owing to the wishes of partner states. The new EU countries, 
for example, mainly started to demand a visa of their Eastern neighbours during 
the accession period as this was a condition for securing full membership of the 
Union (Lavenex and Ucarer 2004). The decision for governments to make, then, 
is how strictly a travel permit requirement should be enforced. How restrictive or 
liberal a visa-issuing practice is to be pursued? The following sections develop 
two models seeking to account for how, if at all, state implementation practices 
could alter as a result of European integration. 
 
2.1 Rational choice institutionalism 
In its approach to institutions, the rational choice perspective emphasises formal 
rules and enforcement procedures, and tend to assume that actors arrive at the 
scene with predefined interests (Tsebelis and Garrett 2000). The preferences of 
players are given, but their favoured strategies and actions will alter depending on 
the incentive structure provided by the institutional setup (Scharpf 1997). Actors 
follow a ‘logic of consequentiality’ (March and Olsen 2008) rationally weighing 
different courses of action choosing the one that will maximize their expected net 
benefits (Elster 1989).  
 
In the following I assume that Schengen participants differ in their preferred visa 
practices. This is a reasonable position to take given the heterogeneity of the EU. 
There are differences for example in the extent to which domestic labour markets 
rely on irregular workers (Triandafyllidou 2010). Likewise, international tourism 
is a major source of revenue and jobs for some countries but not for others (WB 
2010b). Highlighting preference divergence is especially warranted in the case of 
the Central and Eastern European enlargement. The new member-states are, in 
general, transit rather than destination countries for migrants (Anderson 2000; 
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Triandafyllidou and Gropas 2007: 14). In addition, their economies are often 
heavily tied up with cross-border trade and travel with neighbours outside the 
Union (Maroukis et al. 2011). This gives them a more liberal position than their 
counterparts in Western Europe. 
 
Focusing on the enlargement case, Poland, for example, might like to provide 
easy access for travellers from the Ukraine coming to trade or visit family. It 
could also be interested in facilitating travel from Turkey as a major emerging 
market. Germany takes the opposite view fearing in both cases irregular 
migration. In the absence of integration, the two states are free to pursue their 
preferred strategies unilaterally. However, sharing a free travel area alter things 
considerably. Poland can still follow a lenient visa-issuing practice. It is not 
dependent on the cooperation of Germany for doing so but can simply instruct its 
consulates to permit entry in the widest possible set of cases. Germany, by 
contrast, comes to rely on the cooperation of Poland if it wishes to implement a 
restrictive policy. Unilateral action will lack effectiveness as applicants can 
simply enter through Poland instead. Schengen implementation is thus 
characterized by what I term an ‘asymmetric control situation’. 
 
From a rational choice perspective, this asymmetry will be difficult to overcome. 
Germany and Poland are engaged in a zero-sum game (cf. Scharpf 1997: 73). If 
they fail to cooperate they will not arrive at a sup-optimal outcome to what they 
could otherwise achieve. Rather to the contrary: there are only costs and no gains 
for Poland in cooperating with Germany in implementing a restrictive policy. 
Germany thus faces considerable problems in securing the cooperation of Poland. 
 
In such situations rational choice institutionalism points to the importance of 
strong enforcement mechanisms in the form of coercion or financial sanctions. 
The former is not an option within European integration. The monopoly of 
violence rests with the member states. Oversight combined with heavy fines is, 
however, in principle possible. The European Court of Justice can impose 
economic penalties for failure to comply with European legislation (Tallberg 
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2002). Poland might thus adjust its visa-issuing practices for fear that Germany 
would turn to the Commission and prompt it to launch an infringement proceeding 
culminating in financial sanctions.  
 
This scenario is not, however, probable. The common visa rules are broadly 
formulated and seldom strictly bind the member states to pursue a particular 
practice (Meloni 2005, 2009). In order to establish the travel intentions of visitors, 
and whether they are likely to return to their country of origin, the Schengen rules 
obliges participating states to collect information on applicants. Yet it is not 
specified precisely what this entails. A restrictive member country might demand 
comprehensive financial statements, extensive records over family ties as well as 
substantial bank deposits from potential sponsors of the visitor. It could also 
require applicants to travel to the consulate to attend a personal interview. A 
liberal state, in contrast, might only request a photocopy of a credit card, 
documentation of hotel reservation and a brief note setting out the purpose of the 
visit. There is thus ample room with the common rules for pursuing a liberal line 
without engaging in illegal practices which would risk an infringement 
proceeding.  
 
Another route to cooperation in zero-sum games is through side-payments 
(Moravcsik 2003). Realising Poland’s lack of interest in cooperating, Germany 
might instead offer compensation outweighing the losses incurred. It could thus 
set up a financial scheme involving periodic inspections at Polish consulates 
coupled with payments subject to satisfactory performance. Prior to the 
enlargement of the Schengen area the old member states helped fund the build-up 
of border control structures in the acceding countries (Grabbe 2000). Yet these 
transfers were not linked to performance post-enlargement. They reduced 
transactions costs of control but did not presumably alter state preferences. 
Poland’s interest in facilitating easy access for travellers from the Ukraine is 
arguably unchanged. A performance linked compensation scheme could of course 
be established in the future. It would have to not merely reimburse Poland for the 
administrative costs of extra control but also make up generously for the reduction 
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in for example trade revenue arising from stricter border practices. Since such a 
scheme is not presently in operation side-payments is not a mechanism through 
which we could expect implementation behaviour to change.  
 
Finally, cooperation could arise through tit-for-tat interactions (Axelrod 1984). 
Member states might differ in where they prefer more or less intensive control. If 
liberal and restrictive preferences are fairly equally distributed among 
participants, then reciprocal dynamics could arise leading to cooperation. States 
might be willing to give in on their ideal positions on some cases in return for 
similar concessions from partners in other situations. The main problem with this 
argument is that tit-for-tat interactions are unlikely to work when, as in the case of 
Schengen, many actors are involved (cf. Scharpf 1997). With a large number of 
participants it becomes difficult to target sanctions against the offender increasing 
the likelihood of defection. Even if this problem could be overcome, the 
conditions for tit-for-tat to work are not present in the Eastern enlargement. The 
new member states, as noted above, must be expected to take a more liberal 
position on most cases than the old. There are thus few situations where they 
would need the cooperation of their counterparts.  
 
Summing up, rational choice institutionalism helps us identify a fundamentally 
asymmetric control situation within Schengen. A restrictive state needs the 
cooperation of all the other participants to effectively implement its preferred 
policy whereas a liberal does not. In turn, the zero-sum character of the situation 
makes it difficult to achieve cooperation. The three main routes are through 
oversight combined with sanctions, side-payments and tit-for-tat interactions. 
These mechanisms are not strong in the case of Schengen and the Eastern 
enlargement. The expectation from the rational choice perspective is thus that 
integration will not impact on domestic visa-issuing practices of the new 
Schengen participants: 
 
H1: Schengen membership will not have an effect on the visa-issuing 
practices of the new member states 
Mogens Hobolth 
  Page 138 of 244 
2.2 Sociological institutionalism 
Sociological institutionalism offers a different picture of the characteristics of 
institutions and in what ways they affect behaviour. From this perspective 
institutions include not only formal rules but also informal norms, roles and 
standard operating procedures (Checkel 2001; DiMaggio and Powell 1983). 
Actors are guided by a ‘logic of appropriateness’ doing what they perceive to be 
expected or proper conduct for persons in their position (March and Olsen 2008). 
Means-ends calculations are thus replaced by role taking. This does not mean that 
officials are dupes with no space for choosing among different courses of action. 
Roles can be variously performed depending on the understanding of a particular 
situation. But choices are bounded by considerations of what is appropriate 
behaviour. To understand the potential consequences of Schengen participation on 
domestic visa practices it is thus important to explore the role expectations 
embedded in the border regime, and how these are dispersed to and taken up by 
new members.  
 
Let us begin by identifying the role expectations as these are set out in key 
Schengen documents. The founding 1985 Schengen Convention introduces an 
obligation to coordinate visa policies and practices. Here we find a commitment 
by the states to “harmonize” and “approximate” their visa policies and adjust 
“procedures for the issue of visas and admission to their territories, taking into 
account the need to ensure the protection of the entire territory …against illegal 
immigration and activities which could jeopardise security” (OJEU 2000: 14f, 
article 7 and 20). Control should thus be uniform and respect the interest of the 
other participants. Moving on to the 1990 Schengen Implementing Agreement we 
here, additionally, find the principle of ‘compensatory measures’. The member 
states commit themselves to increase checks at the external frontier in order to 
outweigh the implied loss of control by the physical dismantling of internal 
borders.  
 
These general norms are given further weight in an extensive document setting 
out shared administrative guidelines on issuing visas – the ‘Common Consular 
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Instructions’ (Council 2004; OJEU 2000). The manual, the first version of which 
was put together in 1993, spells out the practical procedures to be followed when 
handling visa applications. How should the consular section be organized? What 
supporting documents might be asked for? To what embassy should applications 
be lodged? It also articulates a commitment to mutual consultation between the 
partners on the issuing of visas, and explicates the process to be followed by the 
actors involved. The rules clarify that only in exceptional cases may an alternative 
national visa (‘VTL’) be issued if a partner state objects to allowing a person entry 
(Council 2004: 41). Overall, the document sets out that the “purpose of examining 
applications is to detect those applicants who are seeking to immigrate to the 
Member States and set themselves up there, using grounds such as tourism, 
business, study, work or family visits as a pretext. Therefore, it is necessary to be 
particularly vigilant when dealing with ‘risk categories’, unemployed persons, 
those with no regular income, etc.” (Council 2004: 24).35  
 
The institutional set up is thus characterized by clearly defined roles. The member 
states should prevent irregular access and stays, and in doing so take into 
consideration the interest of all the participating EU executives. What constitutes 
appropriate and acceptable control behaviour is set out in general and specified 
carefully through non-binding administrative guidelines. Restrictiveness is evident 
in the detailed procedures and in the expectation that the control of the external 
border should compensate for security losses triggered by the dismantling of 
internal checks. 
 
Still, even if the Schengen norms are clear a practical impact is not to be taken for 
granted. The key actors – consular officials, ministerial civil servants and border 
guards – are embedded in other institutional settings with pre-existing norms and 
rules. Many of the new member states have close if complex ties with their 
Eastern neighbours reflecting their common past within the communist bloc. After 
                                                 
35
 In 2010, following the entry into force of new European visa legislation, the consular 
instructions were replaced with a new visa handbook negotiated by the Commission under 
comitology (COM 2010a). In contrast with the old instructions, the handbook also highlights 
obligations to respect fundamental rights and the need to balance internal security with facilitation 
of travel. 
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1989, when these states were substantially reconfigured, the fought for national 
sovereignty became an important regulative ideal (Wæver 1997: 281-305). 
Though eager to join the EU, sensitivity about supranational encroachment was 
widespread. In this light, we might expect a symbolic adaptation to Schengen in 
the form of ‘window-dressing’ (March and Olsen 1984: 738). A strong effort is 
made to appear in line with the rules, but in practice old procedures are still 
followed. Such a finding would tally with other enlargement studies. New EU 
directives are swiftly and formally transposed into the national legal order of these 
states (Sedelmeier 2011) but more rarely implemented on the ground. In terms of 
compliance, the new member countries are generally a ‘world of dead letters’ 
(Falkner and Treib 2008). 
 
Yet the extent to which window-dressing is a feasible strategy depends on the 
institutional framework. Could there be strong mechanisms in place to ensure that 
the Schengen rules are diffused and taken up by new actors? Is it possible to 
merely present a picture of adaptation to the common visa-issuing rules without 
substantially altering practices? Three key mechanisms make it difficult to merely 
window-dress Schengen compliance: 
 
First, the case management process is governed by detailed procedures for sharing 
information on unwanted travellers. These rules are underpinned by IT-systems 
making the data transfers possible in practice (Bigo 2000; Broeders 2007). The 
Schengen Information System (SIS) lists persons not to be admitted to the 
common territory, and the Schengen Consultation Network (VISION) allows for 
the exchange of case files. The SIS database must be accessed during the 
inspection of visa applications. Through the consultation network a member state 
can request to see entry requests received by partners for specific nationalities or 
types of travellers. It can object to the issuing of a Schengen visa where it deems 
necessary. This network is extensively used. In 2011, for example, Switzerland 
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“performed background checks on 286472 people in response to consultation” 
(FOM 2012: 15).
36
  
 
Second, the member states conduct regular evaluations. This practice was 
instituted in the late 1990s and is currently carried out within the remit of the 
Council visa working party (OJEU 2000: 138). In 2011-2, to take an example, the 
Hungarian representations in Istanbul and Cairo were inspected. Practices at 
Czech, Polish, Slovakian and Icelandic facilities were also checked (COM 2012a). 
The evaluations make use of questionnaires and visits at the consulates and a draft 
report is drawn up and circulated (COM 2012a). 
 
Third, Schengen allows for and mandates the member states to set up local 
consular cooperation between officials working on the ground in the different 
cities abroad (Fernández 2006). This can involve regular meetings with exchanges 
of best practices, information on visas applied for, issued and refused and lists of 
travellers considered trusted. The common consular instruction, for example, 
notes that persons established as trustworthy through this local cooperation can be 
subjected to less intensive control (Council 2004: 24).  
 
Taken together, these three mechanisms render the practices and positions of the 
partners visible. They ensure a high degree of internal transparency in the visa-
issuing process. This makes it difficult to window-dress. Deviating behaviour is 
not easily hidden and can be brought to light and ‘named and shamed’. 
Importantly, this is not a matter of coercion or financial sanctions. The extensive 
information merely makes it very challenging to circumvent Schengen unnoticed 
and ensures that members are continually taken to account for their practical 
interpretation of the common rules. There are thus few options for escaping the 
role expectations embedded in the regime. Sociological institutionalism would 
therefore lead us to expect a restrictive impact of participation on domestic border 
control in Central and Eastern Europe: 
 
                                                 
36
 Alongside these databases a new Visa Information System (VIS) is also gradually being taken 
into use.  
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H2: Schengen membership will have a restrictive effect on the visa-issuing 
practices of the new member states 
 
In the next section I set out the research design I use to test the two rival 
hypotheses and assess the relative explanatory purchase of the theoretical models. 
 
3. Research design 
In this section I set out the research design I use to assess the extent to which EU-
integration has caused changes in domestic visa policies. I start out by discussing 
general methodological issues involved in Europeanization studies and then 
proceed to outline the quasi-experimental strategy adopted in the paper. 
 
Methodological issues in Europeanization research 
Europeanization is a recent and expanding research agenda in EU studies 
(Exadaktylos & Radaelli 2009: 508). There is some debate as to what the notion 
Europeanization more specifically refers to (Radaelli 2003; Börzel & Risse 2003; 
for a critical overview see Olsen 2002). In the following I understand the concept 
as denoting “[…] the effects of European integration on domestic polity, politics 
and policy” (Radaelli & Pasquir 2006: 36; cf. Hix & Goetz 2000: 2f).37 I focus on 
changes in state policy and administrative practice which are brought about by 
participation in EU cooperation. 
 
Europeanization studies usually consists of careful process-tracings of the causal 
mechanisms through which EU institutions affect national policy and practice 
(Ette & Faist 2007b; Grabbe 2003; Featherstone & Kazamias 2001; Radaelli & 
Pasquir 2006: 40; Exadaktylos & Radaelli 2009: 526). The most common research 
design is a close analysis of one or two single countries (Haverland 2006b: 66; 
Ette & Faist 2007b; Cantero 2011; cf. Geddes 2003; cf. Vink & Graziano 2006: 3; 
Caporaso 2006: 27). This approach allows for an in-depth assessment and 
identification of causal mechanisms at play.  
                                                 
37
 A set of authors see Europeanization as the interplay between the European and domestic level. 
They thus investigate not only the top-down ‘download’ of policies but also the previous bottom-
up ‘upload’ (Börzel 2002). The reason for this is the likely linkage between the two processes.  
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A key criticism of this approach is that it is likely to bias the analytical results. 
Researchers tend to assume from the outset that integration is a main cause of 
change, and thereby run the risk of ignoring other and potentially more important 
explanations. The suggested remedy to this problem is to include ‘control-cases’ 
in the analysis, that is countries not participating in EU cooperation (Levi-Faur 
2004; Haverland 2006a; cf. Hix & Goetz 2000). Levi-Faur’s (2004) analysis of 
the liberalization of the telecoms and electricity industry in Europe is an example 
of such a strategy. His article is based on a comparative research design in which 
the developments in the EU member countries are contrasted with a group of 
other Western and Latin American states. The conclusion he arrives at is that the 
liberalization process is also significantly driven by broader global processes and 
would likely have occurred even in the absence of European cooperation (Levi-
Faur 2004: 4).  
 
Schengen enlargement as a quasi-experiment 
In this paper I carry out a quasi-experimental analysis (Meyers 1995; Shadish, 
Cook & Campbell 2002; Lijphart 1971: 683f; cf. Haverland 2006b: 63).
38
 
Shadish, Cook and Campbell (2002: 12) define an experiment as a “study in 
which an intervention is deliberately introduced to observe its effects”. This can 
take place in a laboratory or in the field. In social and political science there are 
often significant practical and ethical barriers to this kind of research and a quasi-
experiment can therefore be a good alternative. In the quasi-experiment the 
researcher lacks the same degree of control over the factor of interest and instead 
makes use of a ‘naturally’ occurring development such as a shift in government 
policy. 
 
The simplest, basic quasi-experimental design involves the study of one group 
with a measurement conducted before and after the intervention occurs (Meyers 
1995: 154). The difference between the two values is then taken to be the result of 
the policy change. A weakness of this approach is that it is not possible to rule out 
that other events in the same time-period influenced the outcome. For this reason 
                                                 
38
 Meyers (1995) notes that this approach is most often labeled as quasi-experimental in the 
discipline of psychology whereas the term natural experiment is more often used in economics. 
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most studies also assess events in another similar group which did not experience 
the same intervention (Meyers 1995: 155ff). If the same development did not take 
place here, the intervention is very likely to be the cause of the change. As it is 
very difficult to find perfect control cases, it is important to consider alternative 
plausible explanations (Shadish, Cook & Campbell 2002: 14).  
 
The 2007 Schengen enlargement provides the material for a quasi-experiment. It 
allows us to study the effect of EU-cooperation by measuring visa-issuing 
practices before and after. Any shifts among the new member states can then be 
compared with the visa practice of the old as well as countries not part of the free 
travel area.
39
 The two-step Schengen membership procedure for the new 
participants is set out below in table 1. 
 
Table 1 
The two-step Schengen membership process 
Date EU/Schengen membership Change in visa policy 
1 May 2004 Ten new member states join 
the EU; internal border 
controls remain in place. 
Visa lists harmonized. The new members 
must replace their national lists of which 
foreign citizens need to possess a visa to enter 
their territory with the common EU list. Their 
visa formats must also be aligned with the 
European standard. 
21 December 
2007 
Nine of the new member 
states join the Schengen area; 
internal border controls (land, 
sea) lifted. Airport checks 
dismantled 30 March 2008. 
Visa issuing requirements harmonized. The 
new members must now use the same criteria 
as the other Schengen participants, e.g. they 
begin to charge similar fees and where 
required exchange information on visa 
requests. 
SOURCE: COM 2007 
(COM 2007a) 
How should the quasi-experiment be set up? One analytical strategy could be to 
investigate potential changes from the year before full Schengen membership to 
                                                 
39
 The use of the differential speed of integration resembles Haverland’s (2006a: 142) suggestion 
to use the opt-outs and opt-ins of integration to measure the relative effects of EU-cooperation. 
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the next. To do so however could generate both false negatives (identifying no 
effect when there is an impact) and false positives (finding an impact when there 
actually is not one). A false negative could arise for two different reasons. The 
first relates to issues of anticipated implementation. The new members could have 
adapted their practice some time before formally acceding. If this was the case, we 
would see little change from 2007 to 2008 erroneously lending support to the 
hypothesis that EU-integration has no effect. Although it is important to take this 
into consideration, it should be noted that the new member states have 
consistently delayed the adoption of the Schengen rules as long as possible mainly 
to avoid adverse consequences for travel and trade with their Eastern neighbours 
(Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2004: 672; cf. Lavenex & Ucarer 2004: 431). A 
false negative could also arise if after joining implementation is delayed or 
prolonged further. It would not seem unreasonable to expect that at the point of 
accession new member states had not yet fully altered their standard operating 
procedures. Adjusting to Schengen could thus carry into the next couple of years. 
Again, if we looked only at the shift from 2007 to 2008 we would significantly 
underestimate the impact of Schengen membership. Turning to the risk of false 
positives, such a scenario could arise if – to impress and assure their partners – the 
new member states intensified control immediately after accession but then 
reverted to old practices afterwards. A significant restrictive alteration from 2007 
and 2008 would thus lead us to conclude in favour of the hypothesis of an impact 
ignoring that this was a very temporary change. To avoid these problems I analyse 
domestic visa-issuing practices in the three years before (2005-2007) and after 
(2008-2010) membership. This should provide the basis for a more robust 
conclusion.  
 
A false positive could also be found if we identified a shift but this was driven by 
other factors than Schengen membership. An external shock, such as the global 
financial crisis, could very well impact the domestic visa-issuing practices in a 
restrictive direction. All states become more concerned with protecting their 
labour markets against irregular workers. The onset of a major armed conflict 
abroad could have a similar effect. The sudden increase in the number of 
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protection seekers may trigger many countries to tighten practices. For this reason 
it is particularly important to have the control cases in the analysis. If a restrictive 
alteration in the practice of the new member states is mirrored in the old, partial or 
non-members then we cannot be sure that the change is due to EU integration. We 
are faced with either an instance of multiple causal pathways or a shift triggered 
solely by external events. Reversely, if visa practices alter only in the new 
member-states we can be fairly confident that this is caused by Schengen 
participation. 
  
4. Data 
The data source for the analysis is the European Visa Database (Hobolth 
forthcoming). In the period before (2005-2007) and after (2008-2010) the 
Schengen enlargement the EU collected visa-issuing statistics from both the 
existing and new participants in the common policy. This information makes it 
possible to identify potential changes in the number of visas applied for, issued 
and rejected as well as refusal rates. For the same period, the database contains 
information on travel entry permits issued by the partial Schengen members 
(Cyprus, Romania and Bulgaria) and the UK and the US. The documents issued 
by the latter two are similar visas for temporary trips for purposes of business, 
tourism or family visits of a short duration. They are thus very comparable to the 
Schengen visas. There are differences, however. These relate to the application 
fee and, potentially, periods of validity. This should not cause concerns in this 
context as the analysis centres on changes in relative rather than absolute 
restrictiveness.  
 
The dependent variable of the analysis is the change in visa refusal rates from 
2005-7 to 2008-10. Refusal rates are calculated in the database as the number of 
refusals divided by the number of visa decisions (issued plus refused). A 
complication arises from the so-called VTL visas. These are visas that a country 
can issue if it does not consider the EU-criteria to be met, but wishes to allow 
partial entry. VTL permits only give legal access to the territory of the issuing 
member state. I have included these in the calculation as issued visas. A member 
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state, which makes considerable use of this option, would otherwise appear more 
restrictive in its practice than it is. National visas are also interesting as an 
indication of strain in the cooperation. Rising numbers of issued VTL visas 
indicate, potentially, an unwillingness to pay heed to the interests of partner 
countries. I therefore also discuss these in the robustness section. 
 
In the descriptive tables I have calculated the mean refusal rate for a member state 
by averaging the value for each visa-list sending country. An alternative approach 
would be to sum up the total number of issued and refused visas and then use this 
aggregate figure to arrive at a refusal rate. With this method the figure is in 
general lower. The reason is that most member states receive a very high amount 
of applications from a few key countries which often also enjoy a privileged low 
refusal rate. This causes the overall refusal rate to shift downwards. Using an 
average of the countries’ score instead provides a better assessment because it is 
less influenced by outlier partners (cf. Neumayer 2005: 50f).
40
 
 
5. Empirical analysis: The domestic impact of EU border control cooperation 
Did Schengen participation have an impact on the new member states’ visa-
issuing practices? Can we find support for either the rational choice or 
sociological institutional hypotheses? The empirical analysis proceeds in two 
stages. I start by describing trends in the visa-issuing practices of the receiving 
states. The findings suggested by this analysis are then tested statistically. Table 2 
below provides a comprehensive overview of the number of short-stay visas 
applied for and average refusal rates in the period from 2005 to 2010: 
 
                                                 
40
 The dataset, robustness tests and the statistical read-outs are available on the database website. 
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Let us begin by looking at the group of new member states. Prior to joining 
Schengen (2005 to 2007) they received about 3 million visa applications in total 
each year. Poland as by far the largest state also got the lion’s share of entry 
requests, more than one million per year. Hungary and the Czech Republic 
between them handled another million. The remaining applications were spread 
out among the smaller of the new member states, i.e. the Baltic countries, 
Receiving country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
New Schengen 2.963.515 3.168.590 2.966.821 2.092.227 1.986.887 2.156.149 9% 9% 10% 14% 14% 14%
Czech Republic 447.920 556.488 579.932 557.277 452.040 538.915 10% 11% 13% 17% 16% 17%
Estonia 97.027 119.570 103.938 99.261 95.063 120.467 15% 10% 7% 18% 13% 13%
Hungary 584.070 528.638 451.128 324.768 283.166 248.177 9% 9% 9% 15% 14% 14%
Latvia 119.691 148.658 161.253 138.929 123.413 138.498 5% 4% 7% 15% 17% 12%
Lithuania 316.766 406.586 392.477 245.714 238.925 275.153 2% 2% 5% 9% 12% 13%
Malta M 13.893 13.720 31.181 30.529 40.401 M 13% 9% 14% 16% 16%
Poland 1.186.370 1.176.919 1.087.091 512.268 591.604 687.976 11% 9% 10% 13% 14% 16%
Slovakia 114.676 133.285 95.285 79.831 64.982 57.260 5% 9% 7% 7% 11% 14%
Slovenia 96.995 84.553 81.997 102.998 107.165 49.302 10% 10% 8% 10% 7% 5%
Old Schengen 6.844.984 7.951.248 8.331.968 8.578.322 7.956.824 9.271.829 15% 15% 15% 15% 13% 14%
Austria 343.111 329.449 M M 293.148 271.787 7% 8% M M 9% 9%
Belgium 156.861 169.624 199.717 196.776 182.816 201.048 20% 22% 21% 23% 21% 21%
Denmark 70.505 70.573 80.407 76.645 76.118 78.886 14% 15% 13% 22% 12% 14%
Finland 422.461 569.802 708.094 801.391 790.963 1.016.582 16% 17% 17% 16% 21% 21%
France 2.002.319 1.981.876 1.975.985 1.916.205 1.733.434 2.038.327 15% 17% 16% 10% 10% 8%
Germany 1.788.889 1.851.068 1.867.426 1.886.459 1.600.108 1.785.415 17% 18% 16% 14% 15% 14%
Greece M 602.085 672.270 749.020 709.000 611.127 M 19% 16% 14% 13% 14%
Iceland M M 366 460 448 562 M M 2% 13% 7% 2%
Italy 775.345 924.547 1.128.056 1.231.741 1.098.412 1.322.392 9% 7% 7% 9% 9% 10%
Luxembourg 2.751 3.618 4.919 4.734 4.684 6.933 9% 7% 9% 3% 5% 6%
Netherlands 341.763 362.120 392.461 358.985 326.459 369.558 14% 17% 16% 17% 13% 14%
Norway M M 110.487 112.166 M 131.100 M M 16% 13% M 24%
Portugal 74.750 88.449 106.940 116.033 109.986 116.435 20% 15% 22% 18% 17% 13%
Spain 689.148 802.585 872.650 903.618 840.872 1.121.131 15% 14% 14% 15% 14% 13%
Sweden 177.081 195.452 212.190 224.089 190.376 200.546 17% 17% 17% 14% 12% 14%
Partial Schengen 159.005 149.684 1.047.987 1.131.460 872.119 832.253 9% 7% 13% 9% 10% 9%
Bulgaria M M 621.655 656.995 590.104 598.388 M M 14% 11% 11% 12%
Cyprus 159.005 149.684 206.873 236.039 109.880 53.259 9% 7% 8% 12% 12% 8%
Romania M M 219.459 238.426 172.135 180.606 M M 14% 6% 7% 6%
Non-Schengen 1.562.171 6.958.988 7.183.050 7.212.350 4.993.471 5.558.832 14% 25% 24% 25% 28% 28%
United Kingdom 1.562.171 1.728.920 1.329.215 1.481.920 M M 14% 15% 14% 15% M M
United States M 5.230.068 5.853.835 5.730.430 4.993.471 5.558.832 M 29% 28% 29% 28% 28%
SOURCE: See data section
Average visa refusal rateShort-stay visas applied for
NOTES: M = Missing data
Table 2
Visa issuing statistics 2005 to 2010
Mogens Hobolth 
  Page 149 of 244 
Slovakia and Slovenia. Malta as a tiny state received less than 15.000 applications 
annually. The average visa refusal rate was at 9-10% with most countries 
approximating this figure quite closely. The Czech Republic, Estonia and Malta 
were in some years rather above this figure. Latvia and Lithuania, in contrast, 
were in general significantly more liberal with refusal rates around 5%. Slovakia 
was also in the lower end.  
 
The data does not suggest any consistent pattern of anticipated implementation. In 
some of the new member states there was an increase in the number of 
applications, for others a decline or no change. The refusal rate of the Czech 
Republic gradually increased from 2005 to 2007 whereas in Estonia we saw an 
opposite trend. With regards to the remaining countries alterations were minor and 
in varying directions. 
 
After these countries joined Schengen we see a set of changes. The total number 
of annually received applications dropped with about one million. This was 
mainly due to a major decrease in entry requests at the Polish consulates. There 
was also a decline in Hungary, Lithuania and Slovakia. Figures for Czech 
Republic and Estonia were largely stable while the picture is mixed for Latvia and 
Slovenia. Malta deviated by a marked upward shift in the number of visa 
applications after membership. Why did applications numbers drop so 
significantly? If anything, we might have expected an increase. With Schengen 
membership the permits issued by the new member states in some ways became 
more attractive to obtain as they now allowed for visits to the entire free travel 
area. Two explanations of the decrease would seem plausible. First, visitors 
travelling to both for example Poland and Germany would previously have had to 
submit two applications. With Schengen they only need to apply for a single entry 
permit. This might explain a part of the fall in application figures. Second, the 
drop could be a result of a ‘deterrence’ effect of Schengen. In the expectation that 
procedures had now been tightened many potential travellers might give up 
applying.  
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The average visa refusal rate increased markedly from 9-10% to 14% annually 
after Schengen accession. The data thus suggest a stable upward shift in 
restrictiveness.  This trend is found in nearly all the new member countries. In 
Hungary, for example, the refusal rate jumped from 9% in 2005 to 2007 to 14-
15% in 2008 to 2010.  
 
Three states deviate from this overall pattern. The Estonian figures are difficult to 
interpret with shifts both up and down. This is a case which underlines the 
importance of looking beyond the accession year. From 2007 to 2008 the refusal 
rate increased very notably but it then dropped again. It looks like an instance of 
initial adaptation followed by a reversion to earlier practices. The Slovakian case 
offers a reverse image. In the first year after joining there was no change but then 
refusal rates increased. This could be an instance of delayed implementation. In 
Slovenia, finally, we see a rather surprising liberalisation. A part of the 
explanation could be that Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro were removed from 
the common visa list in 2010. As these are neighbouring countries of Slovenia the 
change had a particularly noticeable influence here. But a closer look at the data 
suggests that this cannot alone account for the declining refusal rate. 
 
Overall, the descriptive statistics for the new member states thus show a 
substantial decline in visa applications and a considerable upward shift in refusal 
rates. Are there reasons to believe that these two trends are linked, and if so, how? 
Could the heightened refusal rates be explained by the reduction in the number of 
visas applied for? This might be the case if the decrease in entry requests was 
mainly triggered by many travellers no longer needing to submit multiple 
applications. If we assume that persons visiting several member states are 
predominantly wealthy tourists or business travellers, then previous research 
indicate (see paper one) that these applications are generally less prone to be 
refused. Hence, when the number of entry requests submitted by this group drops 
then, other things being equal, the share of ‘wanted travellers’ in the application 
pool is reduced. This could cause the refusal rate to shift upward.  
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On the other hand, if the fall in application numbers is mainly due to deterrence 
then this does not explain the rise in refusal rates. If anything, self-exclusion 
would be strongest for family visitors and poorer travellers who might be unable 
to pay increased fees. With fewer of these persons applying we could even expect 
the refusal rate to fall. In that case, the increase in rejection rates that we see is an 
even stronger sign of a restrictive shift in practices. It is difficult on the basis of 
aggregated statistics to determine which of these arguments carry more weight. 
We can, however, make some qualified assessments. Take Poland and Hungary. 
They account for most of the drop in applications. Here the fall is so marked (in 
the former from a million to a half and in the latter from about a half to a quarter 
of a million) that the change can hardly be accounted for solely by visitors to 
multiple destinations who now only need one visa. On the contrary, it would seem 
plausible that a significant deterrence effect is operating.  
 
To sum up, the empirics suggest that Schengen participation had a marked 
restrictive effect on the new member states. This questions hypothesis one and the 
rational choice explanation, and lend support to hypotheses two and the 
sociological institutionalist account. Yet before we can draw such a conclusion we 
need to investigate patterns in the control cases.  
 
The control cases 
Beginning with the old Schengen states, we see a general increase in the number 
of applications received annually from 2005 to 2010. The average refusal rate is 
stable at around 15% albeit with a slight fall. As discussed in more detail below 
there are differences in the trends over time among these countries. In some cases 
refusal rates change little whereas in others we see a shift in liberal or restrictive 
directions. 
 
For the partial Schengen members it is difficult to identify a particular trend due 
to missing data for Bulgaria and Romania in 2005 and 2006. Still, application 
numbers do look fairly stable for these two countries in the remaining years. In 
the case of Cyprus there is a marked reduction in applications. Refusal rates 
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change somewhat in different directions. For the non-Schengen states, the UK and 
the US, we also lack data for a few years. Nevertheless, the empirics indicate that 
the number of visas applied for and refusal rates were stable. 
 
Having set out the major trends, let us look in detail at developments in refusal 
rates among the control group countries and contrast these with the new member 
states: 
 
Figure 1: Changes in average visa refusal rates from 2005-7 to 2008-10. The change is 
calculated as a mean of the different observations per year. 
 
Figure 1 shows shifts in average refusal rates from the period 2005-2007 to 2008-
2010 comparing the new member states with the control groups. Among the old 
member states we see varying tendencies. In some cases – France, Germany, 
Greece, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden – the refusal rate 
drops. By contrast in other countries – Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
Iceland, Norway and Italy there is an increase. In the case of Denmark and 
Norway the tendency is quite sensitive to outlier observations characterized by 
very low application numbers. The restrictive shift in the case of Iceland comes 
down to an apparent change in practice at its one and only visa-issuing consulate 
in China. These cases thus do not provide a robust indication of a restrictive 
tendency. If they are removed, we are left only with fairly minor restrictive 
changes in Italy, Austria and Finland. The predominant tendency among the old 
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members is thus one of stability tending towards a slight liberalization. Turning to 
the partial and non-Schengen states we see substantial liberalisations in Bulgaria 
and Romania, a restrictive shift in Cyprus and no changes in the UK and the US.  
 
Hence, while there was a restrictive shift among the new members this was not 
paralleled in the control groups. The descriptive analysis therefore strongly 
suggests an effect of Schengen participation pushing for less open borders.  
 
Statistical tests 
To further assess whether a restrictive effect is indeed at work I ran a series of 
statistical tests comparing mean changes in refusal rates. To maximise the 
numbers of observations, and hence increase the validity of the analysis, I 
investigated country dyads. For example, Czech visa practices in Turkey 
constitute one case in the dataset. This yields a much larger set of data-points than 
in the aggregate picture provided in the descriptive analysis. I first used an 
ANOVA analysis. The results are reported in the table below.  
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Table 3 corroborates the conclusion of the descriptive analysis. The restrictive 
change among the new Schengen member states is statistically significantly 
different from all the other groups and of considerable magnitude. The liberal 
trend in the group of old Schengen states, however, is not statistically significant. 
The ANOVA analysis compares average changes in refusal rates between the 
different groups. To do so, it makes the statistical assumption that the variance 
within each group is roughly similar. A closer look reveals that this assumption 
does not hold because the variation among the partial Schengen members is very 
high compared with the rest. If we exclude this group the problem disappears 
without changing the substantive results. 
 
Still, the adjusted ANOVA test remains sensitive to variation in the number of 
observations among groups. To enhance the robustness of the analysis I therefore 
also conduct a chi square test. For this I converted the visa refusal rate change into 
Lower 
Bound
Upper 
Bound
Old Schengen 6,88 0,68 0,00 5,08 8,69
Partial Schengen 8,11 1,04 0,00 5,36 10,87
Non Schengen 5,80 0,86 0,00 3,52 8,09
New Schengen -6,88 0,68 0,00 -8,69 -5,08
Partial Schengen 1,23 0,86 0,90 -1,03 3,49
Non Schengen -1,08 0,63 0,51 -2,74 0,58
New Schengen -8,11 1,04 0,00 -10,87 -5,36
Old Schengen -1,23 0,86 0,90 -3,49 1,03
Non Schengen -2,31 1,01 0,13 -4,97 0,35
New Schengen -5,80 0,86 0,00 -8,09 -3,52
Old Schengen 1,08 0,63 0,51 -0,58 2,74
Partial Schengen 2,31 1,01 0,13 -0,35 4,97
Table 3
Sig.
ANOVA test: Multiple Comparisons (Bonferroni)
Dependent Variable (I) rcGrp (J) rcGrp
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J)
Std. Error
95% Confidence 
Interval
SOURCE: See data section
NOTES: The average visa refusal rate before (2005-2007) and after (2008-2010) is calculated as an average of each 
observation per sending country). N=1938 (New Schengen: 191, old Schengen: 1.398, partial Schengen: 116, non- 
Schengen: 233). Levene test of homogeneity of variances 6,4 (significance 0,00). See discussion in main text.
New Schengen
Old Schengen
Partial Schengen
Non Schengen
Change in 
visa refusal rate
(before and after 
Schengen 
enlargement)
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an ordinal variable of either restrictive change, no change or liberal change. This 
reduces the amount of variation but limits sensitivity to group size. The results of 
the tests are listed in table 4 below:  
 
 
 
The significance test is shown by the adjusted residuals which take into account 
varying group sizes. They are normally distributed and values below -2 and above 
2 indicate significant difference. We thus here see, as in the ANOVA test, a 
significant and sizable restrictive trend among the new member states. In this test 
the liberalization tendency in the old Schengen states is also significant.  
 
Robustness checks 
The overall robustness of the analysis is increased by the use of multiple 
inferential and descriptive statistical methods. I have furthermore probed the 
stability of the patterns in the data by conducting additional tests excluding 
different groups of potentially deviating cases and analysing alternative measures.  
 
The first issue I tried to explore was the influence of possible outlier sending 
countries where the empirics indicate that only a few persons tried to apply. I ran 
the statistical tests excluding, respectively, third countries in which fewer than 50, 
None Liberal Restrictive
Count 16 29 146 191
% within group 8% 15% 76% 100%
Adjusted Residual -1,4 -11,5 13,0
Count 164 849 385 1398
% within group 12% 61% 28% 100%
Adjusted Residual ,8 8,7 -9,7
Count 13 66 37 116
% within group 11% 57% 32% 100%
Adjusted Residual -,1 ,5 -,5
Count 27 114 92 233
% within group 12% 49% 39% 100%
Adjusted Residual ,1 -1,9 1,9
Count 220 1058 660 1938
% within group 11% 55% 34% 100%
Table 4
SOURCE: See data section
NOTES: Pearson chi-square 187,5 (0,00 significance level)
Total
Crosstabulation of receiving country groups and changes in refusal rates 
 
Change in refusal rate
Total
Country 
Group
New Schengen
Old Schengen
Partial 
Schengen
Non Schengen
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100, 500 and 1.000 applications were received. This did not affect results. As 
noted above, however, doing so has an impact on a few of the old Schengen 
states, in particular Denmark. I also ran the analysis excluding cases where the 
shift in refusal rate was very large (+/- 25 percentage points) to ensure that such 
outlier cases did not distort the findings. Again, the results did not alter.  
 
The second aspect I tried to take into account was potential validity problems with 
the refusal rate indicator. There are some changes in EU’s visa list towards the 
end of the period and US and UK visa lists also differ. This variation is not picked 
up by the refusal rate. I therefore also ran the test using the Mobility Barriers 
Index in the database, which combines information on refusal rates, visa 
requirements and consular services in a single restrictiveness score. Using this 
indicator I still found the same pattern in the data. I also explored the potential 
link between shifts in application numbers and refusal rates by testing separately 
for the sending countries where there was a decrease in the visas applied for 
versus those where there was an increase. The findings were the same. 
 
As another alternative to looking at refusal rates I explored how the use of VTL 
visas has developed over the years. A vast and systematic use of national visas 
would indicate that states do not take into consideration the interests of their 
partners. It could also be a way for the new member states to side-step the 
constraints of Schengen. After joining Schengen, however, they did not start to 
issue VTL visas to any major degree. In the period 2008-10 these visas have made 
up less than 2% of the total number of short-stay visas issued by the new 
members. The only exception to this is Slovenia in 2009. Looking at all Schengen 
states there is a stable pattern with a similar but perhaps slightly more frequent use 
of VTL visas by the old member states. After enlargement France began to issue a 
very high amount of national VTL visas. They justify this publicly with reference 
to a lack of necessary information exchange on the part of the other states (EMM 
2011b: 58).  
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In sum, the different robustness checks do not challenge the overall pattern 
identified. They revealed some uncertainty in the estimated change for especially 
Denmark and France in the time-period. The checks had no impact on the figures 
from the new member states. The findings are thus very robust. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The dismantling of internal frontiers throughout most of Europe has been 
accompanied by intensive efforts to harmonize and coordinate external migration 
control policies. This development has been met with some concern in the 
academic literature. Although movement might have become free on the inside, 
this could have led to a considerable reduction in the ability of outsiders to enter 
into Europe. 
 
In this paper I have sought to contribute to the debate by theorising and testing to 
what extent, if at all, the shift to shared EU visa-issuing rules has had an effect at 
the national level and if so in what direction, and why. Based on rational choice 
and sociological institutionalism I set out two rival accounts of the likely impact 
of cooperation. The rational choice model identified an asymmetric control 
situation. Liberal countries like the new member states could pursue their 
preferred lenient policy without needing to coordinate with partner countries. By 
contrast, restrictive states were dependent on the other participants in the common 
policy to achieve effective control. Without cooperation, a traveller might simply 
enter via a partner state. To ensure collaboration, the rational choice model 
suggested three mechanisms: oversight and sanctions, side-payments and tit-for-
tat interactions. I argued that none of these are characteristic of Schengen, and 
especially not in the case of the Central and Eastern enlargement. The ‘logic of 
consequentiality’ thus point towards no impact of integration.  
 
Following sociological institutionalism, I devised a different account of Schengen 
and the consequences of participation. This approach stressed the presence and 
diffusion of norms in the regime. I found clearly specified role expectations 
pointing in a restrictive direction by, in particular, obliging each participant to pay 
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heed to the security and migration fears of the partners. Furthermore, I found that 
strong albeit largely informal and non-coercive mechanisms were in place to 
ensure their dispersion and uptake. IT-systems, evaluations and local consular 
cooperation created transparency among member states on practices. It enabled 
the naming and shaming of interpretations deviating from restrictive norms. This 
made it very difficult to escape the Schengen role expectations by engaging in 
window-dressing. The ‘logic of appropriateness’ was therefore one of adaptation 
to norms of intensive control, suggesting that Schengen participation should have 
a restrictive effect on domestic practices. 
 
I tested the two theoretical models and their predictions using a quasi-
experimental Europeanization framework based on data from the 2007 Schengen 
enlargement. I compared the new member states’ visa-issuing practice in the 
period before and after the enlargement to assess whether or not their practices 
remained the same, turned more liberal or restrictive and contrasted these with 
different control groups. I showed that the visa-issuing practice of almost all the 
new members became more restrictive following Schengen accession. Their 
refusal rates increased markedly. This shift was not mirrored in the old and partial 
member states or the UK and the US. The quasi-experimental study thus shows 
that EU-cooperation in the case of the Central and Eastern enlargement had a 
restrictive impact on domestic control practices. All in all, the data thus supports 
the sociological institutionalist account of the effect of Schengen on domestic 
practices and questions the explanatory purchase of the rational choice model. 
 
Having established the existence of an overall restrictive effect of Schengen, 
subsequent research could explore variation across sending countries. For 
example, the new member states’ visa-issuing practices in general turned more 
restrictive in Turkey than in India. Could this perhaps be explained by differences 
in domestic interests or the degree of embeddedness of prior norms? Or might 
these factors interplay with variation in the ‘misfit’ (Börzel and Risse 2003; Duina 
1997; for a critical discussion see Mastenbroek and Kaeding 2006) between the 
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practice of the new and old member states in the two sending countries before 
enlargement?  
 
Further studies could also probe the wider applicability of the findings. The 2007 
Schengen expansion is similar to the Southern enlargement in that the joining 
states are generally more liberal than the existing members. It would strengthen 
the conclusions of the analysis if we found a similar pattern in this case. The 
expansion of the free travel area to include the Scandinavian countries, in contrast, 
appears rather different. Here, it seems likely that old and new members shared a 
fairly restrictive profile. This could give rise to different theorisations. From a 
rational choice perspective, issues concerning zero-sums games become less 
important. But other collective action problems could arise leading to sup-optimal 
outcomes (Olson 1965). The sociological institutionalist model would still expect 
increased restrictiveness as states exchange migration fears and increase control at 
the external borders but this shift would probably be of a lesser magnitude. 
Additionally, the focus of the paper has been on the expansion of Schengen rather 
than its initial establishment (See e.g. Guiraudon 2003). The dynamics of regime 
creation might be rather different than those operating later on. Subsequent 
research could also examine in what ways increased involvement of the European 
Commission and Parliament in setting Schengen rules might affect policies and 
practices. Finally, in a wider perspective Europe could be compared with free 
travel areas around the world. In doing so, it would be important to establish 
preference compositions and pin-point formal rules, informal norms and various 
diffusion and enforcement mechanisms characterising these institutions.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
The Schengen visa policy in practice 
 
 
1. Borders and border control in the European Union 
Border control, policing and the administration of justice is today an important 
part of the European integration process. Internal frontiers are physically 
dismantled across most of the continent, and common rules and norms are in place 
to govern external borders and coordinate police and judicial collaboration. The 
establishment of this so-called Schengen area has spurred considerable public 
controversy. Critics stress the loss of state sovereignty and national identity 
associated with transferring and sharing competences in the area of justice and 
home affairs. Proponents point to the cooperation as a major symbol of the 
peaceful unification and stabilization of Europe after the Second World War and 
the withering away of the Iron Curtain. Integration in this policy field thus raise 
with particular strength questions about the future trajectory of Europe, and how 
cooperation might transform the individual nation-states. 
 
So far, the predominant focus of political science research in this field has been to 
understand how EU-integration came about. Considerably less attention has been 
paid to investigating the practical application of the common rules and norms by 
the member states. From the outset, the aim of this research project has been to 
advance our understanding of this side of the integration process. I have focused 
on borders and border control. The overall question explored has been how the 
common European visa policy has been implemented by the Schengen member 
states, and why. Visas are one of the central instruments used in the management 
of the external border.  
 
Theoretically, I drew on existing research conceptualizing Schengen as a border 
regime with two central dimensions: mode of governance and degree of openness. 
These studies characterised Schengen as a mixed model. It is governed through 
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both supranational and national elements and the borders are neither open nor 
closed. In order to better understand what this composite regime form entails I set 
up a revised analytical framework. On the governance dimension I introduced a 
distinction between cooperative and conflictual implementation practices. On the 
openness side, I distinguished between civic and ethnic selectivity.  
 
Turning to the empirics, one of the initial choices of the project was to attempt a 
broad quantitative comparative analysis rather than in-depth studies of a set of 
cases. In this way, the aim was to be able to identify and explain general trends in 
the cooperation. The existing studies that do probe the implementation primarily 
focus on a few countries, and I therefore also found that there might be particular 
value in trying to capture overall features and interaction dynamics. Pursuing this 
research strategy entailed setting up a new database. Current datasets in the area 
of borders and migration control do not cover the application of the Schengen 
rules. That is, existing empirics measure whether a visa requirement is in place 
but not how these rules are enforced. Quantitative EU implementation studies 
emphasise framework legislation (directives) and infringement proceedings. 
Neither of these has played a central role in Schengen. To carry out the project I 
thus put together and made publicly available a database with comprehensive 
information on European visa requirements, issuing practices and consular 
services.  
 
The border regime framework and the database form the basis for each of the 
three papers in the thesis. They explore different aspects of the cooperation and 
therefore also eclectically incorporate and develop methods and theories specific 
to the research question at hand.  
 
2. Findings of the individual papers 
Paper one investigated to what extent, and why, the openness of the European 
Union’s external border varies for visitors of different nationalities. It thus 
primarily thematised the openness dimension of the border regime. Drawing on 
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existing research I developed two different theoretical models explaining 
differences in restrictiveness, and derived a set of testable hypotheses.  
 
I started with interest group theory, which is widely used in migration studies, and 
reworked the framework to be able to account for the case of short-stay visas. The 
overall argument was that border control is characterized by client and 
majoritarian politics. In the case of major trading partners and tourism markets, 
for instance, businesses are likely to organise and lobby for liberal policies as they 
benefit from open borders. The costs of openness – for example strained public 
services – are, in contrast, diffuse and borne by the public in general. Trade and 
tourism interests, however, vary considerably between sending countries. Hence, 
as these diminish the mode of politics shift in a majoritarian direction. When there 
are no concentrated interests lobbying and setting policy practices should instead 
to follow the generally restrictive preferences of the electoral majority.  
 
As an alternative to this account, I developed a model based on constructivist 
security theory. The main focus of this approach has hitherto been to understand 
the political process by which different events and issues, such as terrorism and 
migration, becomes established as security threats. Moving beyond this, I took the 
existence of a widespread securitization of migration and refugees as a given and 
instead sought to investigate to what extent this dynamic is able to account for 
differences in border enforcement levels. I argued that threat constructions in the 
period examined centred on persons from Muslim-majority, refugee-producing 
and poor countries. Hence, to the extent the model holds a purchase on explaining 
border practices we should expect that travellers from such countries face strictly 
enforced visa requirements while others would enjoy easier access.  
 
I then tested empirically the hypotheses derived from the two models. I started out 
by presenting comprehensive data on the European border regime establishing 
that restrictiveness does vary significantly. While there are some differences in the 
practices of the Schengen states the main variation is between different third 
countries. What matters most is the nationality of the applicant rather than what 
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member state he or she seeks to enter. Using linear regression analysis I found 
that the security perspective has the largest explanatory purchase, although the 
interest group approach is also able to account for trends in the data. I arrived at 
this conclusion by testing the effect of bilateral trade, the size of migrant 
communities, tourism, income levels, religious make-up and asylum flows. In 
addition, I assessed the effect of a set of control variables – mainly levels of 
democracy, population size and travel distance. The analysis showed that bilateral 
trade and tourism have an impact on border openness as suggested by interest 
group theory. Yet the strongest predictors revolve around income, religion and the 
size of asylum outflows from sending countries as we would expect from a 
securitization perspective. Other things being equal, borders are more closed 
towards travellers from poor, Muslim-majority and refugee-producing countries. I 
also found that higher levels of democracy were correlated with more open 
borders.  
 
The main contribution of this paper is the advancement of the theoretical debate in 
the literature on the drivers and dynamics in European border control. Though 
security accounts of European borders have often been put forth in the literature, 
no systematic large-N testing has been carried out and recent research has 
questioned the relevance of the perspective. The explanatory models and the 
descriptive statistics also provide a much-needed comprehensive account of how 
the openness of the external border varies for different nationalities. In particular, 
where securitization theory has primarily aimed at understanding processes of 
threat constructions, I developed the theory in an explanatory direction. I offered a 
revised model which allows us to test predictions and assess the impact of 
different securitizations on state practices. 
 
Paper two explored to what extent, and why, the Schengen member states 
coordinate the execution of the common visa policy. This paper thus focuses on 
the governance dimension of the border regime. Here I adopted a more 
explorative strategy mapping out empirical trends and then discussing theoretical 
ways in which the patterns identified could be accounted for.  
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The empirical focus of the paper was consular cooperation abroad in visa matters. 
The Schengen rules enable the member states to make use of each other’s 
consulates in the visa-issuing process. Instead of establishing diplomatic 
representation in a third country, a Schengen state can try to form a cooperative 
agreement with another member state already present there. The focus of the 
paper was on such agreements. To what extent do the member states in practice 
enter into them? Are there any trends in the choice of partner countries? Drawing 
on descriptive statistics and network analytical tools I showed that cooperation is 
extensive and clustered regionally. On average, a Schengen state has independent 
representation in 50 states, relies on cooperative agreements in another 50 and is 
not present at all in the remaining 70. France and Germany are at the centre of the 
network with most Schengen states relying on their consular services. Around 
them form the following clusters: A Nordic, a Benelux, a Southern and an 
emerging Eastern European network.  
 
To account for these patterns of cooperation I engaged with classical European 
and international relations theories. A realist perspective was able to account for 
the centrality of the large member states – France and Germany. It struggled, 
however, to explain the regional clusters. Liberal intergovernmentalism predicted 
collaboration along lines of shared policy preferences. This could account for the 
Southern cluster in particular, where the tourism industry is particularly strong 
pushing for liberal implementation practices. Other clusters were more puzzling. 
Based on an analysis of domestic preferences, for example, Denmark and Sweden 
should not cooperate as tightly as they do. I finally presented and discussed a 
constructivist explanation. I developed a concept of ‘regional imagined 
communities’ to be able to explain the clusters of cooperation. Regional 
identification based on commonalities in language and state-building trajectory 
would be likely to create trust and facilitate cooperation. This perspective, I 
argued, was particularly well-suited to explain the Nordic and the Benelux 
clusters, as well as the centrality of France and Germany. It also had some 
purchase, albeit more limited, with regards to the Southern and Eastern groupings. 
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On balance, I found that the constructivist perspective was best able to account for 
the cooperation patterns.  
 
The contribution of this paper was three-fold. I showed that European states 
cooperate considerable in the visa entry control process. Furthermore, I mapped 
out how their interaction is structured in geographical clusters. Finally, I 
developed the concept of regional imagined communities to account for the 
collaboration. This concept, I suggested, could be of wider use in analysing other 
areas of justice and home affairs and foreign policy.  
 
Paper three, finally, investigated to what extent, and why, participation in 
Schengen has a restrictive impact on the openness of domestic borders to visitors 
from outside of the European Union. In this paper I thus thematised both the 
restrictiveness and governance dimensions of the border regime.  
 
I adopted an institutionalist approach to develop two competing models of the 
potential effect of Schengen participation. The first was based on rational choice 
institutionalism. I took as the starting-point that state preferences differ. Some 
incline towards a liberal enforcement of visa-issuing rules and others seek a more 
restrictive application. In this case, I argued that the EU free travel is 
characterized by an asymmetric control situation. A liberal country can pursue its 
preferred policy unilaterally. In contrast, a restrictive state needs the cooperation 
of all its partners. Otherwise, control efforts are not effective as travellers can 
simply enter through another member state. Achieving collaboration, however, is 
difficult as the situation is a zero-sum game. A liberal state has no benefits and 
only costs from cooperating. This problem could be overcome through oversight 
and sanctions, side-payments or tit-for-tat interactions. None of these 
mechanisms, I argued, are in place in Schengen. Hence, the ‘logic of 
consequentiality’ would lead us to expect that the domestic control practices of 
new member states do not alter as a result of Schengen participation.  
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Having set out this analysis, I then turned to sociological institutionalism. Here a 
quite different picture emerged. This perspective emphasises informal norms and 
role expectations. These I showed to be restrictive stressing in particular mutual 
consultation, respect for the migration fears of partner countries and a general 
obligation to increase control at external borders to compensate for the 
dismantling of internal checks. Furthermore, strong mechanisms – in the form of 
evaluations and inspections, local consular cooperation and common databases – 
were found to be in place to ensure the diffusion and uptake of these roles and 
control norms. That in turn makes it difficult for a member state to avoid 
adaptation through mere window-dressing. The ‘logic of appropriateness’ thus 
suggests that joining Schengen should have a restrictive impact on new EU-
countries’ visa-issuing practices.  
 
I then moved to test these opposing arguments empirically. I did so by setting up a 
quasi-experimental study using data on the Eastern enlargement of the Schengen 
area. This case enables a study of how, if at all, the visa-issuing practices of the 
new member states changed before and after they joined the free travel zone, and 
contrast this with developments among the old and partial Schengen states as well 
as the UK and the US. I showed that the visa-issuing practices of the new member 
states, in general, turned considerably more restrictive after they joined. In the 
same period, the practices of the existing participants were stable or tended 
towards a slight liberalization. Among the partial Schengen states the picture was 
somewhat mixed while practices in the non-Schengen states were largely 
unchanged. The data thus evidence a restrictive effect of EU-integration indicating 
the existence of considerable cooperation between states. This supports the 
sociological institutionalist account and questions the purchase of the rational 
choice model.  
 
The contributions of this paper are two rival models of the potential consequences 
of Schengen participation, as well as an empirical test hereof. In existing research 
there has been considerable conjecturing on the restrictiveness of cooperation, yet 
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few studies have offered clear and precise theoretical modelling and systematic 
empirical assessment of actual impacts of EU-integration.  
 
The key strengths of the three papers are the comprehensive empirical picture of 
the European border regime on both the openness and governance dimensions, 
and the advancement of theoretical models and concepts to account for the trends 
we observe. The analytical tools build on existing research and can be applied to 
other cases of border control and free travel areas, as well as different policy 
fields. The main weakness is that empirical breadth invariably comes at the 
expense of depth in the form of detailed and context rich analysis of precise causal 
pathways.  
 
Taken together, what overall picture of the European border regime emerges from 
these findings? In the next section I discuss the position of the regime in the 
analytical framework and map out potential future trajectories. 
 
3. Mapping the European border regime 
To briefly recall, the theoretical frame developed in the introduction zooms in on 
the current mixed border regime in Europe. Seeking to capture the specific 
dynamics of governance and selective openness it distinguishes between, on the 
one hand, conflictual and cooperative integration and, on the other hand, civic and 
ethnic patterns of restrictiveness. Figure 1 below presents the model and situates 
contemporary Europe within it based on the findings of the project: 
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Figure 1: Positioning the European border regime in the regime typology 
 
As highlighted in the graph, the current regime is mainly characterized by ethnic 
selectivity (paper one). Applicants from Muslim-majority countries encounter 
more tightly controlled borders than others. Such religious bias pushes the regime 
in an ethnic direction. We did see, however, that other things being equal citizens 
of democratic states were somewhat more readily welcomed. This countervails 
the ethno-centric tendencies moving the regime upwards towards the civic end. 
Yet civicness was challenged by the finding that nationals of refugee-producing 
countries appear to face particularly restrictive enforcement of visa rules. This 
does not square with a civic commitment to rights and freedoms and the 
protection of refugees. Weighing the different aspects is challenging and requires 
careful interpretation. There is no automatic way of aggregating scores. On 
balance though, my assessment is that we are firmly on the ethnic side of the 
scale. 
 
Moving to the governance axis, a high degree of cooperation is evidenced in the 
extensive consular network (paper two) and the considerable restrictive effects of 
Schengen participation on domestic border practices (paper three). Consular 
cooperation was widespread and expanded over time. Moreover, there was clear 
Civic 
Cooperation 
Ethnic 
Conflict 
Communitarian 
Europe 
Europe of cultural  
nation-states 
Europe of national 
republics 
Cosmopolitan 
Europe 
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indication of pooling and aggregation of migration fears. There was little to 
suggest that the new member states, despite rather more liberal previous practices, 
sought to avoid or circumvent predominant restrictive norms. Still, after Schengen 
enlargement France began to issue a high number of otherwise exceptional 
national (VTL). This could suggest some strains in the management of the 
external border.  
 
All in all, I thus characterize the regime as ‘communitarian Europe’. Cooperation 
is extensive and ethnic selectivity a key pattern.  
 
While the analytical framework is helpful in mapping out and characterising the 
Schengen cooperation there are significant elements that are not captured. This 
concerns the economic aspects of selectivity.  We saw in paper one that wealth 
and trading ties are important predictors of variation in openness. This highlights 
that market- and/or class-based logics are also involved. This is hardly surprising 
given the overall economic impetus and aim of European integration. What is 
perhaps puzzling is that especially trading ties do not play a stronger role. The 
general expansionary and liberalising drive of the market has not captured the 
Schengen border regime in a major way. Even though it has been incorporated 
into the broader EU institutional framework with its powerful internal market at 
the centre, the regime so far continues to follow a different path of security and 
identity.  
 
The conclusion that economic interests play a lesser role than shared norms and 
migration fears in the European border regime has important theoretical 
implications. It highlights that rationalist models have problems fully accounting 
for the dynamics of governance and variation in the openness of the external 
frontier. Though these theories did in general have some purchase in the three 
analyses, constructivist models were on the whole better able to explain the 
empirical trends. 
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Still, market drivers are present. Should this lead us to revise the analytical 
framework and introduce a new economic axis? A multi-dimensional setup would 
capture more variation but would also be more complex to work with. I have 
opted for parsimony providing a simple tool to map and discuss the border 
regime. Subsequent research could develop the model further, perhaps drawing on 
the database and different visualisation technologies to identify patterns across a 
plurality of dimensions. Here more traditional security concerns, such as 
international terrorism or border disputes, could also be included. 
 
4. Further perspectives 
The positioning of the regime as ‘communitarian Europe’ is not irreversible. In 
what ways might the regime develop in the future? Contemporary politics points 
in different directions. Over the last years there has been a steady liberalisation of 
border rules towards the Balkan countries. This has occurred as an intimate part of 
the enlargement process in which these states are encouraged to move towards 
compliance with the Copenhagen criteria of EU-membership including 
democratic governance. Here we thus see a civic logic at work. The recent period 
has also, however, been characterized by a gradual easing of visa rules towards 
countries such as Russia and the Ukraine in a time where these states can hardly 
be said to have developed steadily in a democratic direction. This suggests a 
different and considerably more ethnic and/or market oriented mechanism at 
work. The Balkan visa waiver has also come under strong pressure with France 
and Germany leading a coalition of states that call for the reintroduction of the 
permit requirement. With the liberalisation of travel the number of asylum-seekers 
from the region has increased in many EU states leading to strong domestic 
critique. 
 
The ‘Arab spring’ movement in the Middle-East is also an interesting case. The 
initial response by for example France to the popular uprisings was to call for 
increased patrolling and the reinstatement of national border control. Rather than 
welcoming potential democratic transformations, European leaders seemed 
primarily concerned with the likely influx of asylum-seekers. This confirms the 
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picture of Europe as ethno-centric rather than civic, but also showed additional 
more conflictual dynamics in the management of the common borders. This event 
thus in many ways played out in the bottom-left part of the figure (‘Europe of 
cultural nation-states’). To what extent the revolts will in fact lead to democratic 
outcomes is as yet uncertain. If this turns out to be the case, the subsequent 
reaction of the EU will be highly interesting to watch. The European Commission 
works for mobility partnerships and an overall liberalisation of movement towards 
the Mediterranean neighbours. Should this succeed it would push the regime in a 
civic direction and situate it in the upper-right quadrant. Still, given the current 
regime and the immediate restrictive response this would not seem particularly 
likely. More generally, the Commission and the European Parliament has in 
recent years gained a more prominent role in the policy-making process. It will 
also be interesting to observe to what extent this will affect the application of 
Schengen rules and norms on the ground. 
 
If economic recession continues in Europe this could also influence the border 
regime, significantly reinforcing market and class oriented logics in it. Opposite 
trends would here seem likely. On the one hand, entry rules could for example be 
liberalised in relation to Saudi Arabia and China in order to attract tourists thus 
overriding both ethnic and civic selectivity. The Commission has recently 
published a report highlighting the negative impact of travel restrictions on 
tourism and suggested reforms of visa policy and practice to facilitate economic 
growth (COM 2012b). On the other hand, we could see increased restrictiveness 
driven by a call to protect jobs for domestic workers against undocumented 
migrant labour. In Greece, fervent criticism of irregular migration was part of 
recent elections, and organisations such as Human Rights Watch (2012) has 
brought attention to a rise in discrimination in the wake of the economic crisis. 
 
Yet at present the border regime resembles a communitarian Europe. This 
prompts wider reflection on the character and legitimacy of the EU-project. In 
academic research, some scholars (Duchêne 1972; Manners 2002; Orbie 2006) 
have described Europe as a civilian or normative power. It is based on democracy 
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and human rights and seeks to export such liberal norms through trade, aid, and 
the good example. In this argument, cooperation and liberalism are usually 
expected to go hand in hand. Yet as shown here this need not be so. In the case of 
Schengen high levels of cooperation focus on ensuring restrictiveness and do not 
follow a civic mode of selectivity. The tension between the ideals of liberal norms 
and ethno-centric or non-civic border practices might challenge the effective 
promotion of universal rights. On the other hand, to what extent a different, liberal 
and more civic-oriented border policy would find public support across Europe is 
an open question.  
 
The analytical framework is thus of relevance both for academic researchers and 
policy-makers. It enables an analytical assessment and normative discussion of 
future developments. Moreover, the model highlights paths and trajectories 
available for the European border regime and underlines the importance and 
potential implications of different political decisions.  
 
5. Questions for future research 
The border regime framework, the visa database and the individual papers opens 
up new questions for future research.  
 
The project has identified patterns of cooperation and restrictiveness, and tested 
the explanatory purchase of different theories. The focus has been on relative 
effects and correlations and it would thus be interesting to know more about the 
specific causal pathways. How precisely do wider threat constructions impact on 
border practices? In what ways do shared regional identities inform decisions to 
cooperate and what, if anything, does cooperation entail for reinforcement and 
reimagining of communities? It could also be interesting to test further through 
interview and ethnographic studies the mechanisms of dispersion and uptake of 
Schengen role expectations and norms. The investigation of these questions calls 
for in-depth case-studies. These could be selected on the basis of the 
comprehensive empirical picture provided by the database. 
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Related to this, our understanding of the impact of participation in Schengen 
could be solidified and deepened by investigating other expansions of the 
cooperation: the Nordic and the Southern as well as the recent joining of 
Switzerland. The Eastern enlargement was a very significant event in EU 
cooperation but might well differ from previous expansions of the Schengen area. 
Studying the accession of the Nordic countries would also enable us to investigate 
effects of the existence of prior regional cooperation and identification. These 
countries had formed a Nordic Passport Union before joining Schengen.  
 
In-depth studies of individual countries would furthermore enable us to advance 
our understanding of how the Schengen cooperation is shaped by and potentially 
transforms state formation trajectories in Europe. Are there differences in the 
ways in which the common rules and norms has been incorporated in domestic 
administrative structures? Do we see systematic divergence in the consequences 
between for example the centralized state of France and regionalized Italy, post-
communist Poland and welfare-state Sweden?  
 
The positioning of the European border regime as communitarian could also be 
further assessed in future research. The ethnic dimension might be probed by 
examining, for example, to what extent descendants of European migrants in a 
sending country are treated preferentially. Do they enjoy easier access compared 
with applicants who hold similar citizenship but without the same claim of 
ancestry? On the civic dimension, subsequent studies could analyse the treatment 
of applicants undertaking trips for civil society organisations such as human rights 
activists. Are visits of this kind specially facilitated or as difficult or easy as 
seeking to travel for other purposes? Studying these dynamics would require 
individual-level data and might call for comparative case studies. Undertaking this 
research would in different ways triangulate and might qualify the overall 
communitarian classification arrived at in the project. 
 
On a similar note, it could be interesting to explore in more detail to what extent 
openness and selectivity varies among member states. I characterised Schengen as 
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a whole as ethnic yet there might be interesting variation within the regime. On 
the conflict-cooperation axis I found distinct clusters of countries interacting more 
tightly with each other. Perhaps similar groupings could be identified on the civic-
ethnic dimension? The political characteristics of foreign states might account 
better for variation in the openness of the border of some Schengen states rather 
than others. Likewise, differences in cultural similarity could be of more 
importance for explaining implementation practices in particular member states. If 
such differences within the regime were found on types of openness, would it also 
follow territorial clusters as on the governance axis or could we see other 
dynamics at play? 
 
Our understanding of the Schengen regime could also be improved through a 
wider comparative perspective. It would be interesting to investigate further how 
different practices are in Schengen-Europe compared with the United States and 
the United Kingdom. Moreover, studies could also explore whether other regional 
free travel areas, for example in Africa and South America, exhibit the same 
characteristics as the European. Is there also here an apparent trade-off between 
open internal borders and more closed external frontiers? This could tell us to 
what extent the patterns and logics identified are unique to the EU and could also 
potentially point to different ways of organizing border cooperation. 
 
Future research could as well probe how the regime is experienced, perceived and 
negotiated by different travellers. Using the dataset we can identify cases of high 
and low enforcement levels, and ask how this influence the attractiveness of 
Europe and affect its ‘soft power’ abroad. These questions can be approached both 
on an ethnographic basis but also pursuing quantitative strategies. If openness is 
reduced, does this influence the amount of cross-border travel and trade? Do 
increased efforts of visa control actually reduce levels of illegal immigration? Is 
there an effect of tightened visa rules on inflows of forced migrants?  
 
The comprehensive empirics on the restrictiveness of the regime, finally, play into 
the considerable normative political theorizing on migration and open borders. 
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How, if at all, are different forms of travel barriers justifiable? To what extent is it 
reasonable and fair to ease internal mobility at the expense of the access for 
outsiders?  
 
Investigating these sets of questions would enhance our appreciation of 
contemporary border policy and practices, European integration and the 
movement of persons.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Database construction codebook 
 
 
1. Introduction 
This codebook describes in detail how the European Visa Database (EVD) was 
constructed.
41
 The purpose is to provide full transparency of the coding process 
and thereby ensure a high reliability of the dataset. It is structured as follows. The 
next and second part sets out how the basic tables in the database on countries, 
cities, travel distances and population sizes were put together. The third, fourth 
and fifth describes the coding of the three dimensions of visa policies: 
requirements, issuing practice and consular services. The sixth part explains how 
the final combined data-table on visa requirements, visa issuing practices and 
consular representation, including the mobility barriers index, was devised. The 
seventh present a set of equations used and the final eighth part contains a 
technical diagram of the database structure.  
 
All raw data, coding schemes as well as the database itself are available as a 
downloadable file from the EVD website. In this way, it is possible to inspect 
precisely how the dataset was compiled and organized in order to verify, repeat or 
modify the process. On a technical note, the downloadable file contains the 
ASP.NET computer scripts, SQL syntaxes, original and processed data as well as 
the database (MSSQL mdf file). This file also contains, where applicable, links to 
the raw data sources. To replicate the coding process a Microsoft SQL Server and 
Microsoft Internet Information Service running ASP.NET is required. The latter is 
available on most Windows computers whereas the former is specialized software 
which needs to be purchased separately. To repeat the conversion of pdf 
documents to excel it is also necessary to acquire software for doing so. For the 
project I used ABBYY’s PDF Transformer 3.0.  
 
                                                 
41
 The database can be accessed via www.mogenshobolth.dk/evd.  
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In general, the time period covered by the database is 2005 to 2010. However, as 
data availability varies for the three dimensions (visa requirements, issuing 
practices and consular services) and receiving countries the years covered can in 
practice differ. The table below details the years included per receiving state and 
analytical dimension. For each year data is available for all relevant sending 
countries. The database is expanded with additional years and receiving countries 
as new data becomes available. 
 
Receiving 
country 
Visa requirements Visa issuing practice Consular representation 
Austria 2001-2010 2005-2010 [1] 2004-2010 
Belgium 2001-2010 2005-2010 2004-2010 
Bulgaria 2007-2010 2006-2010 2006-2010 [2] 
Cyprus 2004-2010 2005-2010 2005-2010 [2] 
Czech Republic 2004-2010 2005-2010 2005-2010 [3] 
Denmark 2001-2010 2005-2010 2004-2010 
Estonia 2004-2010 2005-2010 2005-2010 [3] 
Finland 2001-2010 2005-2010 2004-2010 
France 2001-2010 2005-2010 2004-2010 
Germany 2001-2010 2005-2010 2004-2010 
Greece 2001-2010 2005-2010 2004-2010 
Hungary 2004-2010 2005-2010 2005-2010 [3] 
Iceland 2001-2010 2005-2010 2004-2010 
Italy 2001-2010 2005-2010 2004-2010 
Latvia 2004-2010 2005-2010 2005-2010 [3] 
Lithuania 2004-2010 2005-2010 2005-2010 [3] 
Luxembourg 2001-2010 2005-2010 2004-2010 
Malta 2004-2010 2006-2010 2005-2010 [3] 
Netherlands 2001-2010 2005-2010 2004-2010 
Norway 2001-2010 2005-2010 [4] 2004-2010 
Poland 2004-2010 2005-2010 2005-2010 [3] 
Portugal 2001-2010 2005-2010 2004-2010 
Romania 2007-2010 2006-2010 2006-2010 [2] 
Slovakia 2004-2010 2005-2010 2005-2010 [3] 
Slovenia 2004-2010 2005-2010 2005-2010 [3] 
Spain 2001-2010 2005-2010 2004-2010 
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Receiving 
country 
Visa requirements Visa issuing practice Consular representation 
Sweden 2001-2010 2005-2010 2004-2010 
Switzerland 2009-2010 2009-2010 2008-2010 
United Kingdom 2003-2010 2001-2008 2001-2008 [2] 
United States 2001-2010 2006-2010 No data 
[1] Information on visas refused missing for 2007 and 2008 
[2] Information on consular representation is available via the data on cities where visas were 
issued 
[3] Information on consular representation in 2006 and 2007 is available via the data on cities 
where visas were issued 
[4] Information on visas refused missing for 2009 
 
As illustrated in the table, the database fully covers the period from 2005 to 2010 
on all three dimensions in all receiving countries with a few exceptions. For some 
states, such as Austria, data on refused visas is missing for certain years. For the 
UK empirics on issuing practices is lacking for 2009 and 2010, but here 
information is available already from 2001. It is also important to note, that there 
is no data on consular services for the US. I expand in more detail below on the 
missing data where relevant.  
 
2. Basic tables 
The database stores information on regions, countries and cities in the world as 
well as data on travel distances and population sizes. This data is referenced in the 
other tables containing the information on visa requirements, issuing-practices and 
consular representation.  
 
2.1 World regions 
The table structure is as follows: 
 
Column name Data type Comments 
regionID Int - 
regionName nvarchar(250) - 
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The list of world regions is based on the CIA World Factbook 2012. I downloaded 
a background data file containing an XML file listing all countries in the world 
grouped into regions. I copied this information into an excel file, and subsequently 
imported the list of regions into the database using a country import script. The 
database thus contains a list of 11 regions:  Africa, Central Asia, East Asia, South 
Asia, Europe, Middle East, North America, Central America, South America, 
Oceania and Antarctica. This classification of regions can of course be contested. 
For example, is Egypt part of Africa or the Middle East? Does Mexico belong in 
Central or North America? For some research purposes it could also be relevant to 
consider for example Sub-Saharan or Northern Europe as separate regions, and 
indeed in the second paper of the thesis I pursue such a sub-regional approach 
within a European context. The database does not preclude a re-coding along 
these lines.  
 
2.2 Countries 
The country table is structured as follows: 
 
Column name Data type Comments 
countryID Int - 
countryName nvarchar(250) - 
countryCode varchar(2) - 
regionID Int 
Foreign key (FK) reference to the regions 
table 
 
The list of countries in the world is based on the European visa list (Council 
Regulation 539/2001). I copied all the entries from annex 1 (nationals requiring a 
visa) and from annex 2 (nationals not requiring a visa) to an excel file. For 
abbreviations of the country names I downloaded a table with standard country 
codes from the International Organisation for Standardization (ISO) and added it 
to the import excel file. 
 
The visa regulation makes a distinction between “States”, “Special administrative 
regions of the People’s Republic of China” and “Entities and territorial authorities 
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that are not recognised as states by at least one member state”. I included all 
entries as countries.  
 
Doing so yields a list of 167 countries. To this I then added Iceland, Liechtenstein, 
Norway and Switzerland as countries associated with the European Union. 
Finally, I added the current 27 states member states of the European Union. The 
final list of countries thus contains 198 data points covering almost all political 
entities in the world. After the excel file was put together I copied the data from 
excel to the database using the country import script. 
 
In the main time period under consideration in this project the political landscape 
in the Balkans changed. Serbia and Montenegro split up in 2006, and in 2008 
Kosovo declared itself an independent state separate from Serbia. The database 
contains separate entries for “Serbia”, “Montenegro” and “Kosovo”. There are 
different ways of handling such secessions. One approach is to backdate the data 
so that earlier information as much as possible reflects the current political 
landscape. For example, because Kosovo has now become independent the visa 
practice in Pristina should be retrospectively removed from the data on Serbia and 
grouped under Kosovo. This might seem a reasonable strategy when shorter time 
periods are investigated as is the case in the database currently. However, in a 
longer time-scale the approach becomes problematic as it creates pseudo political 
entities not reflecting the legal-political landscape in which decision-makers acted 
at the time. Consequently, the validity of the inferences drawn is reduced.  
 
In order to ensure that the database can at a later stage be expanded with 
additional years I have thus chosen a different approach which do not involve 
back-dating. Earlier entries in the database for Serbia simply include the visa-
issuing practices occurring at consulates in what are now the states of Montenegro 
and Kosovo up until 2005 and 2007 respectively. Consequently, no data is 
available for these two new states prior to their establishment. If, however, for 
particular research purposes it is relevant to backdate the data can easily be re-
coded. 
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After importing the information into the database I made a set of changes to the 
country list. The country codes for Bolivia, Myanmar, Congo (Democratic 
Republic of), Djibouti, Iran, Laos, Micronesia, Korea (North), Russia, Sao Tome 
and Principe, Suriname, Syria, Tanzania, Comoros, Vietnam, Bahamas, 
Macedonia, Holy See, Korea (South), United States, Venezuela, Palestinian 
Authority, Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan were added manually. This was 
necessary because the automated script failed due to differences in the naming of 
the countries between the EU and the ISO organization. Kosovo does not figure 
on the ISO list. Here I used the country code KV. 
 
The regional coding of Burma, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Congo (Democratic 
Republic of), Djibouti, Gambia, Micronesia, Korea (North), São Tomé and 
Príncipe, Suriname, Comoros, Vanuatu, Palestinian Authority, Bahamas, Brunei 
Darussalam, Macedonia, Holy See, El Salvador, Korea (South), United States of 
America, Hong Kong SAR and Macao SAR were done manually as again the 
automated process failed due to differences in country names. The information on 
Vanuatu was looked up manually on the CIA World Factbook website as the 
country was not listed in the downloadable dataset. Note also that Palestinian 
Authority is listed as the West Bank in the CIA raw data. Croatia was recoded as 
part of Europe since the CIA data erroneously grouped it under Africa.  
 
Finally, to correct spelling errors and for presentation purposes I adjusted the 
country names “Burma/Myanmar” to “Burma”, “Djijbouti” to Djibouti”, “North 
Korea” to “Korea (North)”, “Surinam” to “Suriname”, “The Comoros” to 
“Comoros”, “Bahamy” to “Bahamas”, “Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia” to “Macedonia”, “Salvador to “El Salvador”, “South Korea” to 
“Korea (South)” and “The Democratic Republic of Congo” to “Congo 
(Democratic Republic of)”.  
 
2.3 Cities 
The city information is contained in two tables. The first stores the basic 
information on each location (name, geographical location). The second links the 
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cities with the different countries in the database, and includes a coding of 
whether a city is the capital of the country. The structure of the tables is as 
follows: 
 
Column name Data type Comments 
cityID Int - 
cityName nvarchar(250) - 
Lat decimal(18, 7) Location of city (latitude) 
Lng decimal(18, 7) Location of city (longitude) 
 
Column name Data type Comments 
countryCityID Int Primary key 
cityID Int FK reference to the cities table 
countryID Int FK reference to countries table 
capital Tinyint - 
 
The list of cities in the world is based on a 2012 list of embassies and other forms 
of European consular representation and an overview of EU-Schengen visa-
issuing practices in 2011. The former contains lists of cities outside the Schengen 
area; the latter also includes data on cities inside the EU, EEA or Schengen area 
where visas are issued. Both documents were put together by the EU Commission 
based on information from the member states. The raw data on representation sets 
out countries and cities in the world and specifies what diplomatic services if any 
the different Schengen member states offer. The information on issuing-practices 
details the number of visas issued abroad in different cities. Both documents are 
described in more detail in the sections on issuing-practices and consular 
representation. Here I only detail how I used the data to code cities.  
 
As a first step in the import process I converted the tables in the original pdf files 
to excel. After having done so I inspected the converted data for apparent errors. 
In the process I also made a few adjustments to the information in order to ensure 
the consistency in structure necessary for the automated import to succeed. These 
minor alterations are documented in the excel files.  
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In the second step I put together a conversion table to take into account that the 
naming of countries and cities vary. For example, in the database there is an entry 
for “Russia” but in the raw data on consular representation the name “Russian 
Federation” is used. I put the table together by stopping the import whenever I 
could not look up a country in the database. I then identified what name it was 
coded under. I followed a similar strategy for putting together a list of alternative 
city names. For the import I used four sheets: primary consular representation, 
secondary representation (e.g. honorary consuls), visa-issuing data for full 
Schengen countries and visa-issuing data for partial Schengen countries. After 
coding the first sheet I double-checked that the entries from remaining data were 
indeed new cities and not duplicates with a slightly varying spelling of the city 
name.  
 
After this step was completed city information for 16 countries were still missing. 
For these states there was no representation or visa-issuing data from the EU-
Schengen area. The specific countries are: Bahamas, Bhutan, Dominica, Kiribati, 
Liberia, Liechtenstein, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Saint Vincent 
and the Grenadines, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Tonga and Tuvalu. Here I 
manually added the city listed as capital of the country in the CIA World 
Factbook.
42
 Furthermore, I deleted the entries for Hong Kong and Macao created 
under the entry of China as they also figure under their separate country entries. I 
also renamed ‘Antigua’ to Saint John’s to correctly register the capital of Antigua 
and Barbuda. 
 
Having put together the list of cities I then turned to the coding of capitals. In the 
Commission representation data the capital is the first city listed under a given 
country. I thus made use of this ordering in the coding and flagged the first 
imported city as the capital. As this data does not cover all countries I manually 
had to code the capital in some cases, in particular for the EU states themselves. 
Using the Factbook I coded the following cities as capitals: Vienna, Brussels, 
Amsterdam, Athens, Barcelona, Bern, Berlin, Budapest, Copenhagen, Helsinki, 
                                                 
42
 The Factbook defines the capital as the seat of the government. 
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Hong Kong, Ljubljana, Luxemburg, Macao, Madrid, Oslo, Paris, Prague, 
Reykjavik, Riga, Rome, Stockholm, Tallinn, Vilnius, Warsaw, Lisbon and 
Valetta.
43
 After having done so I recoded all remaining cases as not capitals. 
 
I then inspected the dataset to check whether or not all the imported city names 
were unique. In doing so, I discovered an entry for Valencia in Spain and 
Valencia in Venezuela. I therefore renamed the former to ‘Valencia (Spain)’ to 
minimize further the risk of later coding errors.  
 
The information on latitude and longitude of the cities was inputted using Google 
Maps accessed programmatically via a geo-coding web-service. I set up a 
computer script querying the Google servers for location data based on the 
country and city names stored in the database. A number of records could not be 
geo-coded in this way. For some of these the problem was variation in the naming 
of countries and cities. The code-file details the instances where I temporarily 
renamed a city or a country in order to make the correct data request. In three 
cases – Kuwait City, Funafuti and Majuro – I could not fetch the coordinates 
automatically. I thus inputted information on these through a manual look-up via 
the Google Maps webpage. Location data can be revised as errors and other issues 
are identified, and it should therefore be noted that future lookups could return 
somewhat different coordinates if Google has identified and corrected data errors. 
I checked the accuracy of the coding by randomly selecting 10 entries (capital 
cities) from the database and comparing the coding with the coordinates found via 
another data source, Wikipedia’s mapping service.  
 
Having set up the basic table, containing 368 cities, I then added new entries 
manually as need arose during the import process. All cities manually added are 
listed in the excel import files.  
 
 
                                                 
43
 Juba is now the capital of South Sudan after this became an independent country mid-late 2011. 
As my data currently stops at 2010 Juba is grouped under Sudan and not coded as a capital. This 
required manual recoding. 
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2.4 Distances 
The distance table structure is as follows: 
 
Column name Data type Comments 
distanceID Int - 
rcID Int 
Receiving country, reference countries table 
(FK) 
scID Int 
Sending country, reference countries table 
(FK) 
DistanceKm Int  
 
Travel distance is a key variable when understanding global travel flows and 
variation in visa application numbers. I use it, specifically, in the calculation of 
the mobility barriers index as detailed below. I calculated the travel distance 
between sending and receiving countries as the distance (in kilometres) between 
capital cities using the Haversine formula. This equation can be used to 
approximate the distance between a given set of coordinates. I relied on a pre-
coded implementation of it as a database script, adjusting the radius of the earth to 
6.378 to fetch the results in kilometres. I thus set up an automated script parsing 
the coordinates of all potential sending and receiving countries for getting the 
distance, and inserted the result into the distance table. The result yielded a total 
of 39.006 rows, of which only a subset is of immediate relevance as the database 
does not contain information on the mobility barriers of all potential receiving 
countries in the world. I checked the accuracy of the coding by cross-checking the 
calculation in the database for ten sending countries listed for France with the 
distance found via the Google Earth application. 
 
2.5 Population size 
The population table structure is as follows: 
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Column name Data type Comments 
populationSizeID Int - 
countryID Int Reference to countries table (foreign key) 
dYear Int  
populationSize Int Measured in 1000s 
 
As with travel distance, population size is a key indicator for understanding trends 
and variations in visa figures. The measure is used in the construction of the 
mobility barriers index. To code population size I draw on the United Nation’s 
2010 revision of world population figures. This dataset contains information on 
almost all countries included in the dataset. Data is only missing for Taiwan and 
Kosovo. For Taiwan I instead used the size and annual growth estimate of the 
population in the CIA Factbook for 2010, and backdated this to earlier years 
assuming that growth-rates were constant in the time-period. For Kosovo I made 
use of the alternative population dataset provided by the World Bank. In coding 
the figures for Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo I took into account that the latter 
two were not sovereign states in the entire time-period. The country section above 
explains the strategy followed. All transformations are detailed in the data files.  
 
In total, I imported population data for countries for the period from 2000 to 2010 
equal to 2164 observations (11 per country). For Kosovo there is three entries and 
for Montenegro five. I checked the accuracy of the import by randomly comparing 
five imported values with the information in the original dataset.  
 
3. Visa requirements 
Visa requirements are stored in a table with the following structure:  
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Column name Data type Comments 
visaReqID Int - 
rcID Int 
Receiving country. FK reference to 
countries table 
scID Int 
Sending country. FK reference to countries 
table 
dYear Int  
shortStayVisaRequired Tinyint  
 
The table contains information on whether a receiving country in a given year 
required the nationals of a sending country to obtain a visa before embarking on a 
short trip. The database does not yet contain information on transit visa 
requirements but these can be added later on.  
 
I view nationals of a sending country as ordinary citizens without a special or 
diplomatic passport. This is a reasonable assumption where most travellers are 
concerned. There are, however, exceptions. Particular visa rules for diplomats are 
not covered by the database. For a few countries there is visa free access for all 
but holders of specific types of identity documents. Here I code no visa obligation 
for the state as such even though some categories of travellers still require a 
permit to travel. In recent years, sending states have in some cases lifted the 
permit requirement provided that foreign nationals hold a biometric passport. In 
these instances, I code the visa requirement as having been lifted for the country. 
Furthermore, if a visa obligation was instituted or lifted during a year, the 
classification follows the status the country had for the main part of the year.  
These coding choices slightly reduce the validity of the visa requirement measure. 
Ideally, the different exceptions should be explored in-depth to ascertain their 
precise impact and then re-coded accordingly. This, however, falls outside the 
scope of the research project. 
 
The following sections describe the construction of the data for the different 
receiving countries.  
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3.1 European Union (Schengen) 
The information on the permit requirements of the Schengen states is based on the 
2001 common EU visa list and subsequent revisions. In 2006 Bahamas, Saint 
Kitts and Nevis, Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Mauritius and Seychelles were 
removed from the list pending the conclusion of a visa waiver agreement with 
these states. The agreements eventually reached were thus also found and 
consulted. All the documents were located by searches on the EUR-Lex website. I 
looked up the law from 2001, and used the links from there to find subsequent 
acts altering the visa list. The references and source documents are stored together 
with the database files. 
 
To ensure consistency, I coded the visa requirement per individual Schengen 
receiving state for all potential sending countries – including members of the EU. 
As there are no travel permit obligations in force amongst EU states (including the 
European Economic Area), I also had to compile a list of membership status for 
each of the sending states. This was done using a European Commission overview 
of the EU and a summary of the EEA agreement by the European Free Trade 
Association. For example, from the perspective of Germany up until Bulgaria and 
Romania joined the EU their visa free status originated from the common visa list. 
Afterwards, it flowed from their status as EU member countries.  
 
I coded the time-period from the establishment of the EU’s common visa list in 
2001 to 2010. The new member states (from the 2004 and 2007 enlargement) are 
coded as receiving countries from the year of their EU-membership. As above, 
information for Montenegro is coded from 2006 and onwards; for Kosovo from 
2008 and onwards.  
 
All in all, for this group of receiving states the database contains 49.993 entries. It 
is important to note, however, that the visa lists are identical for these states. 
Hence, the only variation is over time as the common list is expanded and 
contracted. Future revisions could, however, introduce variation also between the 
receiving states by including earlier years. Additionally, rules on short-stay visa 
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requirements for diplomats are not fully harmonized nor are the regulations on 
transit visas. Hence, introducing these would also introduce further variation in 
the dataset.  
 
3.2 United Kingdom 
The visa requirements of the United Kingdom are not defined in legislative acts. 
They are set administratively by the Home Office with a notification of 
Parliament. Currently, the categories of persons requiring a visa to visit the UK 
for a short stay (defined as a period of up to 6 months), are set out in ‘Appendix 1’ 
to the Immigration Rules. Nationalities not listed in this annex can in general visit 
the UK without having to obtain a visa beforehand.  
 
It is somewhat more difficult to track changes in the UK visa list as these cannot 
be looked up via databases over acts of Parliament. I constructed the data entries 
using the following procedure. As a first step I coded the country list in the 
current (October 2012) appendix 1. The list was inspected for different exceptions 
and qualifications following the rules set out above. The entry for the “The 
territories formerly comprising the socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” was 
split into Kosovo and Montenegro (Serbia was already on the list). Finally, I 
added Palestinian Authority to the list as it falls under the general category of 
“Persons who hold non-national documents”. This I double-checked with the 
Home Office webpage. 
 
Having put together this basic list I then tracked the changes to the appendix using 
the ‘Statements of changes in Immigration rules’ published from 2003 and 
onwards on the UKBA website. I went through each of the documents from 2003 
to 2011 searching for visa, and then downloaded and inspected those that made a 
change to the list of visa nationals. Using this procedure I identified changes with 
regards to Lesotho, Swaziland, Bolivia, Taiwan, South Africa, Bulgaria, Romania, 
Croatia and Malawi in the time period. These were then entered into the excel 
sheet. In the final step I imported the information to the database, assuming that 
for all other countries than those identified on the list no visa requirement was in 
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force. The total amount of observations on the United Kingdom for 2003 to 2011 
is 1.765. 
 
3.3 United States 
As a main rule, the United States requires that all persons who seek to visit obtain 
a ‘non-immigrant’ visa before embarking on their trip. This requirement, 
however, has since the late 1980s been lifted for a limited group of countries 
through the ‘Visa Waiver Program’. Whether or not a country is included in the 
program is an administrative decision based on guidelines set by Congress. After 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks the visa exemptions was criticised for endangering the 
security of the United States. As a response, the rules were tightened and visa-
waiver nationals now need to be authorised prior to the travel through the so-
called ESTA system. To obtain the permit it is necessary to pay a fee, fill out a 
form, submit passport information and consent to the US authorities using the 
information. ESTA raises the question of whether the US has de facto re-
introduced a visa obligation for all. I have not coded this to be the case because of 
the short time and ease with which it is possible to go through the ESTA 
screening. However, it is debatable to what extent the ESTA barrier is much 
different from – for example – the relatively lenient visa procedures encountered 
by many in for example Taiwan. 
 
I constructed the visa list for the United States by starting out with the current list 
of countries participating in the waiver program. After having done so, I searched 
through the US Federal Register for departmental notifications on changes in the 
program. The precise documents found and the search criteria used are listed in 
the source files. I identified the following changes to the program in the time-
period investigated: Argentina was removed from the list in 2002, Uruguay 
removed 2003, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Republic of 
Korea, Slovak Republic and Malta added in 2008, and finally, Greece added in 
2010.  
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Additionally, the visa requirement was also lifted for a limited set of countries 
through other legislative means in the time-period. Canadian citizens are generally 
able to travel freely to the US. A similar option is open for nationals of 
Micronesia and the Marshall Islands. These countries are hence also coded as 
having visa-free access to the United States.  
 
This final list was then imported into the database. As the time-period covered for 
the US data is identical to the EU/Schengen area, the total number of data points 
is 2.155.  
 
4. Visa-issuing practices 
The database contains three tables on short-stay visa-issuing practices for 
respectively the Schengen group, the UK and the US. A short-stay is here usually 
defined as a trip for no more than three (Schengen, US) or six months (UK). A 
permit may be issued allowing only for a shorter stay, for example a week’s 
conference attendance. It can also be valid for multiple entries and thereby enable 
the holder to conduct several small visits over a longer time period.  
 
In the following sections I describe how I coded the data for the individual 
receiving countries. 
 
4.1 European Union (Schengen) 
The table structure is as follows: 
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Column name Data type Comments 
visaPracticeEuID Int - 
rcID Int 
Receiving country. FK reference to 
countries table 
scCityID Int 
Location of consulate. FK reference to 
cities table 
dYear Int  
shortStayAppliedFor Int Calculated 
shortStayIssued Int Calculated 
shortStayRefused Int Calculated 
shortStayRefusalRate Decimal(5,2) Calculated 
issuedA_All Int A = Airport transit visa 
issuedA_Mev 
Int 
Mev = valid for multiple entries. 2010 and 
onwards 
issuedB Int B = Transit visa 
issuedC_All Int C = Short-stay visa 
issuedC_Mev Int Data only available for 2010 and onwards 
issuedD Int D = National long-stay visa 
issuedDC 
Int 
D + C = National long-stay also valid as C 
visa 
issuedVTL Int VTL = National short-stay visa 
issuedADS Int ADS = Chinese tourist group visa 
issuedABC Int  
issuedABCDDCVTL Int  
appliedC Int  
appliedABC Int  
notIssuedA Int  
notIssuedB Int  
notIssuedC Int  
notIssuedABC Int  
 
The information on EU visa issuing practices is based on detailed tables setting 
out the number of visas applied for, issued, and not issued at the member states’ 
consulates. These overviews were put together by the General Secretariat of the 
Council of the European Union up to and including 2009. In subsequent years, 
due to the entry into force of new visa legislation, the collection and publication 
of the data has been taken over by the European Commission. The visa-issuing 
statistics are supplied per embassy. 
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The information was compiled in four steps. In step one I converted the raw pdf 
files to excel. This was only necessary for the Council data. The Commission 
made the figures available from the outset in excel. I then went through the 
processed data fixing errors in the conversion and standardising the layout. The 
precise changes I made to the files are set out in the source files. Step two was the 
actual import of the information in the excel sheets to the database. This was done 
using a computer script. During this process I added new cities to the database as 
necessary. In step three I compared the sum-totals for each year and visa column 
with the similar totals in the raw data, and tracked down and corrected any errors 
there might have been in the import. This check was primarily done per receiving 
country and for the Schengen area as such. I checked whether the data had been 
coded correctly under the different sending countries and cities by randomly 
looking up a limited set of data entries. As part of this step I also inspected the 
data from the member states for apparent major errors and problems. This 
revealed that 2009 figures for Norway deviated greatly with earlier and later 
years. I hence excluded these. 
  
In step four I estimated the short-stay visas applied for, issued and refused by the 
EU states. Here I made use of the columns detailing the total number of ‘ABC’ 
visas applied for, issued and not issued. ‘A’ and ‘B’ are visas for transit and ‘C’ 
for short stays. In general, the member states have supplied data on these variables 
consistently across the years. Austria, however, did not report information in 2007 
and 2008. In a set of cases data on the visas not issued were left blank. In general, 
I interpreted this as missing data. However, when the number of visas applied for 
and issued was the same I assumed that the column was left blank because no 
visas were refused that year. In most cases a zero would have been entered in the 
field but in some cases this was apparently not done.  
 
The precise equations used to calculate the visas applied for, issued, refused and 
the refusal rate are listed in section 7. The main ideas behind them are as follows: 
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Firstly, by refused I understand both formal rejections and informal advice or 
delays resulting in the withdrawal of an application. Often a visa application 
results in a formal refusal. In other instances an applicant is encouraged to 
withdraw his or her request before this stage is reached. For example, some 
consular officials might encourage persons to withdraw ‘for their own sake’ so 
that a formal refusal is not entered into government databases. Delaying tactics 
might also mean that the process is prolonged and that the applicant therefore 
gives up. In some cases, of course, a withdrawal might be entirely voluntary and 
not related to state practice. For example, a conference is cancelled well in 
advance and a visa is therefore no longer necessary. Yet it is fair to assume that 
the latter form of withdrawal is comparatively rare especially as applicants have 
already paid a not insubstantial visa handling fee.  
 
To what extent does it matter whether or not only formal rejections are included in 
the measure? Limited data is available on this. German statistics for 2003 suggests 
that formal rejections frequently are not made, whereas UK figures for 2006 to 
2008 points in a different direction. It is likely that there is considerable variation 
in practices. Including informal withdrawals in the refusal rate is important to 
avoid significantly underestimating restrictiveness in certain cases. Reversely, 
with this strategy there is some risk of overestimating the refusal rate if it should 
be common that applicants withdraw freely. Yet of the two scenarios the latter is 
the least probable.  
 
Secondly, in the calculations I include data on national ‘VTL’ visas. A VTL visa 
is a permit valid for transit or a short stay to one or more of the member states but 
not the entire Schengen area. It can be issued, for example, when a receiving state 
deems that an applicant does not meet all entry criteria but still wishes to issue a 
visa for humanitarian or political reasons. It is also issued when there is 
disagreement or insufficient clarity between the member states on what travel 
documents they recognize as valid.  
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VTL visas are not issued very often. In most cases, whether or not they are taken 
into account in the calculation of the refusal rate makes little substantial 
difference. Since the enlargement of the Schengen area in December 2007 the use 
of VTL visas has, however, increased. This is mainly due to a change in practice 
by France. In a French government report the new approach is justified with 
reference to the lack of information provided by Central and Eastern European 
member states on the travel documents they recognize. Apart from this, VTLs 
visas primarily matter in Macedonia and Iraq where several EU countries issue 
them frequently. It is to avoid overestimating the refusal rate in these cases that I 
include VTL visas in the calculations. 
 
Thirdly, transit visas (A, B) figure in the estimate. In principle they should be 
excluded since they do not allow for a short stay. This is not possible however. 
The statistical material for 2005 to 2010 contains information about the number of 
transit visas issued but does not state how many were applied for and refused. 
Recent 2011 statistics include additional information making it possible to 
calculate transit and short stay refusal rates separately for this year. Doing so 
reveals that only in a very limited set of cases is the refusal rate substantially 
influenced by the transit visas. When these permits are excluded the refusal rate 
tends to increase. Hence having them in the calculation is thus not generally a 
problem but it does mean that in a few a cases the refusal rate is underestimated. 
 
All in all, the database contains 14.717 observations for the period 2005 to 2010. 
For 13.941 of these it was possible to calculate the number of short-stay visa 
applications received. Information was adequate to calculate the refusal rate for 
13.367 cases. 
 
4.2 United Kingdom 
The data from the United Kingdom is stored in a table structured as follows: 
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Column name Data type Comments 
visaPracticeID Int - 
rcID Int 
Receiving country. FK reference to 
countries table 
scCityID Int 
Location of consulate. FK reference to 
cities table 
dYear Int  
shortStayAppliedFor Int Calculated 
shortStayIssued Int Calculated 
shortStayRefused Int Calculated 
shortStayRefusalRate Decimal(5,2) Calculated 
visitReceived Int Only for 2001 to 2004 
visitIssued Int Only for 2001 to 2004 
visitRefused Int Only for 2001 to 2004 
visitFamilyReceived Int Only for 2004 to 2008 
visitFamilyIssued Int Only for 2004 to 2008 
visitFamilyRefused Int Only for 2004 to 2008 
visitFamilyWithdrawn Int Only for 2006 to 2008 
visitFamilyLapsed Int Only for 2006 to 2008 
visitFamilyDecided Int Only for 2006 to 2008 
visitOtherReceived Int Only for 2005 to 2008 
visitOtherIssued Int Only for 2005 to 2008 
visitOtherRefused Int Only for 2005 to 2008 
visitOtherWithdrawn Int Only for 2006 to 2008 
visitOtherLapsed Int Only for 2006 to 2008 
visitOtherDecided Int Only for 2006 to 2008 
transitReceived Int Only for 2005 to 2008 
transitIssued Int Only for 2005 to 2008 
transitRefused Int Only for 2005 to 2008 
transitWithdrawn Int Only for 2006 to 2008 
transitLapsed Int Only for 2006 to 2008 
transitDecided Int Only for 2006 to 2008 
 
The data for the United Kingdom is based on the ‘entry clearance statistics’ which 
were published by the Home Office and is now accessible via the national 
archives. There is data for the period 2001 to 2008. Unfortunately the data does 
not follow the calendar year, as is the case for the EU statistics, but the British 
government’s financial year (1 April - 31 March). The data from 2001 to 2005 
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was published by the UK Visas agency. The 2006, 2007 and 2008 information 
was made available by the UK Border Agency. The raw data is grouped per 
consulate (‘diplomatic post’).  
 
I imported the data in a series of steps. First, I isolated the information on visas 
related to short-stays and converted these tables to excel format. I then inspected 
the files and cleaned up the data, for example removing superfluous header lines. 
The precise changes are detailed in the source files. For 2001, 2002 and 2003 the 
data contained information on ‘visit’ visa applications received, issued and 
refused. From 2004 and onwards the files also list how many applications 
concerned family visits; from 2005 there is data on transit visas. The data for 
2006, 2007 and 2008 maintained the basic structure from 2005 but now also 
added data on how many applications were withdrawn, lapsed and decided upon 
by the different diplomatic posts.  
 
Second, I imported the visa practice data using a computer script. I did this for 
each year in turn and compared the sum totals in the database with the raw data. 
For 2006, 2007 and 2008 minor deviations (usually 5 or 10) started to appear. 
These were seemingly due to the fact that the original data was now rounded in 
5s. I also inspected the data for any apparent major deviating trends that might 
reflect coding errors. This did not reveal any apparent problems.  
 
After having imported the data I calculated the totals for the short stay visas 
applied for, issued, refused and the refusal rate. For the period 2001 to 2004 this 
was straightforward. For 2005 and onwards, when applications became divided 
into family and other visits, I used a sum of the two and calculated the refusal rate 
accordingly. For 2006 and onwards I also included withdrawn or lapsed in the 
estimation. This was done to improve comparability with the EU statistics.  
 
In total, the database contains 1.210 observations on the UK case. The number of 
visas applied for is available from all observations. Refusal rates are missing from 
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14 cases because the number of visas issued and refused at the diplomatic posts 
was zero. 
 
4.3 United States 
The table on US visa-issuing practices is structured as follows: 
 
Column name Data type Comments 
visaPracticeUsID Int Primary key (unique identifier) 
rcID Int 
Receiving country. FK reference to 
countries table 
scID Int 
Sending country. FK reference to countries 
table 
dYear Int  
shortStayAppliedFor Int Calculated based on issued and refusal rate 
shortStayIssued Int  
shortStayRefused Int Calculated based on issued and refusal rate 
shortStayRefusalRate Decimal In percentage (%) 
typeB1issued Int B1 
typeB2issued Int B2 
typeB1comb2issued Int B1,2 
typeB1comb2BCCissued Int B1,2/BCC 
typeB1comb2BCVissued Int B1,2/BCV 
 
I constructed the US data entries using an overview over visa refusal rates and a 
detailed background table setting out the number of visas issued per nationality. 
The time period covered is 2006 to 2011. The data relates to ‘B’ visas issued for 
visits for business or pleasure. This is by far the most widely used visa for 
temporary entry to the US. It can be issued either solely for business (B-1) or 
pleasure (B-2) or as valid for both purposes (B-1,2).  
 
There is raw data on visas issued for earlier years but here data on refusal rates are 
missing. The US data differ from the UK and EU figures in important ways. It is, 
firstly, grouped per nationality. Hence, the data relates to all citizens of a given 
country regardless of where they submitted their application. The data, secondly, 
follows the US fiscal year which runs from 1 October to 30 September. For 
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example, fiscal year 2006 runs from 1 October 2005 to 30 September 2006. Thus 
the data for a given year also includes information on some of the previous 
months. 
 
As the US figures only include information on the refusal rate and the visas issued 
it is necessary to calculate the applications received and refused manually. In the 
Department of State’s explanatory note to the overview of refusal rates it is 
clarified that the calculation is based on the number of decisions made and only 
include final refusals. I reversed this equation to identify the number of visas 
applied for and refused. For mathematical reasons, this approach cannot be used 
in cases where the refusal rate is 100. This is a very limited problem as such a 
high refusal rate is only reported in three cases: Micronesia 2006 and 2009 as well 
as Andorra 2010. Here the applications received and refused are unknown. Please 
note that since the US statistics apparently do not include withdrawn applications 
the number of visas applied for might be higher than calculated. Likewise, the US 
refusal rate could be somewhat underestimated in comparison with the UK and 
Schengen.  
 
I coded the data in two main steps. I started out by converting the pdf files with 
refusal rates to Excel format to be able to import the data. The information on 
visas issued was already in Excel format.  
 
In coding the data I made the following choices. For Hong Kong I used the refusal 
rate information for ‘Hong Kong SAR’ and not the separate figure for ‘Hong 
Kong BNO HK passport’. Data on visas issued and refusal rates for unknown, no 
nationality or laissez-passer was ignored. Throughout the period I coded ‘Serbia 
and Montenegro’ under Serbia. For 2008 to 2010 this meant that the otherwise 
separate entries for ‘Serbia and Montenegro’ and ‘Serbia’ were merged into one. 
The data for 2006 included statistics on visas for Serbia without a corresponding 
record on refusal rates. I hence ignored this and only used the statistics on ‘Serbia 
and Montenegro’ in this year. The only missing cases are Montenegro for 2006 
and 2007. 
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In relation to Mexico, importantly, the data is not valid. This is because a separate 
type of permit is widely used, the Border Crossing Card (BCC or BCV). The visa 
refusal rate published by the US does not include these, at least not for 2006-2009. 
This means that the estimate in the database does not reflect the actual number of 
permit applications and decisions for this country. The refusal rate is of course 
also of limited value. 
 
After having thus inspected the data and clarified these issues I imported the data 
using a computer script designed for the purpose. I fetched and added the refusal 
rate and issued visas for each year and sending country. Then I calculated the 
number of visas applied for and refused based on the imported statistics. 
Afterwards, I randomly checked a set of the refusal rate figures. I also controlled 
that the sum total of visas issued in the database equals the sum in the original 
data. This control only revealed a deviation of 2 visas issued for 2006 relating to 
the excluded case of ‘Serbia’.  
 
In total the dataset includes 1.180 US entries (including two missing cases). 
 
5. Consular representation 
The information on consular services for visa-issuing purposes are stored in a 
single table structured as follows: 
 
Column name Data type Comments 
visaReprID Int - 
rcID Int 
Receiving country. FK reference to countries 
table 
scCityID Int 
Sending city. FK reference to countries_cities 
table 
dYear Int  
reprByRcID Int 
State representing the receiving country. FK 
reference to countries table 
ExtSerPro Tinyint 
External Service Provider involved 
(outsourcing) 
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The database contains data on the diplomatic representation of the Schengen 
states. It includes information on their use of cooperative agreements between 
them. For example, Denmark might process and issue visa applications on behalf 
of Norway in several sending countries. 
 
5.1 European Union (Schengen) 
I coded the diplomatic representation of the Schengen states drawing on 
overviews put together by the Council General Secretariat in different years 
(annex 18 tables to the Common Consular Instructions). With the recent entry into 
force of the European visa code the task of compiling the annex was transferred to 
the Commission, and hence data for 2011 and onwards are based on Commission 
overviews (annex 28 to the EC visa code Handbook). These files detail the cities 
where the member states have independent consular representation for visa-
issuing purposes, and where they rely on cooperative agreements with Schengen 
partner states. The pattern of diplomatic representation alters during years. I coded 
a consolidated version of the annex published in a given year as indicative of the 
representation pattern, but also made note of the precise date of the data so that it 
is possible to re-group otherwise where relevant. For example, in paper two I 
make use of a slightly different year coding.  
 
The coding was done in two steps. First, I converted the raw pdf data to excel and 
inspected the data for immediate conversion errors. Having done so, I went 
through detailed footnotes in the originals providing additional comments on 
individual cases. For example, a note might indicate that a representation 
agreement only last for a specific time period or that a consulate is currently not 
accepting visa applications. When an embassy was noted to be in practice closed 
or not accepting applications I registered this and did not import it as a case of 
visa representation. I removed notices on representation agreements if they lasted 
less than half of the year in question. When the Commission took over 
responsibility of the annex they also started to collect information on the cities 
where applications are processed in cooperation with a private company (‘external 
service provider’). I decided to also code this, as the outsourcing of the visa 
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process might be interesting for other researchers to explore. The list now also 
indicates cities where a member state does not have consular representation as 
such but the private firm has an office. I did not code these cases as instances of 
representation to ensure consistency with earlier years. 
 
In the second step I imported the information to the database making use of the 
automated computer script. In total, this process yielded 25.917 data instances of 
either independent or cooperative consular representation abroad. Of these, 6644 
also contain a coding of the use of private firms.
44
  
 
5.2 United Kingdom 
Information on the UK case is not contained in the overviews produced by the 
Commission and the Council. Data on the consular services of the United 
Kingdom are thus indirectly coded via the information on the visas issued. As this 
data is supplied by consulate it provides information on the diplomatic posts 
where the UK handles visa applications. And, reversely, it indicates where the UK 
is not represented for visa-issuing purposes.  
 
5.3 United States 
Information on US consular services is missing from the database. These cannot 
be inferred from the visa practice data as this is grouped per nationality and do not 
state in what country or city the applications were lodged. 
 
6. Visa policy and practice: Mobility Barriers Index 
The database contains a main mobility barriers table drawing together the 
information from the sub-tables on visa requirements, issuing practices and 
consular representation data for the different receiving countries. The content of 
this table is shown as default on the database website. The structure of this table is 
as follows: 
 
                                                 
44
 External service providers, the data indicates, is only used in 354 cases. They are, however, 
often involved in major sending countries such as Russia, Turkey, India and China. 
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Column name Data type Comments 
evdID Int Primary key (unique identifier) 
rcID Int 
Receiving country. FK reference to countries 
table 
scID Int 
Sending country. FK reference to countries 
table 
dYear Int  
rcSchMember Tinyint  
visaRequirement Tinyint  
rcReprType Int  
rcReprOthers Int  
rcReprByRcID Int 
Representing state. FK reference to countries 
table 
visaAppliedFor Int  
visaIssued Int  
visaRefused Int  
visaRefusalRate Decimal In percentage (%) 
mobBarIndex Int Mobility Barriers Index 
 
The analytical unit in the table is country-pairs in different years. It measures the 
mobility barrier of a receiving state towards a sending country in a given year. 
The table was put together in a series of step. I started out by adding the basic 
information countries and years. For the period 2005 to 2010 this yields 35.340 
observations. I then added on the information on visa requirements, issuing 
practice, consular representation and the mobility barrier index. After having done 
so, I corrected the table for missing data entries. For example, I made sure that the 
records accurately reflected that there is no data for the UK for 2009 and 2010. As 
a final step I coded cooperating countries as having the same refusal rate and 
mobility barrier. Excluding the missing cases the table contains 32.714 cases. The 
next sections describe in further detail the different variables contained in the 
table and how they were computed. 
 
Starting with the diplomatic representation, the “rcReprType” variable measures 
whether a receiving country has an embassy in a sending state, relies on a 
cooperative agreement or is not present at all in the location. If a state relied on 
both (for example had an own embassy in one city and cooperated in another) I 
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coded it as being independently represented. The “rcReprOthers” variables 
measure whether or not the receiving country represents partners in the sending 
state. Finally, the “rcReprByRcID” variable is used to identify what member state 
a receiving country is represented by. For the US I simply coded information on 
these dimensions as missing. I coded the UK as represented in states where it had 
processed visas. Reversely, I assumed that it had no representation in the countries 
were it did not process visas. I followed a similar logic for the countries only 
partially participating in Schengen.  
 
On the visa statistics, I aggregated the consular data to the country level where 
necessary. For example, I calculated the total number of visas applied for, issued 
and refused at all French consulates in China. These sums were then inserted in 
the table. Note that I also use these sums to calculate the refusal rate. That is, the 
refusal rate is not an average of the practice at the individual consulates in a state 
but for the sending country measured as a single unit. 
 
If a member state was represented by another, I coded the number of visas applied 
for, issued and refused as missing but copied over the refusal rate from the 
representing state. I thus assume that when countries share embassies their 
mobility barrier is the same. In the (few) situations where a receiving country was 
represented by more than one partner state in a sending country I selected one of 
them randomly. 
 
Moving on to the Mobility Barriers Index, the overall idea behind this indicator is 
to provide a single restrictiveness score for a country-pair in a year taking into 
account both visa requirements, issuing practices and consular representation. I set 
up the indicator as a four point scale ranging from no mobility barriers to low, 
medium and high.  
 
The index was constructed using the following rules. Firstly, if no visa 
requirement is in force I code the mobility barrier as none. Although the control at 
the territorial border is a hurdle to movement, it is here assumed to have a very 
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limited impact compared with the obligation to obtain a visa before even 
embarking on the trip.  
 
Secondly, if a visa requirement is in force I use the refusal rate to group a case as 
either one of a low, medium or high barrier. To do so, I first inspected the 
interquartile ranges in the dataset and used these as a starting-point for the 
classification. Here I only considered applications lodged in a visa-list country 
(EU, UK) or by nationals on a visa-list (US). The first range of observations in the 
dataset (0-25%) covers refusal rates from 0 to 4, the second and third (25-75%) 5 
to 21 and the fourth (75-100%) captures rates from 22 and above. I then decided 
to deviate a little from the interquartile ranges and use a more easily 
communicable range. I thus coded a refusal rate of below 5 as low, between 5 and 
20 as medium and above 20 as high. These values thus approximate but do not 
strictly follow the interquartile ranges. 
 
Thirdly, when receiving countries cooperated in a sending state by sharing 
consulates I coded them as having the same mobility barrier.  
 
Fourthly, if a receiving state was not represented at all in a sending country I 
coded the barrier as medium. It might be argued that this score should be higher. 
Why not code the impossibility of lodging a visa application as a high mobility 
barrier? I decided not to go this route as in several cases the absence of an 
embassy or consulate need not be a major obstacle to travel as applications can be 
forwarded and processed in a nearby state, and here issued leniently. Hence, the 
medium score is a compromise between this consideration and rival cases (such as 
Somalia, Sierra Leone) where the absence of a consulate could well be interpreted 
as a high barrier.  
 
A key feature, finally, of the index is that it tries to take into account the many 
options receiving states have for preventing applications from being lodged in the 
first place. It does so by comparing the actual number of visas applied for with a 
model estimate. If the application figures are very low, below 20% of estimated, it 
Mogens Hobolth 
  Page 206 of 244 
adds a penalty score to the index. For example, a score of “1” (low barrier) is 
lifted to “2” (medium). The model is simple so as to not bias later analytical result 
and ensure the transparency of the indicator. It only uses the population sizes of 
the receiving and sending countries, as well as the travel distance, to estimate 
application numbers. Adding on for example income (GDP per capita) to the 
model would undoubtedly increase explanatory purchase. But it would at the same 
time risk biasing later analytical results investigating how wealth influences 
mobility barriers. I ran the model as an ordinary linear regression analysis 
predicting the number of visas applied for based on the predictors. All the 
variables were transformed using the natural log to better approximate a normal 
distribution. This worked well for all variables but the size of the receiving 
countries. The distribution of this variable was not optimal. The regression only 
seeks to predict the amount of applications received for countries facing a visa 
requirement. The key results of the model are as follows: 
 
 
 
As shown in the table, the model has a good overall explanatory purchase (37%). 
All the predictors are significant at the 0,01 level. Let us look at a couple of 
examples. The regression predicts that Austria (population size 8,2 million) 
should receive about 3.600 applications from Albania (3,1 million) with a travel 
distance of approximately 800 kilometres. In practice, Austria received on average 
3.800 applications annually. A contrasting case is Germany in Iraq in 2005. Here 
Standardized 
Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta
Lower 
Bound
Upper 
Bound
Constant 5,60 0,23 23,89 0,00 5,14 6,06
Population size (sending country) (ln) 0,47 0,01 0,44 41,58 0,00 0,45 0,49
Population size (receiving country) (ln) 0,78 0,01 0,59 52,87 0,00 0,75 0,81
Travel distance (ln) -1,23 0,03 -0,51 -47,55 0,00 -1,28 -1,18
Estimating the number of visas applied for
Notes: r square = 37%, n = 6.806
Table 1
Main model
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
t Sig.
95,0% Confidence 
Interval for B
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the model predicts about 11.000 visa requests annually yet only 1.100 was 
received this year. In general, the regression identifies cases of few applications 
across most sending countries. The instances with very low figures concentrate, 
however, in a set of countries such as Algeria, Zimbabwe, Pakistan, Nigeria, Iraq 
and Afghanistan. 
 
I checked the stability of the coefficients, significance levels and model 
explanatory purchase (r
2
) by running the same model separately for all available 
combinations of receiving countries and years. For some states (Iceland, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovenia) the number of observations per 
year was too low to carry out such an analysis. In total, I ran 123 separate 
regressions checking for changes in significance levels and shifts in the direction 
of the coefficients. Doing so identified, first and foremost, that the Portuguese 
application figures are not captured by the indicators. They are not significant and 
the effect of sending country population size even drops slightly below zero. In 
the case of Slovakia size was not significant in any years. For the remainder, there 
were four years where population size dropped out as insignificant and seven 
where distance did the same. Thus, in terms of significance levels and the 
direction of effects the predictors are very stable. Turning to the explanatory 
purchase of the model we do see some variation. In most cases the r
2 
is between 
30 and 50%. The model is particularly strong in the case of the US (r
2
 = 66%). At 
the bottom end we find Spain, the UK and the Netherlands (r
2
 = 18-23%).  
 
The overall size of the coefficients did not, at least apparently, vary. However, as 
the variables are measured on a logarithmic scale small changes can have a major 
impact. Minor alterations matter a lot for small countries but less so for larger 
ones.  
 
Still, a relatively strong and transparent model I used it to identify the cases where 
the model estimate is much higher than the applications actually received. I 
assigned a penalty score when the number of visa application received was below 
20% of the estimated. This should ensure that the ability of destination states to 
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prevent applications from being lodged is adequately captured.  Where to draw 
the line is of course debatable. 
 
A closer look at the cases where the index score was adjusted reveals a set of 
interesting patterns. Firstly, two main sending countries where the barrier index is 
moved upward are Burma and North Korea. Other key cases are Zimbabwe, 
Afghanistan and Tunisia. The first two suggests that the model also captures cases 
where it might be debatable to what extent the barrier is due to policies and 
practices of the receiving or sending countries. In these two states exit is tightly 
controlled by the sending state governments. In terms of receiving countries, the 
adjustment affects the observations from Romania and Poland far more than for 
other states. This implies that these states make more use of the options for 
preventing applications being lodged in the first place than other receiving states. 
It could also reflect that the shared model is not well adapted to these cases. That 
is, the coefficients are not so well-suited to capture the dynamics of these cases.  
 
7. Equations 
 
7.1 European Union (Schengen) 
 
( )                                                      
 
( )                                            
 
( )                              
 
( )             
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7.2 United Kingdom 
 
( )               
                        
                                
 
 
Note 1: Calculation is based on ‘visit’ visas (2001-2004) and family plus other 
(2005-2008) 
Note 2: Data on withdrawn and lapsed only available from 2006 and onwards. 
 
7.3 United States 
 
( )             
                
                       
 
 
( )                     
      
   
            
   
 
 
( )                                     
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8. Database diagram 
The diagram below is a technical overview of the structure of the database 
(referred to as an ‘E-R’ diagram). This version mainly shows the data-columns 
that are used to cross-reference the content in one table with another. For example, 
the figure highlights that the table ‘visaPractice_EU’ is linked with the countries 
table (for identifying the receiving country) and the table over cities in different 
countries (for identifying the location of the diplomatic post).  
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